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ABSTRACT 
 
Making Sense of Judicial Sensemaking:  
A Study of Rhetorical Discursive Interaction at the Supreme Court of the United States.  
(May 2010) 
Ryan Allen Malphurs, B.A., Regis University;  
M.A. Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James Arnt Aune 
 
  This dissertation engages previous research in political science and psychology 
by arguing for the importance of oral arguments from a communication perspective, 
examining justices’ rhetorical discursive interaction in oral arguments, introducing 
Sensemaking as a new model of judicial decision making, and discussing the legal and 
cultural impact of justices’ rhetorical discursive interaction in Morse v. Frederick, 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, and District of Columbia v. Heller.  In contrast to the aggregate 
behavioral models and longitudinal studies conducted by political scientists and 
psychologists, this study examines these specific cases in order to gauge each justice’s 
individual interaction in oral argument and to determine how certain justices may have 
controlled the discursive flow of information within oral arguments, which in turn may 
have influenced the Court’s decision making ability. 
 The dissertation begins with an introduction, providing an overview of the 
development and study of legal rhetoric from the Greeks to present day.  A review of 
 
iv 
 
prior literature in law, political science, and psychology displays how fields outside of 
communication view oral arguments and reveals where communication may provide 
valuable contributions to the study of Supreme Court oral arguments.  Theoretical and 
methodological approaches adopted for the study of oral arguments are discussed.  
Analysis within the dissertation begins with an overview of the inherent complexity 
found within oral arguments and applies the previously discussed theoretical and 
methodological approaches to the case of Morse v. Frederick as a means of determining 
theoretical and methodological validity.  Following analysis of Morse v. Frederick, a 
second case, Kennedy v. Louisiana is analyzed to determine if similar results will occur.  
Final consideration is given to a third case, District of Columbia v. Heller, to understand 
whether justices’ behavior may deviate in more socially and politically sensitive cases.  
The dissertation concludes with suggestions for lawyers and judges based upon this 
study’s findings and makes recommendations to scholars for further areas of research.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL RHETORIC 
AND SUPREME COURT ORAL ARGUMENTS 
I think it is extraordinary these days the tremendous disconnect between the legal 
academy and the legal profession. … They occupy two different universes.  What the 
academy is doing is of no particular use to people who practice law. 
 –Chief Justice John Roberts1 
 
Dear Chief Justice, 
It may appear unusual that an entire work be directed towards a single individual, 
but my scholarship in this text will have the greatest impact upon the Court if you take 
seriously some of the findings in this study and seek to correct the imbalance in 
communicative interactions between justices and lawyers at oral argument.  At the very 
least, a shift in the current style will better reflect upon audiences the serious 
consideration and measured justice with which the Court scrutinizes each case.  While 
lawyers, judges, and legal scholars will find unique insights and beneficial suggestions 
within this study, as Chief Justice, you have the ability to influence directly the 
communicative interactions between lawyers and justices.  I have witnessed you prevent 
justices from asking questions in order to allow a lawyer to finish their response, and I 
have also observed you end an oral argument as another justice was leaning forward to 
ask a question.  Your substantial power within the rhetorical environment of oral 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of the Quarterly Journal of Speech. 
1 John Roberts, “Supreme Court Interview” www.Lawprose.org  
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argument can greatly affect the manner in which other justices understand and evaluate a 
case.   
Frequently in oral argument, justices who dominate the interaction may prevent 
less active justices from posing important questions to advocates, and more importantly, 
having their questions answered.  Your position should ensure the opportunity for each 
justice to have their questions properly responded to by advocates.  We should expect 
oral argument to be a site where all the justices may have important lingering questions 
resolved by advocates.  At the very minimum, oral arguments should reflect a balanced 
and fair treatment for advocates on each side, particularly because the public observers, 
upon which the Court’s authority rests, should respect the equal attention and care you 
give to every case and each counsel.  Some cases draw greater attention in oral argument 
from the justices than other cases, but those cases which attract significant social and 
political attention tend to foster vigorous and sometimes unbalanced interactions.  Of 
course the irony is that these significant social and political cases require the most 
careful and balanced scrutiny both because of the public’s interest in the case, as well as 
the larger reaching social implications of the Court’s ruling.  The people have a right to 
expect balanced consideration of both sides of a case, particularly when the Court’s 
decision will have wide spread influence upon the American people.  In the past, I 
realize oral argument has been characterized as a dialogue among the justices, but this 
singular purpose overlooks the many purposes each justice, lawyer, and audience 
member brings to the case.  Within dialogues each actor may have multiple purposes 
within the engagement, and one can imagine that with nine justices and two advocates, 
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at the very least a multiplicity or purposes exist.  This study will foreground a number of 
an actor’s purposes that can be found in oral argument.  As an important component of 
the justices’ decision making process, of a lawyer’s representation of a case, and of the 
public’s regard for the Court, oral argument requires that you pay a strict level of 
attention to the communicative interaction between justices and advocates.             
 Your charge at the opening of this work suggests the impractical nature of the 
academy’s research.  Admittedly not all legal scholars design their research to contribute 
pragmatically to the practice of law, but many do, and yet academics also suffer from the 
disparagement of public officials, who ignore their rich and pragmatic scholarship, and 
thus the reverse of your critique holds true.  We must not ignore each other.  I have 
attempted to capture and lay forth the complex dynamics found within oral argument in 
a manner that reveals the serious and influential nature oral arguments play in the 
judicial decision making process.  I hope you find my scholarship both interesting and 
useful in your approach to oral arguments.  And to those lawyers, judges, law students, 
or legal scholars, reading at this time, I also hope that you discover information that 
proves useful, because I have designed this study to act as both a contribution to 
knowledge in the field of legal scholarship, as well as to provide pragmatic suggestions 
based upon my findings.  Of course the influential nature of my research depends upon 
my persuasiveness, so without continuing further, I will let the text speak for itself.  “Mr. 
Chief Justice and may it please the Court …” .    
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Rhetoric and Oral Argument 
Rhetoric and Oral Argument before the Supreme Court are topics well suited for 
one another, but few scholars have written academic articles about oral argument from a 
rhetorical perspective.  In fact only two journals in the field of Communication even 
address the issue of oral argument before the Court, and those two articles were written 
by political scientists describing the various functions oral argument serves for justices.2  
Other scholars in Political Science, Psychology, and Law have written extensively on the 
topic of oral argument, but scholars in Communication, and rhetorical studies in 
particular, have largely ignored the topic.  The lack of research from Communication 
scholars may be due to the prior inaccessibility of the Court’s proceedings.  Unlike 
televised presidential speeches or Congressional debates, the communicative interaction 
within the Court’s oral arguments could only be experienced in person, requiring 
scholars to travel to the Court during its limited schedule.  Transcripts have been 
available for quite some time, but lack any attention to the tone and emotion of 
statements, which can make it difficult for readers to discern sarcasm from good natured 
joking.  Only recently, has an organization called Oyez.org posted audio files online 
where researchers can listen to the debates.  Audio files of oral arguments provide a 
better insight into the communicative process, but scholars still lack the non-verbal 
behavior between the justices and the advocates.  Accessibility proves a key difficulty in 
examining oral arguments from a rhetorical perspective, but technology is slowly 
                                                 
2 See Stephen Wasby, Anthony D’Amato, and Rosemary Metrailer, “The Functions of Oral Argument in 
the U.S. Supreme Court” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 62 (1976): 410-422.;  Milton Dickens and Ruth 
E. Schwartz, “Oral Argument before the Supreme Court: Marshall v. Davis,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 57.1 (1971): 32- 42. 
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removing prior barriers and it will only be a matter of time before cameras are allowed 
into the Courtroom to capture major case proceedings. 
This dissertation has taken advantage of technological innovations, and first hand 
observation to provide a new perspective through a rhetorical study of oral arguments 
based upon assumptions in the field of Communication. My dissertation seeks to engage 
previous research in Political Science and Psychology by arguing for the importance of 
oral arguments from a communication perspective, examining justices’ rhetorical 
discursive interaction in oral arguments, introducing Sensemaking as a new model of 
judicial decision making, and discussing the legal and cultural impact of justices’ 
rhetorical discursive interaction in Morse v. Frederick, Kennedy v. Louisiana, and Heller 
v. District of Columbia.  In contrast to the aggregate behavioral models and longitudinal 
studies conducted by political scientists and psychologists, my dissertation will examine 
these specific cases, in order to gauge each justice’s individual interaction in oral 
argument, and to determine how certain justices may have controlled the discursive flow 
of information within the oral arguments. 
Although the popular understanding of “rhetoric” used by media and political 
pundits refers to deceitful or insincere communication, this cultural position ignores the 
noble conception of rhetoric lauded and theorized by Aristotle, Cicero, St. Augustine, Sir 
Francis Bacon, and other prominent thinkers.  Scholars have long considered rhetoric an 
essential tool for communicating and arguing a position, and a particularly useful art for 
law.  At its essence the study of rhetoric focuses on persuasion; Aristotle called the study 
of rhetoric “an ability, in each particular case, to see the available means of 
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persuasion.”3   For Aristotle rhetoric was both a method, or technique with no particular 
subject, as well as a practical art.4  He divided his study of rhetoric into three classes 
which he called epideictic, forensic, and deliberative.  Epideictic rhetoric emphasized 
praise or blame concerning a subject, while deliberative rhetoric examined whether 
political actions should or should not be adopted.  Forensic or legal rhetoric evaluate
the truth and falsity of past events and highlights the role of persuasion in the courtroom
Aristotle’s categories present one of the earliest considerations of legal rhetoric an
provides a specific concern for legal rhetoric that distinguishes it from other rhetorical 
forms.   
 W
d 
.  
d he 
hile historically rhetoric and law have been intimately connected, the Supreme 
es, 
areas 
, 
 
  
                                                
Court’s modern day oral argument has been the result of developments in the legal field 
spanning thousands of years.  In contemporary terms, “legal rhetoric” broadly 
encompasses judicial opinions, jury judgments, the speech of lawyers and judg
historical discussions of law, legal theories, federal and state laws, as well as other 
of legal scholarship.  To focus on the development of legal rhetoric in its movement 
towards oral argument before the Supreme Court, the following historical overview 
emphasizes a Western legal tradition, due to the Court’s ties to English Common Law
and foregrounds the evolution of laws, and the language of lawyers and judges, because
rhetoric is both method and practical in the laws judges and lawyers generate.  
 
3Aristotle. On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. Trans. George Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991) 
37.  
4 For more on Aristotle’s general view of rhetoric see George Kennedy’s introduction in On Rhetoric.  
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 Historical Contributors  
 As an institution the Supreme Court has resulted from thousands of year
tradition.  In the Supreme C
s of legal 
ourt’s courtroom, figures of Hammurabi, Moses, Justinian, 
blished a tradition that serves as the 
founda  
 
iberative 
ries 
ive 
 
                                                
Muhammad, and other historical characters are depicted in friezes to recognize their 
historical contribution to law which has contributed to the creation of the Supreme 
Court.  The Court’s Greco-Roman architecture reflects its debt to Greek and Roman 
culture, the birthplace of two legal traditions that dominate American, British, and 
European conceptions of law.  Tracing the development of laws and legal rhetoric 
provides a historical understanding of the central role legal rhetoric played across 
Western cultures and at the Supreme Court.    
Greek and Roman traditions figure most prominently into the Court’s 
architecture, but ideologically the cultures esta
tion of the American legal system.  Greeks understood law as a process
conferring general benefits to the people which served as a mediating force between
humans of equal status.5  Two forms of justice existed with Greek society.  Del
justice was established by legislators, while corrective justice was handed down by ju
and judges, similar to our own justice system.  Either form of justice rested on a social 
contract between the state and individual, morally obligating citizens to follow the 
state’s laws and take an active role in participating in Greek civic life.  J.M. Kelly 
suggests that the Greek’s concept of social contract “foreshadowed the most pervas
and most fruitful of European political and legal theories” through Locke’s own 
expansion upon “the idea that submission to government and law, the fundamental civic
 
5 Greeks extended legal rights to males and restricted the legal rights of women, foreigners, and slaves.  
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duty, rests on supposed agreement to which the individual citizen remains by implication 
a party.”6  In order to successfully traverse the relationship between individual and 
government in Greek life, citizens studied rhetoric for the public speaking roles they 
were expected to engage in. Knowledge of legal rhetorical principles was crucial 
because Greek citizens were expected to represent and argue their positions before jur
and judges occupying the government’s role as governor and mediator.   
The active role legal rhetoric played in Greek life elevated the importance of its 
development.  The Greeks first established and articulated ideas of what w
ies 
e now know 
as “due  
ility 
t of 
th 
y of 
                                                
 process of law.”  Under due process every person, even rulers, fell subject to the
rule of law, and these laws articulated specific procedures that were guaranteed to 
citizens as a way of obtaining justice for society.  The egalitarian approach to the 
development of justice and laws drew the Greek’s attention to the equity and flexib
of laws, or what has become known as the division between the letter and the spiri
the law.  Interpreting laws within social contexts raised questions about the role of 
punishment.  Punishment required a consideration of the transgressor’s intent and 
whether punishment should be corrective or a form of deterrence.  But in order to 
understand what form of punishment should be prescribed, Greeks believed that bo
sides of a case should be heard.  Within Greek society, legal rhetoric informed man
our contemporary understandings of our own justice system, such as our right to due 
 
6 J.M. Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory: sustainable diversity in the law. (Oxford: 
Clarendon press, 1992) 14.  
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process, debates about the letter or spirit of the law, the purpose and application of 
punishment, as well as the tradition of hearing both sides of a case.7 
Aristotle believed that knowledge of legal rhetoric was essential to Greek life.  
His wo
 
versal 
or 
 
elt 
nceptions and Greek laws, the Romans contributed a 
great d
                                                
rk On Rhetoric provides a variety of legal arguments speakers may employ in a 
variety of situations and he understood legal rhetoric to be concerned primarily with a 
person’s guilt or innocence in a previous event.  For Aristotle, law formed and shaped 
states’ virtues that in turn cultivated individuals’ morals.  Legal rhetoric was employed 
to mediate the relationship between individuals and the relationship between individuals
and the state.  Individual’s actions, Aristotle theorized, could be classified as just or 
unjust based the law and those affected.  He divided laws into those that were 
“universal” or natural laws and laws that were “particular” or state based.  Uni
laws articulated behavior that all humans should follow and were pervasive across 
civilizations.  Particular laws varied between states and were unique to that culture 
society.  Aristotle also identified that both a community and individual could harm 
through injustice, and the severity of an action, and thus the punishment, could vary
depending on the circumstances of harm.  His teachings provide the first systematic 
exploration of legal rhetoric, painting a noble and practical picture of an art form he f
was essential to Greek life.        
Building on Aristotle’s co
eal to the development of laws and legal rhetoric, largely by establishing the 
lawyer as a legal profession.  While Greek laws derived from philosophical 
 
7For an expanded  discussion see Kelly A Short History of Western Legal Theory.   
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considerations of the role of law and justice, Romans approached the law wit
pragmatic considerations, exempting rulers from following laws, using legislators to 
establish laws, and relying on praetors or judges to determine how laws should be 
applied.  According to H. Patrick Glenn’s Legal Traditions of the World, Romans’ 
concern with practical matters contributed to our own development of contract law 
areas such as private ownership, trusts, mortgages, bailment, leases, partnerships, and 
liability.  Because Roman law provided “governance of complex personal relationships
it became “an object of admiration.”
h more 
in 
,” 
 
a 
cero and Quintilian largely expanded on Aristotle’s 
concep  
ion, 
n 
                                                
8  Romans systematic approach to laws resulted in 
the compilation of Roman laws called the “12 Statues” which codified already existing 
traditions within Roman culture.  The 12 statues provided all citizens with a basis of 
appropriate conduct and served as the first example of codified law which would later
inform the Napoleonic Code and provide the foundation for Europe’s Civil Law legal 
system.  In addition to these substantial contributions, the emperor Justinian compiled 
list of judicial opinions to give guidance to judges for how laws should be properly 
interpreted and applied.   
Roman scholars Ci
tions of legal rhetoric, but contributed in their own unique ways.  Cicero
expanded legal rhetoric’s audience by writing down his legal theory for distribut
facilitating the sharing of ideas and exposing new audiences to legal theory.  Quintilia
emphasized the ideal nature of law and its transformative ability by which the just man 
could restore justice and prominence to his country.  Quintilian’s optimistic view of 
 
8 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004) 120.  
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legal rhetoric likely arose from the chaotic environment in Rome that resulted from th
rise and fall of six emperors.  The chaotic environment of the Roman empire caused 
even greater chaos in Roman territories where conquered peoples were suddenly left 
without the guiding principles of the Roman empire and forced to establish their own 
laws.
e 
an invasion spawned what is now recognized as the 
Comm m to 
ed 
m the 
ar connections to Greek, Roman, and English legal 
traditio
urt’s 
                                                
9  
In England, the Norm
on law system because ruling nobles were forced to develop a judicial syste
maintain order in local populations.  Nobles appointed judges to be responsible for 
maintaining order, and jurisdiction, while juries composed of townspeople determin
the judgment and sentence of fellow transgressors.  Local lawyers began relying on 
juries’ previous decisions to establish precedent as a persuasive means of ruling in a 
case.  Successful lawyers would often draw on juries’ rulings from other towns to 
persuade juries to follow a similar ruling.  Our own court system draws heavily fro
patterns established by Norman nobles.10   
Development of Oral Argument   
The Supreme Court bears cle
ns by relying on a common law tradition that seeks to interpret legal codes 
established by legislatures and states.  Legal rhetoric has been at the heart of the Co
historical and intellectual development but comparatively few scholars pay attention to 
 
9  For more on Cicero and Quintillian see Patricia Blizell and Bruce Herzberg, Eds. The Rhetorical 
Tradition (New York: Bedford St. Martin, 2000).  
10 For an extended discussion see Kelly’s A Short History of Western Legal Theory and Glenn’s Legal 
Traditions of the World.  
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the contemporary role legal rhetoric plays in the Court’s primary ritual of oral argument.
The rhetorical art of oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States has 
shifted dramatically from the artful and poignant days of Daniel Webster’s arguments t
the contemporary intellectual whirlwind designated by a flurry of thrusts and parries.  
Over the past two hundred years, the Supreme Court’s conduct of oral argument has 
significantly transitioned from the Court’s early days in which multiple lawyers could
argue cases for days, to the current model in which lawyers on each side typically 
receive only thirty minutes for their case. 
  
o 
 
 Appellate Advocacy traces the evolution 
and im
sed 
mmon law 
                                                
11   
David Frederick’s Supreme Court and
portance of oral argument throughout the Court’s history.  In 1791 significant 
“uncertainty among practitioners” resulted from the Court’s early position, which cau
the Court to issue a statement noting “that this court considers the practice of the court’s 
of King’s bench, and of chancery in England, as affording outlines for practice of this 
court; and that they will from time to time, make such alterations therein as 
circumstances may render necessary.”12  Originally following the English co
tradition of oral argument at the King’s Bench, the Supreme Court historically relied on 
lawyers to provide them with the information and facts of a case within oral argument.  
The material oral presentations to a judge were designed to “diminish the possibility of 
 
11Oral argument for Gibbons v. Ogden lasted 20 hours and spanned five days, while McCullough v. 
Maryland had six arguing advocates. 
12David Frederick, Supreme Court and Appellate Advocacy: Mastering Oral Argument (New York: West, 
2002) 15.;  Supreme Court rule VII, issued 8/1791. 
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out-of-court influence.”13  Similar to the King’s Bench, oral argument heavily 
influenced the Court because it was largely the only opportunity through which justic
learned about a case’s details which would in turn impact a justice’s vote.  A lawyer
oral argument often served as the only information justices used to decide cases.  Today 
this seems highly unusual given the Court’s requests for written briefs, but the reliance 
upon written briefs was a slow process and began a slow diminishment in the central role
oral argument once played
es 
’s 
 
.    
                                                
In the late 1700s and early 1800s, justices did not impose time limits because 
they believed lawyers should have the necessary time to serve their client’s needs.  Wide 
discretion caused oral arguments to often drift away from the topic at hand.  One can 
imagine the difficult task lawyers were charged with in maintaining the justices’ 
attention while expounding the necessary details of a case over the course of a few days.  
Likewise, justices must have struggled to remain attentive during days or even weeks of 
a lawyer’s argument.  The transmission and consideration of a case’s details through the 
process of oral argument were less than ideal.  Because of humans’ poor attention span, 
tendency to mentally wander, and lawyers’ meandering arguments, written briefs proved 
easier to follow than a lawyer’s oral arguments.  In 1833 the Court allowed written briefs 
to accompany a lawyer’s oral arguments noting “the court will receive printed 
arguments, if the Counsel on either or both sides shall choose.”14  The allowance of 
written briefs began the movement towards significantly diminishing the presence and 
 
13 Frederick, Supreme Court, 16. 
14 Supreme Court rule XL issued 1/1833. 
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importance of oral argument within Supreme Court cases, shifting away from “the long 
pedantic orations that had marked Supreme Court practice up to that time.”15   
As the nation grew, so too did the Court’s workload.  Justices were forced to develop 
procedures through which they could process the ever growing case load.  Justices began 
relying on written briefs by which they could more conveniently and efficiently weigh 
the arguments at hand.  Written briefs also helped to supplement oral arguments by 
reminding justices of a lawyer’s arguments and highlighting important details.  In the 
early 1800s, oral arguments still played a central role in the Court’s consideration of a 
case.  However, in 1849 the Court limited oral arguments to two hours and required 
lawyers to submit written briefs beforehand.16  Written briefs expedited justices’ 
introduction to a case’s arguments and allowed oral argument to be employed more 
efficiently to clear up any ambiguities in the case and answer any questions justices 
might have.  The primary introduction of arguments and facts came about through a 
case’s brief, and oral argument, while necessary, assumed a secondary supporting role.  
Finally, in 1970 the Supreme Court established the current rule in which each counsel is 
accorded 30 minutes.17  The change in oral argument time developed from the Court’s 
experience with their summary calendar, which limited cases placed on the summary 
calendar to one hour.  The justices found that the issues in most cases could be 
                                                 
15 Frederick, Supreme Court, 23. 
16 Supreme Court rule 53 (issued 1/1849)  and rule 58 (12/1850).   
17 Supreme Court rule 28 (issued 5/1999).  
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adequately addressed within a one hour time span.18  As a consequence of restricting 
oral arguments, the art of oral argument before the Supreme Court transitioned from 
lawyers presenting the facts and argument’s of a case to lawyers “clarify[ing] and 
emphasiz[ing] what has been written,” thereby “boiling a case down to its essence.”19 
Today’s lawyers now approach oral argumentation as an opportunity to highlight the 
crucial elements from which the case should be decided. 
                                                
The changes in oral argument resulted from a tradition shifting away from orality 
to written arguments, and a shift in power from lawyers to judges in their control of 
information in their arguments.  The evolution has primarily occurred because of the 
Court’s overwhelming workload.  In recent years the Court has had over 9,000 cases on 
the docket submitted for review and only hears arguments in about 70 cases a year.  
Simply as a means of bureaucratic efficiency the Court must rely on lawyers’ written 
arguments through petitions, and writ certioraris, before ever granting oral argument.  
The oral argument itself has shifted from the presentation of information to a 
clarification and rigorous test of the lawyer’s position by the justices.  Instead of oral 
argumentation serving the lawyer’s purpose, justices often use the time to raise their own 
questions and challenges concerning the case.   
 
 
 
18 See Robert L. Stern, Eugene Gressman, Stephen M. Shapiro, and Kenneth Geller, Supreme Court 
Practice: For Practice in the Supreme Court of the United States (Washington Bureau of National Affairs 
2002) 672. 
19 Ruggero Aldisert, Winning on Appeal: Better Briefs and Oral Argument  (South Bend: Notre Dame Law 
School, 2003) 31.; David C. Frederick, Supreme Court, 9. 
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Modern Oral Argument 
The American art of oral argumentation has changed dramatically from its 
inception in the 1790s.20  But now, perhaps more than ever, it is crucial to have a lawyer 
successfully navigate the intellectual gauntlet justices throw before them; because in 30 
minutes, litigants must address questions from all nine justices, with incessant 
interruptions, and still attempt to foreground the crucial issue on which justices should 
make their decision.  The intellectual environment of oral argument makes it one of the 
most difficult rhetorical skills anyone could perform.  David Frederick, who at this 
writing has argued more than 30 cases before the Court, noted that  
contextual dynamics put a high premium on the advocate’s nimbleness and 
mental agility in maintaining focus on the main points to present and in fending 
off hostile questions that threaten to undermine the case … argument often seems 
as though it is a series of sound bytes, strung together amid frequent interruptions 
from the bench.  The intensity level of a typical Supreme Court or court of 
appeals is great.21 
     
Despite the intellectual intensity in oral argument, advocates relish the opportunity to 
argue before the Court.  Frederick suggests that the “reward” of oral argument lies in 
“the thrill of being alone in the well of a court composed of some of the smartest humans 
on Earth, the satisfaction of passing an exacting and demanding test of personal skill and 
fortitude, and the honor of playing at least a small part in the development of the law.”22  
Justice Ginsburg has also remarked about her first oral argument in which  
                                                 
20 For a more comprehensive discussion see David Frederick, Supreme Court, 14-49; David M. O’Brien, 
Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics 7th ed. (New York: Norton, 2005); Robert Stern, et 
al., Supreme Court Practice. 
21 Frederick, Supreme Court, 49.  
22 Frederick, Supreme Court, 13. 
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I looked up at the bench and experienced a feeling of extraordinary power.  There 
sat nine top judges in the land.  They had no place to go.  They were my captive 
audience for the next several minutes.  Then a teacher by trade, I relished the 
opportunity to persuade them that my cause was just, my legal argument sound.23 
   
Both Frederick and Ginsburg’s comments resonate with the experiences of other novice 
advocates and reflect the comments of other lawyers who have argued before the Court.  
When leaving the Courtroom it was common for arguing advocates to be asked by 
family and friends about their feelings regarding the experience.  All advocates 
mentioned both the honor as well as the intellectual rush they felt when presenting 
before the justices.  One attorney likened the experience to delivering a sermon in church 
and remarked that he would love to argue again before the Court.  Arguing before the 
Supreme Court is a coveted honor within the legal community and has become a coveted 
opportunity for advocates.  Reappearing advocates often work cases pro bono and when 
cases are first granted certiorari by the Court, phone calls from various lawyers offering 
pro bono services bombard petitioners and respondents.      
Since so much honor and excitement are involved with an advocate arguing 
before the Court, it is ironic that so few advocates argue skillfully.  It also seems ironic 
that law schools spend little time on developing their student’s rhetorical skills, 
particularly when lawyers arguing cases before the Supreme Court or other appellate 
courts face significant oratorical challenges which require extensive skills in delivery 
and argumentation to persuade justices.  Noting the irony of this situation, Raymond 
Walkins suggests that while “appellate argument is a common occurrence and represents 
                                                 
23 Ruth Bader Ginsburg.  Intro. Supreme Court and Appellate Advocacy: Mastering Oral Argument by 
David Frederick (New York: West, 2002) vii.  
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the culminating competitive effort in the legal contest, it is probably a fact that this is the 
least qualitative accomplishment of the bar as a whole.”24  The lack of preparation has 
resulted in justices remarking that “four out of every five arguments” they listen to are 
“not good” or “far below what it could be,” furthermore justices have been “astonished” 
by the “number of disappointing arguments to which courts listen.”25  Justice Douglas 
has also remarked on the poor quality of advocates who appear before the Court noting 
“few truly good advocates have appeared before the Court.  In my time, 40 percent were 
incompetent.  Only a few were excellent.”26   
Personal observations of nearly forty Supreme Court oral arguments also 
revealed advocates’ poor skills in delivery and argumentation.  At the height of 
argumentation and delivery, when one would expect lawyers to perform at the greatest 
level of articulation and persuasion, most lawyers struggled to foreground crucial and 
essential elements of their cases.  My observations resonate with those of previous 
scholars.  In Anthony Lewis’ The Supreme Court and How It Works, he notes that 
“considering how important oral arguments can be, it is sad to say that most of them are 
badly done.  Lawyers appearing before the Supreme Court are frequently nervous, 
                                                 
24 Raymond S. Wilkins, “The Argument of an Appeal,” Advocacy and the King’s English. Ed. George 
Rossman (Bobbs-Merrill 1960): 277.   
25 Frederick Bernays Wiener, “Oral Advocacy,” Harvard Law Review 62 (1948) 56.; Warren E. Burger, 
quoted in Timothy Robinson “Attorneys’ Standards Eyed Here” The Washington Post. June 4th, 1975.; 
John M Harlan. “What Part Does Oral Argument Play in the Conduct of an Appeal?,” Cornell Law 
Quarterly (1955)11.  
26 Myron H. Bright, “The Ten Commandments of Oral Argument,” American Bar Association Journal. 67 
(1981) 1136.  
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unprepared, or worst of all, overconfident.”27  Former Supreme Court law clerk, Edward 
Lazarus, echoes a similar sentiment describing “much of the advocacy before Court” as 
“mediocre and some downright contemptible.”28  In the cases I observed, many lawyers 
stumbled and stammered their way through various questions posed to them by justices, 
often losing a valuable opportunity of persuasion by failing to clearly address, respond 
to, or shift a justice’s challenging question to more advantageous territory.  Other 
lawyers could not respond and did not seem prepared for justices’ hypotheticals.   
Most surprisingly, a large number of advocates at the opening of their argument failed to 
provide a concise statement highlighting the crucial elements of their brief.  Often called 
a “mapping statement,” a brief opening statement that foregrounds the primary points 
you plan to address prepares audiences and enables them to recall arguments.  The top 
advocates I observed all used mapping statements and articulated their points within two 
minutes.  Other advocates attempted similar feats, but failed to move succinctly through 
their points, tangling themselves in smaller arguments, or attempting to explicate too 
many points.  Justices will grant arguing counsel in between a minute and two minutes 
to layout their argument before they begin to interrupt with questions.  After the justices 
begin their questioning, it is very difficult to finish articulating essential points to one’s 
case.  While top advocates incorporated simple techniques in the case I observed, their 
overall delivery and rhetorical styles caused them to stand apart from other lawyers.  The 
top advocates’ skills resulted in a performance in which “nothing [could] equal the 
                                                 
27 Anthony Lewis, The Supreme Court and How It Works. (Library binding, 1966) 125-126.  
28 Edward Lazarus, Closed Chambers. P.34, 1999.  
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experience of seeing the great advocates at work in the courts and catching the magic of 
the spoken word, for it [was] not so much what [was] said but the manner in which it 
[was] said that matters.”29       
While it is certain that Supreme Court oral argumentation is an incredibly 
difficult skill and requires an intelligent skillful speaker, justices do not expect lawyers 
to emulate Cicero, but rather expect lawyers’ argument to include basic public speaking 
principles.  Justice Scalia and Bryan A. Garner’s new work Making Your Case reads like 
an undergraduate public speaking textbook and includes such profound topics as “know 
your audience,” “never read an argument,” “never memorize an argument,” and “don’t 
chew your fingernails.”  While I needle the great needler, Scalia and Garner’s work 
results from the lack of skilled advocates who appear before the Court.  A Supreme 
Court justice’s book articulating basic public speaking principles is evidence enough that 
many of the advocates appearing before the Court are not prepared to handle the 
intellectual rigors of oral argument.   
In order to raise the rhetorical skills of advocates before the Court, law schools at 
Georgetown and Stanford have both created Supreme Court Institutes which assist 
lawyers in preparing and practicing their oral arguments.  Georgetown’s Supreme Court 
Institute has elevated the quality of advocates’ arguing before the Court, but rarely 
provides feedback regarding an advocate’s delivery, focusing instead on the articulation 
of clear legal principles.   Georgetown has done an impressive job of replicating the 
interior Courtroom and famous advocates such as David Frederick, Tom Goldstein, and 
                                                 
29 Lord Birkett, Six Great Advocates (New York: Penguin, 1961) 107.   
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Miguel Estrada assume the coveted roles of Supreme Court justices, intellectually 
grappling with the arguing attorney.  The exchange and development of arguments 
between advocates and “justices” enables counsels to reduce their case to its essence and 
articulate the fundamental concepts upon which their case depends.  Guidance in 
rhetorical delivery can grow problematic because, as one attorney explained, critiquing 
an advocate’s manner of speaking cannot be remedied within a week before oral 
arguments, often when Georgetown’s SCI hears a counsel’s argument.  The lawyer 
further explained that advocates may also take such criticism personally and it may do 
more to hinder the group’s suggestions rather than assisting it.  While the attorney’s 
insights seemed reasonable, a handful of simple suggestions could have assisted the 
advocate in fending off the justices attacks.30  Most attorneys’ lack of experience with 
the Court, and the success of repeat counsels before the Court has led to a niche forming 
of highly experienced lawyers in Washington D.C.  In observing oral arguments, there is 
a substantial difference between experienced and inexperienced counsels.  Experienced 
counsels often are more confident and take more liberties with the justices than novices, 
most likely due to their substantial experience before the Court.31  Counsels’ with 
significant experience before the Court also have their own rhetorical flourishes that help 
them manage the justices’ questions and often concisely respond to a justice’s question 
                                                 
30  To be fair, most advocates use moot courts as warm up sessions to prepare for oral argument, and there 
was a substantial change in the advocate’s delivery who prepped at Georgetown.  However, the change in 
his argument could easily have been the result of his experience in ten previous arguments before the 
Court.    
31 Differences will be discussed at length in chapter 2. 
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without wasting valuable time.  The justices also treat more experienced counsels with 
less formality, and tend to probe more deeply and stringently into the issues before the 
Court, establishing a high expectation for performance in an experienced advocate.  Less 
experienced advocates, often first time performers or young lawyers will receive a 
gentler reception from the Court; however, if a young attorney or novice advocate is 
unable to articulate the essence of their case or answer the justices’ questions, he or she 
may endure what will seem like an eternity of questioning before retreating to their seat.  
Georgetown’s Supreme Court Institute has provided novice advocates with a valuable 
opportunity to practice their delivery and arguments before a handful of “justices,” and 
saved a countless number from a scarring argument. 
Georgetown and Stanford’s Supreme Court Institutes, and books by Scalia and 
Garner, and David Frederick reflect a renewed interest in rhetorical skills within the 
Court’s oral arguments and is a call for Law to recognize the practical nature of rhetoric 
and the benefits of its study.  As a field, Communication, is intimately concerned with 
the role of language in humans’ daily lives, and makes it a particularly well suited 
discipline to consider the role of oral arguments before the Supreme Court.  
Rhetoricians, group communication scholars, and discourse analysts would all find the 
Court’s oral argument to be a fascinating site of study; however, rhetoricians concern 
with persuasion through the structure and advancement of arguments make them 
particularly well equipped to approach the study of oral arguments.  Previous scholars 
studying oral argument draw from scientific disciplines that offer studies which ignore 
the role of language and argument in oral arguments, focusing instead on the 
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psychological or decision making of justices across longitudinal studies.  Political 
scientists and psychologists have long believed that oral arguments make little difference 
to the outcome of cases before Supreme Court justices, commonly noting that there is no 
direct causal relationship between oral arguments and the justices’ voting patterns. 
However, this scientific approach to studying oral arguments ignores the complexities 
and nuances with which language can influence judicial thinking and in turn constitute 
reality through the justices’ opinions. Although language’s constitutive nature and subtly 
powerful influence is a common theoretical position within the field of Communication, 
political scientists often overlook language’s potential. While a substantial amount of 
humanistic research has been conducted on the Supreme Court, primarily through the 
rhetorical criticism of justices’ opinions and the relationship between rhetoric and 
hermeneutics, very few studies examine the rhetorical role of oral argument before the 
Supreme Court.  
A Rhetorical Study of Supreme Court Oral Arguments 
My dissertation seeks to engage previous research in Political science and 
Psychology by arguing for the importance of oral arguments from a Communication 
perspective. Political scientists and psychologists often ignore the complex environment 
of oral arguments, such as verbal cues, and body language, preferring instead to focus 
solely on written transcripts.  My method of analyzing the Court’s oral arguments blends 
ethnography, rhetorical criticism, and discourse analysis to reveal language’s dynamic 
influence on oral arguments. In contrast to the strategic actor and other decision making 
models adopted by political scientists and psychologists to explain the justices’ behavior, 
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I suggest that scholars consider Sensemaking as an alternative model, primarily because 
it emphasizes the role of discourse in human decision making.  In establishing the case 
for Sensemaking, I hope to foreground the importance of rhetorical discursive 
interaction with the Court’s oral arguments, drawing attention to the importance of 
understanding how the Court’s communicative interaction may influence their decision 
making abilities.   
Where prior studies of oral arguments have adopted aggregate behavioral models 
and longitudinal research conducted by political scientists and psychologists, I examine 
three specific cases, and immerse myself in the Court’s oral argument.  Thus instead of 
providing another objective post-positivist study, I seek to establish a more interpretive 
and textual based understanding of the rhetorical discursive interaction found within the 
Court’s oral arguments.  Before examining the three cases chapter II and III provide a 
background to the literature and theory of Sensemaking.  Chapter II addresses a driving 
concern of lawyers, political scientists, and psychologists by attempting to answer the 
question: “Do oral arguments matter?”  A survey of literature from the fields of Law, 
Political Science, and Psychology provides tentative answers, but exposes the limitations 
surrounding prior approaches to the study of oral arguments.  An answer to this question 
from the field of Communication explains the importance of communication within 
human engagement.  Chapter II concludes by introducing readers to Sensemaking as a 
model of communication and as a form of decision making.  Chapter III responds to the 
more difficult question of “how do oral arguments matter?” by reinterpreting  everyday 
human sensemaking into a form of judicial decision making, and proposing key 
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behaviors observers could witness in sensemaking justices.  In explaining judicial 
sensemaking behavior, I argue why sensemaking could be an undesirable form of 
judicial decision making that should be carefully avoided.  The dissertation’s primary 
research questions are laid forth: 
1.  Do justices demonstrate a substantial preference for one counsel 
over another in 
 
a. their challenging of counsels,  
b. permitting counsels an equal opportunity to respond, 
c.  the frequency at which they interrupt counsels,  
d.  their assistance of counsels arguments, and 
e.  their treatment of counsels? 
 
To answer these questions chapter III situates Sensemaking between two prominent 
areas of communication: Rhetoric and Discourse Analysis to explain the adoption of a 
variety of methodological approaches that can address the driving research questions.  
Chapter IV applies the methodology discussed in chapter III to Morse v. Frederick 
known infamously as the “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” case; however, before analyzing the case, 
I provide readers with a description of the Court’s general style of interaction, the 
various purposes of oral argument, and the justices’ individual styles to give readers a 
general understanding of the Court’s interaction.  I chose to analyze Morse v. Frederick 
because the justices and advocates’ interaction in oral argument gives readers a clear 
picture of sensemaking behavior and the potential dangers associated with it.  In 
evaluating Morse v. Frederick, I compare the strategic actor model (the dominant model 
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of decision making within political science Supreme Court research) to the sensemaking 
model of decision making to determine whether justices act as sensemakers or strategic 
actors within the case’s oral arguments.  The chapter establishes sensemaking as a viable 
model that can be used to understand rhetorical discursive interaction in oral arguments.  
Chapter V applies a more rigorous methodological standard by requiring that I evaluate 
an oral argument in person, because I was not present for the Morse v. Frederick oral 
argument.  Chapter V considers Kennedy v. Louisiana which challenged the 
constitutionality of the death penalty being applied to a conviction of child rape in which 
the child did not die as a result of the crime.  Chapter V uncovers similar sensemaking 
behavior by the justices, but not to the degree to which it occurred in Morse v. 
Frederick.  Chapter VI questions whether justices may act more carefully in historically 
important cases and focuses on Heller v. District of Columbia the first 2nd amendment 
case the Court has heard in over 70 years.  It seems reasonable to believe the justices 
will more carefully evaluate cases that hold an extraordinary level of social significance.  
Heller v. District of Columbia, not only offers a recent historical case, but also maintains 
consistency among actors by including the same justices that appeared in Morse v. 
Frederick and Kennedy v. Louisiana.  Chapter VII discusses the importance and 
implications of this study’s findings and includes suggestions and recommendations for 
scholars, lawyers, and judges.   
Mr. Chief Justice, I hope you haven’t grown bored with the necessary details of 
this study.  At its essence this research considers the potential implications of the 
rhetorical discursive interactions within oral arguments.  If you believe that language 
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matters, and human communication has the ability to influence how other humans think 
and act, then the manner in which advocates and justices use language to communicate 
in the Courtroom is of crucial importance because you would want a fair consideration 
of both parties.  My job in the upcoming chapters is to present you with compelling 
evidence that suggests communication matters, and that controlling communicative 
interactions in the courtroom is essential to fair proceedings and impartial consideration 
of a case.   
I ask that you remember this study is not “scientific” in nature.  I do not seek to 
prove a theory, or determine with certainty the influence of sensemaking, a task that 
would require crystal balls and a penchant for mind reading.  Instead, this study applies a 
theory and method to reach reasonable conclusions that resonate with my observations 
before the Court, interviews with top advocates and former clerks, and moot Courts at 
Georgetown’s SCI and the National Association of Attorney Generals.  It is true that I do 
not have a law degree, nor do I have the experience of serving as a judge or Supreme 
Court justice, but my education in research and communication makes me well equipped 
to study the Court’s interactions.  To you, my scholarship may seem unrealistically 
idealistic, but if you can walk away considering that the interactions in oral argument are 
important to the decision making of the justices, and thus should occur in the most fair 
and balanced manner possible, then I will have been successful.  If you have no further 
questions, I’ll reserve the remainder of my time and allow the research to make the case. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
DO ORAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT MATTER?32 
 
Chapter II begins with this crucial question because it is a common question 
addressed to scholars studying the Supreme Court that is based upon a misunderstanding 
of the influence of oral argument.  I review the previous research in law, political 
science, and psychology to explain the theoretical and methodological differences that 
separate the fields, as well as revealing how each field answers this chapter’s driving 
question.  After providing a background to the three fields, I suggest an answer from a 
Communication perspective that includes using sensemaking theory to understand the 
importance of oral arguments, and their ability to influence judicial decision making.  In 
articulating sensemaking’s potential influence upon judicial decision making, I explain 
the drawbacks associated with the justices falling into patterns of sensemaking. 
Nearly every scholar studying oral arguments before the Supreme Court begins their 
study with this fundamental question for a couple of reasons.  First, it is by far the most 
commonly asked question from both everyday citizens and members of the legal 
community, and should therefore be addressed in order to move forward with the study.  
Second, scholars answering this question not only justify their study of oral arguments 
(if oral arguments had no influence then their studies would matter little), but also 
answering this question enables researchers to approach oral argument from a particular 
                                                 
32 This question’s phrasing derives from the numerous studies that begin by asking “do oral arguments 
matter?”  What scholars mean in their use of the term “matter” is unclear and may contribute to the 
disagreement surrounding the influence of oral argument.  I have adopted the ambiguous terminology to 
point out the wide interpretive latitude created by using the term “matter.” 
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perspective.  However, scholars do not agree on the manner in which oral arguments 
“matter.”  Scholarly disagreement may result from indeterminate meaning surrounding 
the term “matter.”  Some scholars use “matter” to refer to oral arguments ability to 
change a justice’s tentative voting position.  Other scholars interpret “matter” to suggest 
the manner in which a justice understands a case, potentially resulting in an alteration of 
the written opinion and the resulting construction of law.  The question’s interpretation 
often depends upon the scholarly context within which it is raised, and the answer also 
naturally derives from the scholar’s field of study.  Three primary fields of research have 
attempted to answer this question.  Members of the legal profession, political scientists, 
and psychologists have all sought to determine the influence and purpose of oral 
arguments, both at the Supreme Court and lower level appellate courts.  
Each field produces distinctly unique studies because of the differences in the 
purpose of their research, goals, methodology, and theoretical approaches.  Members of 
the legal profession often rely on personal accounts through the testimony of lawyers 
and judges on the importance of oral arguments. Psychologists tend to determine how 
judges may align with previously established models of human decision making by 
evaluating voting patterns and written opinions.  Political scientists typically employ 
longitudinal studies to examine the voting records of judges and account for whether oral 
arguments may have influenced judges to shift from prior positions.   
The purpose, influence, and effect of oral arguments have been examined largely 
by psychologists and political scientists through an identification of variables that may 
influence a justice’s voting pattern.  These social scientists typically evaluate voting 
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records to establish prior judicial trends and separate themselves from their subjects of 
study as a means of establishing objective, verifiable, and replicable empirical truths.  
Social scientists, by nature of their methods, must assume that every case elicits specific 
behavioral patterns from the justices, yet they fail to recognize that each case is unique 
and has the potential to draw forth unpredictable responses by the justices.  In contrast to 
the perspective and methods of social scientists, members of the legal community tend to 
focus more upon human experience, often using interviews, speeches, and written 
comments as a means of verifying uniquely individual experience with a topic.  
However, recalling human experience is also vulnerable to flaws in memory as well as 
an inability to recognize a pattern of behavior over a long time span.  Each field’s 
divergent path of research and methodology emphasizes unique advantages and 
limitations.  Psychologists and political scientists’ techniques generate knowledge which 
accounts for generalizable principles, but may not explain individual differences.  As 
these social scientists approach their studies with a wide encompassing macro 
perspective to establish sweeping conclusions, members of the legal community take a 
micro approach and use individual perspectives to make specific contributions.  
However, where psychologists or political scientists remain relatively separate from their 
object of study, members of the legal community are intimately associated with legal 
topics, and may lack critical distance to reach sound conclusions.  The advantages and 
limitations of various approaches should not suggest the superiority of any particular 
field or methodology but rather expose the limited nature of knowledge.   
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Although all three fields provide perspectives which assist in more fully 
understanding the dynamism and complexity of oral argument before the Supreme 
Court, psychologists and political scientists are somewhat divided on the influence of 
oral arguments before the Supreme Court; however, the legal community largely 
believes in the importance of oral arguments.  Members of the legal community oriented 
toward practical application of oral advocacy typically provide handbooks detailing how 
to effectively craft oral arguments, often including personal anecdotes and interviews 
with judges and justices to bolster their positions.  This method may seem mundane and 
a self-justification of the legal profession and its rituals, but members of the legal 
community find through narratives and interviews that oral arguments do make a 
difference in cases.  The importance of oral argument thwarts the conventional wisdom 
followed by political scientists.  Members of the legal community believe oral arguments 
matter in the outcome of a case by creating a moment when lawyers’ arguments bolster 
or diminish their client’s position.  Conversely, political scientists have advanced the 
most radical view of oral arguments by questioning whether oral arguments make a 
difference in a judge’s decision making process.  Although political scientists have not 
reached a consensus in this area, they largely believe that “oral arguments [do not] play a 
significant role in the decision making of the U.S. Supreme Court.”33  The literature 
review begins with studies by legal scholars, confronting their claims with views from 
                                                 
33 Kevin T. McGuire, “Oral Arguments and Decision Making on the United States Supreme Court, by 
Timothy Johnson” Law and Politics Book Review 15.2 (2005): 107-109.  
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/ accessed 9/17/07. 
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political scientists and psychologists, and concluding by emphasizing the value that 
communication studies can provide to the analysis of oral arguments.   
Legal Research  
Within the field of critical studies, legal scholars make a confident assumption: 
oral arguments matter, at least to an extent.  Legal scholars who emphasize the 
importance of oral arguments generally do so in legal handbooks that provide 
suggestions for improving a lawyer’s argumentation skills.  Justice Scalia and Brian 
Garner’s recent work Making Your Case reflects both the attitude of the legal 
community regarding oral arguments as well as the typical form of texts addressing the 
topic of oral arguments.  Scalia and Garner’s book never questions the value of oral 
arguments, recognizing the importance of oral argument from both men’s experience in 
the courtroom.  Their suggestions for oral argument occur in the form of a handbook 
which addresses topics such as “general principles of argumentation,” and “legal 
reasoning.”34  The assumptions, methods, layout, and purpose of the book is markedly 
different from scholars in the field of psychology and political science, but reflects the 
general experience based approach which scholars in the legal community rely upon to 
make practical recommendations.   
Two important handbooks that provide tips and draw from a unique wealth of 
experience are David Frederick’s Supreme Court and Oral Advocacy and Ruggero J. 
Aldisert’s Winning on Appeal.  Frederick was an assistant to the Solicitor General for 
                                                 
34 Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges (West: St. Paul, 
2008) xi-ii. 
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five years and Aldisert was a senior judge for the United States Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  Both writers incorporate significant accounts of their experiences as well as 
those of other judges on various appellate courts, and they provide transcripts of both 
poor and exemplary arguments.  Because judges and lawyers have distinctly different 
goals in oral argument, Aldisert and Frederick each contribute important insights into the 
purpose of oral argument.  The authors’ advice and meaningful explanation of a complex 
and multifaceted interaction largely accords with the position of other lawyers and 
judges.   
According to Frederick, for lawyers and their clients, “oral argument can be 
critically important” because it represents the culmination and recognition of the legal 
work that has served as the foundation for the judicial process.35  Through oral 
arguments, lawyers attempt to establish a narrative or sense of ethos through which 
judges may better understand and respond to their position.36  As a judge, Aldisert also 
recognizes the value of oral argument for lawyers because the compressed time forces 
lawyers “to emphasize and simplify the pivotal issues of the brief” reducing a fifty page 
brief to a few arguments and addressing any questions or misgivings the judge may hold 
with regards to a case.37  Advocates must look to “work [their] way into the judge’s 
consciousness and make the judge think about the things that the advocate wishes him to 
think about.  One of the best ways to begin this process is to establish eye contact with as 
                                                 
35 Frederick, Supreme Court, 8. 
36 Aldisert, Winning on Appeal, 32. 
37 Aldisert, Winning on Appeal, 32. 
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many judges as possible.”38  In addition to connecting with a judge, advocates must also 
“attempt to stimulate the judge’s appreciation of the client’s point of view and to 
demonstrate the essential fallacy of the opponent’s position.”39  Finally, oral 
argumentation should demonstrate the “logical soundness of [a lawyer’s] position” by 
enduring the tempering of judicial questioning and reflects the knowledge a lawyer has 
of his or her case.40  A lawyer’s knowledge of a case makes them a valuable source of 
information for judges.  As a source of information, advocates and judges may “jointly 
grapple with the difficult legal issues presented by the case that will affect the 
development of law,” and the lawyer plays a unique role in guiding and persuading 
judges to adopt a favorable course of action.41   
 Judges, like lawyers, may use oral arguments to clarify issues.  Often times, a 
case involves hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of information and oral argument 
provides an opportunity to efficiently isolate the essence of a case.  Justice Hughes 
remarked that oral argument “is a great saving of time of the court . . .  to obtain the 
grasp of the case . . .  and to be able to more quickly separate the wheat from the chaff.  
Our records in these days of typing are apt to be full of chaff.”42  Oral argument presents 
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a key opportunity to foreground the crucial issue in a case and potentially shift a judge’s 
position.  Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked that  
you could write hundreds of pages of briefs, and you are still never absolutely 
sure that the judge is focused on exactly what you want him to focus on in that 
brief.  Right there at the time of oral argument, you know that you do have an 
opportunity to engage or get into the judge’s mental process.43   
 
Because the Court’s cases can become so materially voluminous, oral arguments may 
assist the justices in focusing upon singular issues within counsels’ briefs rather than 
grow confused by the enormity of issues before them.  Justice Brennan echoes 
Rehnquist’s view of oral argument emphasizing the importance of oral argument by 
calling it an “indispensable ingredient of appellate advocacy” because “often my whole 
notion of what a case is about crystallizes at oral argument.  This happens even though I 
read all the briefs before oral argument; indeed that is the practice now of all the 
members of the Supreme Court.”44  The opportunity by which a judge or justice may be 
able to clarify or isolate issues in a case depends upon “the advocate’s ability to answer 
questions effectively and persuasively” and could have “a major impact on trials, [and] 
appellate arguments.”45  In oral argument, judges have the opportunity to clarify issues 
and problems in a case and lawyers have the rare chance to answer persuasively, but 
judges rely on oral arguments for more than simple record clarification.    
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Judges also rely on oral arguments to test the implications of their potential 
rulings.  Judges must “clarify the scope of claims or defenses” by examining “the 
practical implications and defenses” of their rulings.46  Judges will test a lawyer’s 
argument or logic by applying it to analogous situations.   Interestingly, judges take the 
opportunity of oral argument to “talk to each other” by testing theories “to gauge the 
reactions of other justices without necessarily being committed to a particular 
viewpoint.”47  At the Supreme Court, the justices “view the argument not as an occasion 
for speeches or a game of 20 questions, but rather as an initial conference convened to 
decide the case.”48  Advocates serve as “a resource, providing information needed to 
clarify the thinking of the Justices; and to bring an organizing theme, emphasis, and note 
of drama needed to marshal the information in a meaningful way.”49  In oral argument, 
judges or justices may advance perspectives to provoke a response from colleagues or to 
address a colleague through remarks to lawyers.  The dynamic interactions between 
judges or justices may cause them to change their voting position.  Although not 
Supreme Court justices, other judges have mentioned the influence of their colleagues’ 
interaction during the course of oral argument.  Judge Frank Coffin has noted “how often 
I have begun argument with a clear idea of the strength or weakness of the decision 
being appealed, only to realize from a colleague’s questioning that there was much, 
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much more to the case than met my eye.”50  Judge Guest has also remarked that “I have 
known cases in which when the case started I was convinced that the appellant was 
either right or wrong and during the course of the case a point made either by me or by 
one of my colleagues has completely changed one’s view.”51  For members of the legal 
community, oral argument plays a vital role in its ability to inform a judge’s 
understanding of a case and provide lawyers with an opportunity to distill the essence of 
a case from voluminous distracting elements.  While members of the legal community 
view oral argument as important process in the review of a case, they also suggest that 
the power of oral argument is limited because it does not often have the ability to reverse 
a judge’s voting position.   
Limitations of Oral Argument 
The legal community recognizes oral argument as a significant moment in a case, 
but the effects of a lawyer’s performance have long been debated.  Some lawyers view 
oral argument as a perfunctory exercise which rarely reverses a judge’s initial voting 
position.  These skeptical lawyers often rely on briefs to make the most persuasive 
argument.  Like other skeptical lawyers, Chief Justice Roberts noted a shift in his 
regards for oral argument in his transition from lawyer to justice.  As a lawyer Roberts 
“wasn’t as sure” that oral arguments were crucial in a case, but “as a justice, I know how 
very important oral argument is.”52  His comment responds to the doubt in the legal 
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community surrounding oral argument, and yet confirms the importance of oral 
argument from the perspective of a justice.  Roberts’ opinion reflects those of his 
colleagues at the Supreme Court and the justices who preceded him. 
 While it is true that “the majority of appellate cases” are “won or lost on the 
briefs,” “somewhere between 10%-35% of cases on appeal are won or lost on oral 
argument.”53  However, oral argument should not simply be understood as a process to 
reverse a judge’s voting position; lawyers should also consider how oral argument may 
be used to inform the resolution of a case in the client’s best interest.  Judges may not 
reverse a voting position, but may adopt a more favorable position based upon an 
advocate’s argument.  At the very least judges use oral argument to learn and clarify 
important information and may also rely on oral argument to assist them in writing the 
case’s opinion and subsequently developing future laws.  As evidence of oral argument’s 
subtle yet powerful potential, two Eighth Circuit judges, Myron H. Bright and Richard S. 
Arnold, tracked all the cases that appeared before them in a ten month period asking 
themselves: “was oral argument necessary?”, “was oral argument helpful?”, and “did it 
change the judge’s mind?.”  Bright found oral argument necessary in 85% of the case, 
with 82% of oral arguments assisting the case, but changing his mind in only 7% of 
cases.  Similarly Arnold determined that oral arguments proved necessary in 75% of 
cases, with oral arguments helping the case in 80% of cases, but only changing his mind 
in 2% of them.54  Similar to Chief Justice Roberts experience as a justice, these judges’ 
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findings suggest oral argument’s influence is more than simply changing votes.  
Reducing oral argument’s purpose to the reversal of a position, simplifies the complexity 
of the communicative process, and ignores the numerous purposes individual actors may 
bring to the process of oral arguments. 
Influence on Decision Making Process 
 
 At the Supreme Court level, oral argument is largely recognized as a crucial 
activity for justices, lawyers, and clients in the pursuit of justice and law.  The Court 
considers oral argument so important that they are “reluctant to accept the submission of 
briefs without oral argument of any case in which . . . certiorari has been granted . . . the 
Court may require oral argument by the parties.”55  The Court’s reluctance may largely 
be due to Justice Brennan’s experience of oral argument in which “my whole notion of 
what a case is about crystallizes at oral argument.”56  Justice Harlan also lauded the 
effective role of oral argument while speaking to a young group of lawyers.  He 
reminded them that “your oral argument on appeal is perhaps the most effective weapon 
you have got if you will give it the time and attention it deserves.  Oral argument is 
exciting and will return rich dividends if it is done well.”57 Justice Ginsburg and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist have also pointed out the significant influence oral arguments may 
have on a justice’s consideration of a case.  Justice Ginsburg has noted, “I have seen few 
victories snatched at oral argument from a total defeat the judges had anticipated on the 
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basis of the briefs.  But I have seen several potential winners become losers in whole or 
in part because of clarification elicited at oral argument.’”58  Chief Justice Rehnquist has 
made similar statements about oral arguments mentioning that:  
in a significant minority of the cases in which I have heard oral argument, 
I have left the bench feeling different about a case than I did when I came 
to the bench . . . the change is seldom a full one-hundred-and-eighty 
degree swing, and I find that it is most likely to occur in cases involving 
areas of law in which I am least familiar.59 
 
The prior statements by justices highlight the importance of oral argument and 
demonstrate the close relationship legal briefs and oral arguments play in informing a 
justices’ understanding of the case.  Where briefs serve to establish a judicial frame 
through which a judge tentatively understands a case, oral arguments assist the justices 
in confirming or reevaluating their initial pre-argument positions.  The justices’ 
comments suggest that Supreme Court justices approach oral arguments with a tentative 
voting position, and oral arguments may potentially assist justices in writing and shaping 
the Court’s final opinion as justices explore potential avenues for resolving the current 
case and anticipate subsequent future cases.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices 
Ginsburg and Brennan suggest that oral arguments may have a profound influence on the 
manner in which justices understand and evaluate a case.  Oral arguments provide the 
opportunity for justices to confirm or reject their initial position by testing arguments 
and tentative positions.  The examination of arguments could, in some instances, cause 
justices to change voting positions, but in all likelihood oral arguments help the justices 
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confirm their preliminary voting positions.  Former Chief Justice Hughes confirms this 
perspective noting “‘the impression that a judge has at the close of a full oral argument 
accords with the conviction which controls his final vote.’”60  Legal handbooks typically 
recognize the limitation for oral argument to change a Supreme Court justice’s position 
entirely, but authors do acknowledge the importance of a strong presentation, noting that 
disaster often results from a poor one. 
 The opinions of Supreme Court justices, appellate judges, and experienced 
lawyers provide experience based perspectives that validate the importance of oral 
argument within the legal profession.  Given the large variety of purposes for oral 
argument listed by justices, judges and lawyers, it seems unusual that such an important 
process would be reduced to only thirty minutes per counsel, but humans’ attention span 
is limited and can only be tightly focused for brief periods of time.  Justices commonly 
struggle to maintain focus during mundane cases or oral arguments with very little 
interaction by the justices.  Justice Ginsburg has fallen asleep during extended argument 
for the Texas redistricting case, woken after a number of minutes by a gentle hand from 
her friend Justice Souter.61  In witnessing oral argument at the Supreme Court, observers 
grow aware of the very human qualities of the justices, such as their frailties, anger, 
irritation, and boredom.  As the audience struggles to remain awake, the justices must 
remain alert and involved with the case before them.  Furthermore, the limited time 
frame forces advocates to identify the key elements of a case and focus tightly upon 
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those primary issues.  An advocate’s ability to concentrate their arguments, retain the 
justices’ attention, and draw them into his or her argument through eye contact or vocal 
intonations may have a significant impact on the justices’ ability to remember key issues 
surrounding a case.  The rhetorical skills of an advocate in oral argument are crucial to 
the success or failure of a case, and there is little wonder why rhetorical suggestions 
largely comprise the bulk of legal handbooks.  Although handbooks may not generally 
be regarded in academic circles as scholarly works, legal handbooks, similar to the 
suggestions of an ethnographer, contribute important experiential findings from judges 
and lawyers that point to the overwhelming importance of oral arguments. 
Political Science Research 
The members of the legal community and authors of legal handbooks base their 
suggestions for oral argument on their experience and the belief that they do “matter” 
and can influence the outcome of a case.  While members of the legal community anchor 
their beliefs about oral argument on reflections of personal experience, political 
scientists take a very different approach.  Political scientists attempt to demonstrate, 
empirically and systematically, the influence of oral arguments, or lack thereof, by 
questioning the underlying premise that oral arguments matter.  As with any important 
research, political scientists begin their studies by questioning the fundamental 
assumptions legal scholars take for granted.  Largely dominating studies of the Supreme 
Court, political scientists have taken advantage of the relationship between the cause and 
effect of arguments and judicial decision making, particularly in regards to oral 
argumentation.  A significant portion of political scientists traditionally believe oral 
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arguments make little difference in Supreme Court decision making.62  Other political 
scientists argue that oral arguments do matter, but their influence is difficult to determine 
given the other variables’ potential influence on the justices, such as the counsel’s briefs, 
supporting amicus curiae briefs, intra-court negotiations, lawyers’ experience, and the 
external political environment.63   
Timothy Johnson is a recent prominent political scientist whose comprehensive 
research on the Supreme Court has led him to conclude that oral arguments do “matter” 
by influencing judicial decision making that leads justices to test policy options within 
the political environment.64  In order to determine the importance of oral arguments, 
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Johnson evaluated “litigant and amicus briefs, oral argument transcripts, notes and 
memoranda from the private papers of Supreme Court justices, and the final decision 
handed down” for cases handled in between years 1972 and 1986.65  Johnson cleverly 
attempts to isolate the abundance of variables to determine the influence of oral 
arguments.  As he isolates the origination point of certain arguments that may again 
appear in the final decisions, his study depends upon a certain understanding of human 
decision making and behavior. 
Johnson’s study relies on fundamental assumptions of human behavior, which 
political scientists call the strategic actor model, to explain judicial behavior.66  The 
strategic actor model has its roots in the rational actor model or rational choice theory, 
which proposes that humans weigh all possible options, before rationally choosing the 
best possible solution.  Rational choice theory is “arguably the most popular and fastest 
growing theoretical orientation in contemporary political science.”67  Over the years the 
rational actor model was modified to include the strategic actor model which recognizes 
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that human decision making is constrained by a variety of factors. 68  Johnson believes 
the strategic actor model best represents the justices’ decision making because “when 
making decisions, policy-oriented justices must account for the preferences of their 
immediate colleagues, the preferences of actors beyond the Court, and institutional 
norms and rules that might affect the decisions they can make.”69  Johnson also believes 
that “the main goal of most Supreme Court justices is the attainment of policy in line 
with their personal preferences.”70  He suggests, and proves to an extent, that justices 
strategically maneuver through the entire decision making process.  Rightly claiming 
that if justices “simply voted for their most preferred outcomes, there would be no 
evidence of bargaining and accommodation behind the scenes of the decision-making 
process.”71 While justices seek to achieve policy in accordance to their personal 
commitments, how they achieve this policy is of crucial importance.   
Under the strategic actor model, justices should gather as much information as 
possible in order to find the best possible solution in accordance with their preferences.  
Johnson echoes this position stating: 
The first tenet of the strategic account is that justices strive to achieve their most 
preferred policy objectives.  To do so they need information about all the policy 
choices available to them.  I posit that oral arguments provide a time for justices 
to gather this information by raising questions concerning legal principles the 
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Court should adopt, courses of action the Court should take, or a justice’s beliefs 
about the content of a policy.72    
 
For Johnson, oral arguments play the crucial role of informing justices of policy 
implications by exploring the consequences of various alternatives.  He determines that 
justices’ questions in oral argument will focus on policy issues 40%  of the time and 
31% will be questions related to the constitutionality of their position; over 70% of 
justices’ questions will focus on either policy or constitutional matters.73  Johnson also 
provides a few examples from oral argument transcripts to demonstrate how justices use 
oral argument for policy testing and exploring constitutional issues.  Historically, 
Johnson’s conclusions are important because they foreground the importance of oral 
argument before the Supreme Court as a valuable tool the justices use to gather 
information about a case.  His study also establishes the strategic actor as one of the 
primary models for Supreme Court decision making.   
Johnson’s study leaves a number of questions as a consequence of his methods.  
First, Johnson’s aggregate findings fail to account for individual differences in justices’ 
decision making or approaches to oral argument.  For example, Justice Scalia argues 
with counselors incessantly while Justice Thomas rarely engages in open debate, and it 
seems unlikely that both justices share a similar decision making process.  Second, 
Johnson ignores whether justices treat counselors equally or seek balanced information, 
seemingly an important underlying indicator of the strategic actor model.  Third, he 
overlooks the multiple voices of a case (litigant and amicus briefs, opinions of clerks, 
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justices’ conferences, and senior justice voting patterns) that could influence a justice’s 
decision.  A justice could be persuaded by an amicus brief to rule in favor of a litigant 
and use a frame provided by a counselor in oral argument to explain their ruling.  A 
variety of pressures that cannot be accounted for influence the justices’ thought process.  
Fourth, Johnson’s use of the strategic actor model eschews substantial scholarly research 
that claims humans do not actually use the strategic actor model but invoke sensemaking 
instead to process information and make decisions.74  More will be said about the theory 
of sensemaking, but briefly it suggests, in a complex situation where multiple outcomes 
are possible, humans seek to simplify their decision making process by eliminating 
variables which conflict with their personal life experiences.  While Johnson may not 
have chosen a practical model of decision making, his reliance on only one model of 
human decision making, leaves his scholarship vulnerable to inquiries of more widely 
accepted and verifiable forms of decision making. Fifth, the ambiguous nature of the 
strategic actor model prevents a clear articulation of behavioral expectations in humans, 
potentially subsuming all human behavior and therefore capable of explaining none.75  
The strategic actor, as derived from rational choice theory, suffers from the same 
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ambiguity where “theorists have not clearly articulated their epistemological positions 
and for this reason, their arguments in favor of rational choice theory are inconsistent, 
contradictory, and unpersuasive.”76   Finally, ironically but perhaps most importantly, 
Johnson’s study on oral argument does not consider the dynamic role communication 
plays in the environment of oral arguments.  His understanding of communication 
depends upon the eclipsed transmission model of communication in which interaction 
occurs between only two actors who use speech primarily to transmit information to one 
another.  Johnson fails to consider the rhetorical nature of a justice asking questions or 
making statements to influence his or her colleagues.  He also ignores the tone of 
justices’ statements and questions which may reveal more about a statement’s purpose 
than any other quality.  Johnson’s study also fails to understand that each case presents 
unique situations and scenarios.  Indeed, the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari on a 
topic they have already ruled, and while cases may fall into similar legal categories 
(death penalty, abortion, freedom of speech, habeas corpus, etc …) each case often 
presents unique circumstances that evoke different interactional responses among 
justices. 
Johnson’s study relies on the strategic actor model in opposition to the attitudinal 
model which had previously dominated research on the Supreme Court.  Political 
scientists Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth have argued that Supreme Court justices base 
decisions “in light of facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the 
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justices.”77  The attitudinal model, as Spaeth and Segal call it, claims that justices vote 
particular ways because they are “extremely conservative” or “extremely liberal.”78  
Scholars who apply the attitudinal model assume that all human behavior is goal 
oriented and when faced with a decision, individuals will make a choice from the 
available alternatives by selecting the course which best achieves the person’s 
ideological goals.  The decisions an individual pursues “will depend upon his personal 
value system—the set of beliefs, attitudes, and values that disposes him to behave in a 
certain fashion,” and when applied to political contexts, these values serve as personal 
policy preferences.  Because scholars studying the attitudinal model believe that a 
justice’s values are set and intractable over time, they reject the influence of oral 
argument on the justice’s decisions.79  For scholars adopting the attitudinal model oral 
arguments do not “matter” because they fail to reverse a justice’s voting position.  
Although oral arguments may help justices situate their policy preferences and their 
written opinions, for scholars studying the attitudinal model, if oral arguments “matter,” 
then they would have the ability to change a justice’s mind.      
Where the rational actor relied too heavily on reason, the attitudinal model relies 
too heavily on values, beliefs, and emotions, leaving no real room or explanation for a 
justice’s change over time.  Nor does the attitudinal model explain how rulings may 
stand in opposition to an individual’s personal values or belief systems, such as a 
                                                 
77 Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme Court (2002): 86. 
78 Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme Court (2002): 86. 
79 Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme Court (2002):281. 
 
50 
 
Catholic judge who views abortion as immoral, but yet legally supports its Constitutional 
nature.  The attitudinal model ignores how political contexts and personal policy 
preferences vary and shift in relationship to social and political environments.  Justices 
Souter and Stevens were both believed to be conservative justices, but both men have 
become some of the Court’s most liberal justices.  These men’s views changed during 
their time with the Court, but the attitudinal model does not account for change in 
humans’ attitudes or belief systems.  Scholars invoking the attitudinal model must 
attempt to account for the numerous variables that could influence a justice’s decision in 
prior and future decisions and these variables appear nearly infinite (upbringing, political 
affiliation, law school, affiliation with legal organizations, prior opinions, professional 
background).  Scholars using the attitudinal model may also overlook the important role 
of opinion formation in oral arguments.  At times advocates with weak cases must 
consider how to mitigate the loss in a case, better known as “how to lose a case” in the 
legal community.  In order to preserve a client’s best interest, lawyers must be prepared 
to suggest a ruling which may cause their client to lose the case, but in a manner which 
cuts against the client in a minor manner.  Therefore even if a justice is set to vote 
against a certain counsel and a lawyer’s oral arguments does not persuade the justices to 
vote differently, a lawyer’s arguments may still persuade the justices to rule narrowly 
against a party, in turn causing minimal damage to the client’s case.  And finally, those 
studying the attitudinal model, presuppose knowing a justice’s voting position before 
that justice enters oral argument, an impossible feat in itself, and one where scholars 
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would not even be capable of obtaining reliable information to accurately assess a 
change in voting position.   
Like Johnson’s reaction to the attitudinal model, Spaeth and Segal, along with 
other Supreme Court scholars adopted the attitudinal model as a reaction to the classical 
legal model of Supreme Court decision making.  In contrast to the attitudinal model, the 
legal model, or legal formalism, argues that justices use reason alone to address legal 
issues by investigating the facts of the case, judicial precedent, the plain meaning of 
statues and, the issue’s relationship to the Constitution and the framers’ intentions.  
Although not a political scientist, Richard Posner’s How Judges Think addresses the 
problems of formal legalism.  Legalism proposes that judges determine law through the 
“reading of legal materials and performing logical operations” which would reveal the 
true path of the law.80  In contrast to the attitudinal model which suggests that personal 
values provide justices with the means to select the desired course of resolution or 
judgment, formal legalism argues that judges use reason and the guidance of written law 
to resolve legal issues.  Even though the legal model bears similarities to the antiquated 
and unrealistic rational actor model, formal legalism remains “the judiciary’s ‘official’ 
theory. . . proclaimed most emphatically by Justices of the Supreme Court. ”81  Through 
the process of formal legalism judges and justices must confront multiple rationalities, or 
multiple reasonable paths of resolution in a case.  If the majority of lawyers “have 
precedents supporting them,” cogently argue the case to show the societal interests in 
                                                 
80 Richard Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard UP: 2008): 42. 
81 Posner, How Judges Think (2008):41. 
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their favor, “and both sides typically allege that either the plain meaning of the 
Constitution and/or the intent of the framers supports its position,” then how are justices 
to reach a final decision?82  Reason and rational consideration alone cannot eliminate 
equally compelling rational arguments. 
Political scientists disagree on whether oral arguments matter, largely based upon 
the way in which each scholar understands and frames the term “matter.”  Johnson 
believes oral arguments serve as a place for justices to test their policy preferences, and 
while they may not force a 180 degree change in a justice’s vote, they do help justices 
decide which policy to adopt in their opinion.  Segal and Spaeth take an oppositional 
stance primarily due to their view that the “influence” of oral arguments lies in its ability 
to change a justice’s previous voting position.  If oral arguments lack the ability to 
change a justice’s voting position, then the arguments do not matter.  Ironically, neither 
the strategic actor, attitudinalist, or formal legalism, provide any explanation into the 
nature of communication within oral arguments, seemingly an essential area adopted 
models should address, particularly when examining the communication of the justices 
and lawyers.  Oddly political scientists are not the only social scientists who ignore the 
role of communication in oral arguments; psychologists suffer from the same error.   
 
 
 
                                                 
82 Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1993): 64-65. 
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Psychology 
 The findings of psychologists have primarily been used in studies by political 
scientists to explain judicial and human decision making.83  Although lacking a critical 
mass of scholarship on the Supreme Court, psychologist Lawrence Wrightsman has 
made significant contributions on the topic of oral argument before the Supreme Court.84  
His work on oral arguments derives from his general research on the Court and from his 
earlier research on lower courts.85  Wrightsman’s most recent work on oral arguments 
before the Supreme Court provides an interesting collection of information and studies 
on the Supreme Court, ranging from transcripts of interviews with experienced Supreme 
Court lawyers to informal studies conducted by Chief Justice John Roberts.86  His 
scholarly collage raises a number of interesting questions about the Court, but the real 
substance of his research lies in his concluding study in which he suggests that justices 
cast votes in relationship to their ideological relationship to the case.   
                                                 
83 See Ziva Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning.” Psychology Bulletin 108 (1990): 180..; Jeffrey 
Mondak, “Substantive and Procedural Aspects of Supreme Court Decision and Determinants of 
Institutional Aproval,” American Politics Quarterly. 19 (1991): 174.; Gregory Caldeira and James Gibson, 
“The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court.” American Journal of Political Science. 36 
(1992): 635.; Sarah Levien Shullman “The illusion of devil’s advocacy: How the justices of the Supreme 
Court foreshadow their decisions during oral argument,” Journal of Appellate Practice and Process. 6 
271-293. 
84 Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The Psychology of the Supreme Court (Oxford: Oxfrod UP, 2006); Lawrence 
S. Wrightsman, Oral Arguments Before the Supreme Court (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008). 
85 Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Judicial Decision Making: Is Psychology Relevant? (New York: Kluver 
Academic, 1999).  Lawrence S. Wrightsman and Saul M. Kassim. Confessions in the Courtroom 
(Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993).  Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Michael T. Nietzel, William H. Fortune, and 
Edith Greene Psychology and the Legal System (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1994). 
86 Lawrence Wrightsman, Oral Arguments before the Supreme Court (London: Oxford UP, 2008). 
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Wrightsman’s case study examines 24 cases from the October 2004 term, 12 
cases reflecting potential ideological bias and 12 displaying no evidence of bias.  He 
attempts to compare the oral arguments in ideological and non-ideological cases to 
develop a basis of comparison and reveal the influence of oral arguments.  Wrightsman 
considers ideological cases as those cases which “elicit predispositions to favor a 
particular side” because each case is “related to “basic values such as individuals’ rights, 
states’ rights, property rights, privacy, executive power, or other equally salient 
concerns.”87  Although he mentions that these values reflect “liberal” and “conservative” 
political positions, he fails to define in his perspective what those terms refer to.  
Wrightsman believes that the political predisposition of justices will predict their 
behavior in oral arguments.  If a case falls into an “ideological” category, then justices’ 
questions will be “predictive” of their votes, while non-ideological cases will result in 
less predictive questions.  He hypothesizes “justices will ask somewhat more questions 
to the advocate whose side they disagree with, if the justices had already formed an 
opinion,” but Wrightsman fails to explain why he holds this hypothesis.88  It seems 
equally reasonable, if not more likely, that justices who have already formed an opinion 
will not ask many questions at all, because they have determined how they will rule in a 
case.  
Wrightsman’s study is primarily concerned with the role of questions in oral 
arguments as a means of predicting a justice’s vote.  He finds that oral arguments do 
                                                 
87 Wrightsman, Oral Arguments (2008): 37. 
88 Wrightsman, Oral Arguments (2008): 137. 
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matter, “demonstrate[ing] that individual justices’ questions seem to be related to their 
eventual votes,” but “in only about half of the cases were more questions directed at the 
eventual losing side.”89  But according to Wrightsman, oral arguments matter because 
they reveal justices predispositions and are therefore capable of predicting how justices 
will vote.  While interesting, Wrightsman’s study reveals very little about Supreme 
Court oral arguments; his approach suffers from similar pitfalls found in research 
conducted by political scientists. 
Scientific in nature, Wrightsman’s research focuses on the predictive nature of 
oral arguments, but no real practical utility lies in predicting the votes of justices after 
oral arguments.  What good, scholarly or pragmatic, is accomplished if researchers can 
predict the votes of the justices following oral argument?  Wrightsman never answers or 
addresses this question and I am also puzzled by the practical value found in predicting 
votes following oral argument.  Perhaps even more puzzling to me is that when listening 
to or observing oral arguments predicting justices’ votes following oral argument is not 
necessarily difficult in cases that attract a significant amount of communicative 
interaction among the justices.90  Interaction within oral arguments may reveal clearly 
established voting positions which justices may defend vigorously.  I do not suggest that 
it is always possible to predict all nine voting positions, but typically it is obvious where 
six of the nine justices stand following oral argument.  Wrightsman’s study could offer 
                                                 
89 Wrightsman, Oral Arguments (2008): 141. 
90 Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, Theodore W. Ruger, and Pauline T. Kim, “Competing Approaches 
to Predicting Supreme Court Decision Making,” Perspectives on Politics 2 (2004):1761.; Linda 
Greenhouse, “Press Room Predictions.” Perspectives on Politics 2. (2004): 761.; John G. Roberts, “Oral 
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practical advice for lawyers or judges if it attempted to isolate unique elements in oral 
argument that shape justices’ positions.   
In addition, Wrightsman’s methods, like those of political scientists, could also 
have been more attuned towards the subtle nature of communication.  Even though 
Wrightsman attempted to collect and isolate “sympathetic” and “unsympathetic” 
questions, he overlooks collecting statements to either lawyers or other justices.  A 
justice’s statements may prove just as challenging to a counsel as questions.  
Wrightsman also ignored  listening to the tone in which justices asked questions, a key 
fault with his and other scholars’ research on oral arguments.  A justice’s tone can often 
help identify the large variety of intentions surrounding a justice’s statements or 
questions: “softball” arguments (arguments from a friendly justice who wants to present 
an opportunity for advocates to advance essential positions), “trap door” arguments 
(arguments intended to appear to assist an advocate’s position but may trap an advocate 
in an un-seen position), investigative arguments (arguments designed to explore the 
limits of a postion), inquisitive arguments (arguments questioning factual issues 
surrounding a case) and combative arguments (arguments from a justice attempting to 
destroy an advocate’s position).91  When justices ask a question or make a statement, 
listening to a justice’s tone and if possible observing their body language will provide 
accurate indications revealing the intention behind their utterance.  It seems ironic that 
Wrightsman’s study attempts to evaluate the communication within oral arguments and 
                                                 
91 This is demonstrative and not an exhaustive list because the intentions of justices can vary widely 
between counsels and between cases. 
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yet he ignores the simple process of listening to a case to obtain more accurate findings.   
Finally, the Achilles’ heel of longitudinal studies, Wrightsman is unable to provide us 
information about the behavior of individual justices, which could prove interesting in 
learning who may be controlling the flow and interaction within oral arguments.     
Communication 
As a field, Communication has a wealth of research and theoretical approaches 
that can be applied to further illuminate oral arguments.  Communication’s practical 
nature and assortment of methods makes it an ideal field from which to approach and 
discuss the importance of oral arguments, from both a theoretical and pragmatic 
position.  The field of Communication is largely concerned with improving 
communication between humans and is centered on providing suggestions for how 
humans should communicate in a situation.  Political scientists and psychologists have 
ignored the practical application of their studies and the improvement of the legal 
community.  These researchers have been more concerned about proving the dominance 
of their proposed models through “scientific” approaches, than attempting to 
pragmatically use their research to assist the legal community.  Johnson’s “strategic 
actor model” could include suggestions for lawyers to be prepared for policy questions 
by justices, which according to Johnson results in about 40% of the justices’ questions.  
Based upon his own research, Johnson could suggest that lawyers foreground policy 
proposals in their oral arguments, preempting the need for justices’ questions and 
maximizing argument time. Likewise, Wrightsman could suggest that lawyers attempt to 
mediate and control the number of questions justices ask them, or conversely attempt to 
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raise significant questions about their opponent’s position, forcing their opposition to 
defend their case rather than advance an argument. 
Communication contains two scholarly areas of study that could significantly 
inform the way researchers and practitioners understand and approach oral argument.  
Adopted for their valuable potential in this study, Rhetoric and Discourse Studies offer a 
perspective on language and discursive interaction that broadly evaluates persuasion and 
understanding in a variety of contexts in human communication.  More will be said 
about these areas of study in the next chapter, but a brief overview should foreground the 
immediate usefulness of rhetoric and discourse studies in evaluation of Supreme Court 
oral arguments.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, rhetoric considers the role of 
persuasion in a speaker’s address by examining the development of arguments within the 
speech.  Traditionally focusing on persuasion through argumentation in a single 
speaker’s oratorical presentation and delivery, rhetoric rarely focuses upon the fluid and 
interactional structure of dialogues or active arguments between two or more people.  On 
the other hand, discourse studies ignore a speaker’s style and arguments, focusing 
instead on the process of dialogue between two or more parties.  Often emphasizing the 
structural nature of interactions, discourse studies highlights the barriers that prevent or 
disrupt understanding between humans, which they consider to be the primary goal of 
human communication.  In the study of Supreme Court oral arguments, rhetoric proves a 
useful approach because of its concern with persuasion and argumentation, and 
discourse studies lends its understanding of dialogic interaction to achieve understanding 
between humans.  Clearly Supreme Court oral arguments represent a site where 
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persuasion, argumentation, and understanding are negotiated by the participants.  
Rhetoric and discourse studies are obvious choices for the evaluation of oral arguments; 
however, these topics have never been applied to the study of oral arguments. 
Although Communication is capable of significantly contributing to the study of 
oral arguments, Communication scholars have largely ignored the study of the Supreme 
Court’s oral arguments, providing surface level research that lists the various purposes of 
oral argument and emphasizing the rhetorical skill lawyers require to navigate its 
shifting landscape.  The two Communication related articles published on oral 
arguments before the Supreme Court describe the formidable rhetorical task lawyers are 
faced with.  Milton Dickens and Ruth E. Schwartz examine how oral arguments in 
school desegregation cases influenced justices Marshall and Davis by comparing how 
each justice responded to and participated in the process.92  Dickens and Schwartz 
foreground characteristics which separate the art of oral argumentation from other types 
of political communication and they emphasize the skills involved that lawyers need in 
order to navigate the justices’ questions.   Their research is the first of its kind to trace 
the transmission of arguments from oral arguments to briefs.   
As Dickens and Schwartz articulate the skills necessary for lawyers to excel in 
oral arguments, Wasby et. al. describe the importance of oral argumentation in judicial 
decision making.93  At the heart of oral argumentation are the questions put forth by 
                                                 
92 Milton Dickens and Ruth E. Schwartz, “Oral Argument before the Supreme Court: Marshall v. Davis in 
the school Segregation cases” The Quarterly Journal of Speech.  57.1 (1971): 32-42 . 
93 Stephen Wasby et al. “The Functions of Oral Argument at the U.S. Supreme Court” The Quarterly 
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justices which provide lawyers with the opportunity to persuade the justices.  Wasby et. 
al. call attention to the many purposes of oral argumentation through which justices test 
policy, challenge logic with analogies, persuade other justices of their reasonable 
positions, gather more information, clarify positions, and reduce cases to their essential 
arguments. They note that “for the lawyer, there is the reassurance that a case has been 
heard” as well as the ability “to concentrate on the points from his overall case he 
considers most important.”94  For justices, oral arguments emphasize “the most 
important elements in the case,” but it also serves as a ritual which “legitimizes [their] 
function, provides new opportunity to communicate with his colleagues, and to obtain 
information about a case and clarification of points which may have been raised.”95  
However, of utmost importance to Wasby et al. is oral arguments ability to assist justices 
“in shaping the strategy he and his colleagues should follow” in resolving the case.  
Wasby et. al. urge others to learn more about the Court’s communicative interactions, 
but their calls went unnoticed.  These two works, both published in the Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, were the first of their kind to attempt a Communication style study of 
oral argumentation.96 
Communication research concerning the Court’s oral arguments is limited in the 
contributions dedicated to understanding oral arguments, but prior research suggests that 
oral arguments matter because of their ability to influence how justices may resolve the 
                                                 
94 Wasby et. al, 422. 
95 Wasby et. al, 422. 
96 Ironically Stephen Wasby is a political scientist who published his findings in a communication related 
journal. 
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case in their opinions.  While Communication studies may believe that oral arguments 
matter, they fail to emphasize the most significant consequences of oral arguments.  Oral 
arguments impact how a justice thinks about a case, make a justice’s position known to 
the Court’s other members, and through the act of speaking, create belief about a 
position, instead of simply reflecting it.  Oral arguments provide an interactional 
situation which influences a justice’s evaluation in a case.  Johnson’s research finds that 
justices use oral arguments to explore policy options, but he fails to consider how 
discursive dynamics can impact what information and policy proposals are highlighted 
within oral arguments.  If a proposal is left out of oral arguments, then how might that 
influence a case’s resolution?  Secondly, oral arguments provide a place where justices 
can make their positions known to the other justices, staking their claims to an argument, 
and potentially generating support.  Thirdly, instead of viewing justice’s speech as 
reflective of predispositions, speech should be considered as generative of a position.   
Although this may seem counterintuitive to the widely held belief that we think first and 
then speak, speech may also help us crystallize ideas or come to an understanding about 
a position.  Speaking may help humans develop their thoughts, rather than simply 
reflecting apriori ideas.  Justices reflect this tendency when they find that an opinion 
“won’t write,” meaning that they cannot write a justification for their voting position, 
often switching their vote as a result. 
As a field, Communication calls attention to how symbolic communication 
influences decision making, foregrounding how interactional participation can influence 
communication, and in turn, the way in which a person thinks, feels, and understands the 
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world.  Language and arguments play a crucial role in understanding and improving 
communication between humans.  The method in which a researcher approaches 
communication is crucial to understanding language’s function.  Ironically, while 
research by political scientists and psychologists study oral arguments, most of these 
scholars fail to consider their interactional qualities, preferring instead to code them 
without understanding their context.  For example, most scholars, such as Wrightsman 
and Johnson, only read and code transcripts, without ever listening to digital recordings 
of cases.  Moreover, these scholars never give evidence of their firsthand observation of 
the Court; instead, their studies are distantly removed from the Court’s actual discursive 
interaction.  To be fair, previous studies conducted by political scientists and 
psychologists have attempted to collect vast amounts of information and may not be 
concerned with individual behavior or behavior within key cases.  However, within 
Communication studies, understanding context is essential to understanding 
communication.  Without understanding contextual cues, such as tone and voice 
intonation, researchers could easily overlook sarcastic or ironic statements in transcripts, 
coding them as genuine statements.  Even an understanding of the physical courtroom 
and how justices interact with each other is crucial in understanding and interpreting 
communicative interaction.  Without a significant amount of experience, researchers 
may come to rely on second hand views, while first hand observation may reveal a very 
different perspective.97 
                                                 
97 Justice Thomas is repeatedly criticized for his lack of involvement in oral argument, but my personal 
observations suggest that he remains active (flipping through briefs, speaking with Justice Breyer, or 
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Studies by political scientists and psychologists have used longitudinal 
approaches, coding vast amounts of language and voting patterns in order to provide 
generalizable findings.  Their findings often group all of the justices together and fail to 
account for individual or unique judicial behavior; in addition longitudinal findings 
cannot account for the unique elements informing each case.  Communication research, 
on the other hand, often foregrounds the situational and unique context of varying 
participants, preventing actors from being overlooked or grouped together generically. 
While Communication scholars and members of the legal community share similar 
views and approaches to studying oral argument, members of the legal community tend 
to ignore prominent theories of communication.  Few legal handbooks look to explain 
the importance of oral arguments, rather they assume, or provide anecdotal evidence, 
concerning the importance of oral arguments.  Members of the legal community are also 
less concerned with the systematic study of communication and more concerned with 
providing effective strategies for other community members.  However, the lack of a 
systematic approach may lead legal community members to overlook important aspects 
of communication that could prove useful to their cases.  
Across the three primary fields of inquiry into oral argument before the Supreme 
Court, each area responds to the question “Do oral arguments before the Supreme Court 
matter?” a bit differently given their interpretation of “matters.”  Members of the legal 
community and Communication scholars primarily approach oral arguments from a 
humanistic perspective. In this humanistic sense, oral arguments provide a context 
through which justices may not change their initial position when entering the argument 
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session, but justices may adopt a justification for their position or an argument frame that 
they otherwise would have overlooked.  This slight change in their approach often 
results in drastically different legal procedures that can have compounding legal 
repercussions throughout society.  Simply because a justice does not change their mind 
because of a lawyer’s arguments, does not mean that lawyer has been ineffective, or that 
oral arguments are irrelevant in their influence upon justices’ thinking.  In contrast to the 
humanistic approach of Communication and legal scholars, political scientists and 
psychologists approach the examination of oral arguments from a scientific foundation 
in which they search for and attempt to isolate instances of direct cause and effect 
relationships between oral arguments and justices’ voting patterns.  Political scientists 
remain divided as to the influence of oral arguments, and recent psychology research 
seems to suggest that oral arguments do make a difference in a case, but only as a site 
that can be used to predict justice’s votes in the case.  The scholarly division between the 
influence of oral arguments largely depends upon the vantage point from which 
researchers study oral arguments.   
Researchers, seeking to predict behavior through scientific methods that examine 
either direct cause and effect responses or that employ quantitative approaches, may not 
be approaching the subtle nature of oral arguments from the most ideal vantage point.  
Qualitative researchers who use personal experience and theories of communication may 
be better suited to study the dynamic roles oral arguments may play.  As a method, 
scientific approaches cannot account for the inherent subtleties of language or 
language’s diverse impact upon audiences, often overlooking important dimensions of 
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communication.  For example, Lawrence Wrightsman attempts to compare the rate of 
interruptions in transcripts between counsels in order to determine the role of oral 
arguments; however, he ignores listening to the audio transcripts where he would have 
found a number of unmarked interruptions because the Court’s transcription only records 
mid-sentence interruptions.  Justices will regularly interrupt a lawyer who has finished a 
sentence, taken a breath, and before they can fully articulate the next word, a justice will 
interrupt them.  This instance occurs frequently, is often not captured within the Court’s 
transcripts, and is a prime example of the need for detailed attention, particularly when 
relying on data that has not been transcribed for academic purposes and lacks the 
necessary attention to communicative details.  A lack of concern for language and 
attention towards language’s subtle differences skews Wrightsman’s results, perhaps 
without him ever realizing it.  In addition to ill-suited methodological approaches, 
political scientists and psychologists do not provide pragmatic suggestions for the 
extension or application of their research.  I do not mean to imply that their findings are 
not practical, because they often can be useful, but rather that previous Supreme Court 
studies that employ scientific methods often are not concerned with improving or 
shaping other areas of human development.   
This study seeks to make practical suggestions for scholars, lawyers, and judges 
by considering a new a model of decision making that emphasizes the role of 
communication in the process of judicial decision making.  It seems unusual that 
scholars studying Supreme Court oral arguments employ decision making models that 
overlook the role of communication, but as a consequence of one’s discipline and field, 
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researchers outside the field of Communication may not have been exposed to decision 
making models that account for the role of human communication.  To better inform 
researchers in their understanding of oral arguments, I suggest that scholars consider the 
adoption of a popular model of decision making within the field of Communication 
known as Sensemaking.   
Where the strategic actor model suggests that humans approach solutions to 
problems in relatively systematic ways, Sensemaking suggests that humans employ 
cognitive commitments to reduce the ambiguity of an environment and information due 
to conflicting, excessive, uncertain, or undesirable information.  Sensemaking suggests 
that humans use a combination of cognitive and social mechanisms to manage the 
ambiguity of an environment.  Where the strategic actor may articulate universal human 
behavior, Sensemaking captures a wide range of human behavior within specific 
circumstances and proposes that in order to understand how humans “make sense” of the 
world, we should focus on how people selectively see and construct the world.  As a 
process, Sensemaking can be both deliberate and unintentional, but at its core, it 
emphasizes the way in which communication enables people to frame problems and 
reach solutions. Sensemaking, as a theory of decision making, has been widely 
employed by scholars across a variety of fields, but Karl Weick’s studies of 
organizational communication has provided some of the greatest contributions to the role 
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communication plays in human decisions, and in explaining the way communication 
shapes how people understand the world.98 
Sensemaking 
Karl Weick’s work extends across the fields of Communication, Psychology, and 
Business management.  Perhaps most famous for his work on sensemaking in 
organizations, Weick’s findings have contributed to the significant diversity by which 
scholars adopt and use his theory of Sensemaking.99  Although Sensemaking, as a 
theory, lacks an individual founder who could claim responsibility for its emergence, 
Karl Weick’s contributions to the theory have made him one of the most prominent 
scholars on the topic.  His work on sensemaking links the fields of Communication and 
Psychology, by suggesting that communication influences human cognition.  Weick 
views the “symbolic process” of language as “central [to] sensemaking,” because 
language, as a symbolic form of communication, constructs the world around and within 
                                                 
98 For a list of recent studies see Ruth Blatt, Marlys Christianson, and Kathleen Sutcliffe, “A Sensemaking 
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us.100  Weick acknowledges the surrounding material world, but he also recognizes the 
influential role communication plays in organizing human lives.  Sensemaking requires 
the “symbolic process through which reality is created and sustained.”101  Because 
communication frames how humans understand and interact with the world around 
them, its ubiquitous presence plays a key role in human understanding and thus proves 
vital to Sensemaking.  Just as communication may be a product of individual and social 
acts, so too is Sensemaking “grounded in both individual and social activity.”102  
Communication in Sensemaking, while socially constitutive, does not “create from 
scratch,” but rather “reproduce[s] and transform[s]” like a Straussian bricoleur, 
borrowing past concepts and ideas to create a bricollage.103 People depend upon 
previous social experiences and rely on communication to make sense of am
environments they are faced with.  In plain terms, people use their background and 
experience to order information in a manner that helps them understand the world.  
biguous 
                                                
Sensemaking requires a focus on human communication, because it often occurs 
in environments where there is no single “right” answer, but rather where multiple 
reasonable options exist that people must talk through to reach a resolution.  Weick 
names these multiple reasonable options “equivocality,” because multiple voices call for 
 
100 Karl Weick, Making Sense of the Organization, (2001) 11. 
101 Gareth Morgan, Peter J. Frost,and Louis Pondy, Organizational Symbolism (Greenwhich, CT: JAI 
Press 1983), 19. 
102 Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations, (1995): 6. 
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an individual or group’s attention and somehow these voices must be managed by a 
group.  Humans use communication to  
differentiate and determine the nature of the materials they are working with, 
have to look for a unifying order without any assurance that there is a pre-
existing order in these materials, have to decide how to represent this order, and 
have to play indefinitely never knowing whether they have discovered a unifying 
order.104   
 
Equivocal environments prove challenging because of the inherent ambiguity involved 
and the difficulty required to determine a specific path of resolution.  Sensemaking 
suggests that individuals reduce equivocality, or the vast number of options before them, 
by relying on a person’s preconceptions or judgments that have established 
commitments which will cause an actor to choose a course of action which best fits those 
commitments.  Previous commitments or values will cause individuals to limit potential 
resolutions to those which appeal to their commitments.  Instead of humans weighing 
and evaluating all options, people “make sense of the things by seeing a world on which 
they already imposed what they believe.”105  When presented with a problem, humans 
rely on these commitments, or what Weick calls “cognitive maps,” “to set the boundaries 
of understanding from which we may determine how to correct errors or flaws.”106  
However, this problem solving method and often its solution follows from our own 
personal preconceptions, rather than a collection of potential possibilities.  Even more 
directly related to our preconceptions, we may first determine a solution or explanation 
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to a problem and then construct a narrative to make sense of how a variable error caused 
the problem.  Juries often reach a decision through this process by starting with a verdict 
“and then render that outcome sensible by constructing a plausible story.”107  
Commitments guide and shape how an actor interprets events and “constrain the 
meanings that people impose on streams of experience.”108 
The physical act of speaking also plays a key role in the sensemaking process 
because the individual act of speaking to another individual or group can influence how 
the speaker thinks about and evaluates a situation.  Weick provides an example of a 
young girl asking a profound question,to her father who has told her to be sure of her 
meaning before speaking; the young girl replies “‘How do I know what I think till I see 
what I say?’”109  The young girl’s comment reflects the importance speech serves for 
clarifying, ordering, and crystallizing human thought as humans look back 
retrospectively “to reconstruct predecisional histories” altering thoughts in accordance  
with the reactions of others or with the speaker’s own commitments and beliefs.110  
Anyone who has put thoughts on paper knows of the often shifting manner in which 
words and ideas are ordered, rarely does the first draft remain untouched.  Famous 
writers John Updike and Daniel Boorstin have reflected on the importance writing plays 
in a human’s process of thought.  Updike described writing as a process that “educates 
the writer as it goes along,” and Boorstin made a similar comment noting that “I write to 
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discover what I believe.”  Theses writers’ insights reflect the discovery process humans 
often experience when writing.  U.S. Circuit Judge Frank Coffin explains that in legal 
decisions writing “tells what’s wrong with the act of thinking.”111  The process of 
writing relates directly to the process of speech as humans use the communication 
process to refine, revise, and structure their thoughts.  Like Judge Coffin’s explanation 
of writing’s function, U.S. Circuit Judge Wade H. McCree has noted that “all of us have 
had seemingly brilliant ideas that turned out to be much less so when we attempted to 
put them on paper.  Every conscientious judge has struggled and finally changed his 
mind when confronted with the ‘opinion that won’t write.’”112    His comments resonate 
with justices who may change voting positions because the opinion “won’t write,” 
meaning that the justice authoring the opinion cannot find a Constitutional justification 
for their position, which may result in the authoring justice, and other justices, switching 
their vote, or altering the course of Constitutional justification.  Weick’s suggestion that 
communication plays a valuable cognitive function for humans should not be surprising 
given the important role writing plays in the decision making process.  Anyone who has 
practiced the delivery of a public speech may also realize the shifting nature of their 
speech as they begin to refine, revise, and structure their material.  As justices wade 
through the complex nature of a case in an hour, communicative interaction can have a 
dramatic cognitive influence on the way in which a justice understands and evaluates a 
                                                 
111 Frank M. Coffin, The Ways of a Judge: Views from the Federal Appellate Bench,  (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1980): 57. 
112 Wade H. McCree, Jr., “Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning,” 129 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 777 (1981): 790-91. 
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case.  Oral arguments provide a crucial moment for a justice “to know what [they] think” 
as they “see what [they] say.”113 The physical speech process of oral arguments 
influences the cognitive frame by which a justice understands a case and is another 
reason oral arguments prove so important to the decision making process.   
The public nature of oral argument also influences the role communication plays 
on the cognitive process humans use to make sense of information.  Public 
communicative interaction causes people to commit to a certain position whether they 
mean to or not, because “each party’s action is public, [and] irrevocable.”114  When an 
actor articulates a position, the group attributes that idea to the individual whether or not 
the individual holds that belief, generating a commitment for that individual regardless 
of his or her intention.  The communicative interaction “occurs in a committing context 
and also generates its own commitments.”115  At the Supreme Court when a justice 
offers up a potential path of resolution, the justices may begin to commit the justice to a 
certain position within the case.  The justice’s speech commits them to a particular idea 
which then may cause them to defend the validity of that position because “the action 
becomes bound to both parties and a search for justification intensifies.”116  The public 
action of committing to an idea and then justifying that idea through speech “exerts an 
effect on subsequent action,” which can lead actors to defend a position they may not 
have initially adhered to, because their pride prevents an overturning of their idea, or 
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114 Weick, Making Sense of the Organization, (2001): 15. 
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may cause an actor to defend a position so vehemently that they fail to consider other 
avenues.117  According to Weick, “justifications can turn into preferences that control 
subsequent attention and action.”118  A defense of the position by the actor may cause a 
cognitive shift which causes the actor to accept a position they did not originally accept, 
overlooking other courses of resolution.  And for groups, justification may “encourage 
forceful, sustained action that can change demands, rather than adapt to them,” 
potentially causing other justices to align with positions that are vigorously defended.119 
Finally communication in the sensemaking process can indicate whether humans 
have individually committed to a position before group consensus has been reached 
because “postdecision behavior differs markedly from predecision behavior.”120  During 
the predecision stage “people pay equal attention to alternatives in an effort to reduce 
their ignorance,” but in the postdecision stage, human “commitments marshall forces 
that destroy the plausibility of alternatives . . . these forces are non-rational” and causes 
humans to “pay more attention to the alternatives they eventually reject” as they create 
challenges and arguments against opposing viewpoints.121  Individuals who have not 
reached a decision will explore alternative options in an effort to gather information 
about competing positions, yet individuals who have made a decision will explore more 
heavily the position they will eventually reject, as a means of limiting equivocality and 
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preserving the integrity of their decision by noting flaws in competing positions.  The 
connection to judicial behavior in oral arguments is somewhat obvious in that justices 
who explore both sides equally may reflect predecision behavior while justices who 
pursue one-sided questions may reveal postdecision behavior. 
Sensemaking Pitfalls 
As a theory, Sensemaking does not necessarily consider the quality of humans’ 
decisions, but rather seeks to explain the process of human decision making.  Similarly 
Karl Weick does not typically evaluate Sensemaking as a positive or negative cognitive 
process, rather the majority of his scholarship focuses on capturing the process of 
sensemaking and articulating its nature.  However, in one study, Weick attempts to 
explain how the communication process of wilderness firefighters resulted in nearly a 
complete outfit of firefighters, or thirteen men, perishing in an emergency situation.  
Weick’s article suggests that the firefighters’ “deficient sensemaking,” created “positive 
illusions,” causing them to ignore competing messages and eventually lead to their 
deaths.122  Although Weick does not identify the characteristics of “deficient 
sensemaking,” it is clear in his scholarship that “blindspots,” occur in sensemaking 
because of an overreliance on personal commitments or cognitive maps.123  According 
to Weick humans “don’t see through concepts we see with them, and are sometimes 
                                                 
122 Karl Weick, “The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster.” 
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123 See Weick Making Sense of the Organization, (2001): 13, and Sensemaking in Organizations, (1995): 
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blinded by them.”124  Humans’ cognitive maps enable us to understand and process 
information in a manner that makes sense to us, and yet these maps may also cause 
humans to overlook potential solutions.     
While Weick has not elaborated upon the pitfalls of sensemaking, other scholars 
have; in a paper delivered to the CIA at the Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence 
Analysis, Warren Fishbein and Gregory Treverton examined the role of sensemaking 
during the analysis of Transnational Threats.  Fishbein and Treverton have noted that 
cognitive maps, or what they call “mental models . . . allow individuals to give meaning 
to, and thus efficiently process” large amounts of data, but mental models may “cause us 
to overlook reject, or forget important incoming information that is not in accord with 
our expectations.”125  Mental models influence how humans search information by 
“leading us to seek information that supports what we believe to be the case,” which has 
also been known as confirmatory bias.126  Overturning mental models may be difficult 
because humans rely on past successes to inform their current approach and a shift in 
thought process may result in humans feeling an unnerving sense of loss of control.  
Avoiding the feelings associated with a loss of control, explains why experts in various 
fields “whose highly developed models allow them to make quick and accurate 
judgments most of the time, are often the most likely to cling to longstanding 
                                                 
124 Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe, “Mindfulness and the Quality of Organizational Attention,” 
Organization Science 17.4, 518. 
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interpretation in the face of anomalous information” that can often lead to “astonishing 
misjudgments and misguided forecasts by bona fide experts.”127  In connection with 
mental models, Fishbein and Traverton identify a host of other behavior related to 
commitments and cognitive maps, such as judgment bias-“tendency to judge the 
probability of an event by the availability of examples of similar types of events rather 
than by its mathematical probability,” cultural bias-“belief that individuals in other 
cultures will act or react similarly to the way we do,”  motivational influences on 
thought- “desire to avoid addressing unpleasant issues,” group think-“desire for cohesion 
in small task groups … imposes conformity on thinking,” and organizational lock-in-
“organization as a whole … primarily searches for and inevitably finds information 
consonant with prevailing ideas,” effectively engaging in confirmatory bias at the group 
level.128  Fishbein and Traverton identify pitfalls related to mental models, but mental 
models are created by a process known as associative thought. 
Nyanaponika Thera’s work distinguishes sensemaking behavior in a process she 
identifies as associative thinking in which humans interpret the world by “select[ing] 
certain distinctive marks” and associating the marks with our response to them.129  When 
humans reencounter those marks, we “release a standard reaction,” which “makes it 
unnecessary for us to apply new effort and painstaking scrutiny to each step in a 
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sequence. The result is a great simplification in life.”130  Although life may be 
cognitively simpler through associative thought it may “also bring grave dangers,” by 
“perpertuat[ing] and strengthen[ing] faulty or incomplete initial observations, errors of 
judgment, and emotional prejudices.”131  Incomplete observations “may prove quite in 
adequate and entail grave consequences if mechanically applied to changed 
circumstances.”132  Misguided associative thought can cause “a strong instinctive 
dislike” or connection to “things, places, or persons which in some way are merely 
reminiscent” of the pleasant or unpleasant experience.133  Associative thought can cause 
humans to take mental shortcuts by relying on prior experiences. 
Associative thinking and mental models both reflect behavior found in 
sensemaking because at the heart of all three theories lies the prominence of human 
commitments in decision making.  As a theory, Sensemaking subsumes associative 
thought and mental models into its larger collection of behavior, but for Weick either a 
reliance on mental models or associative thinking points to the danger of “thoughtless, 
faulty, uncontrolled thinking” in the process of sensemaking.134  Weick’s cure for poor 
sensemaking or an overt reliance on commitments is through a process he calls 
“mindfulness.”135  He describes mindfulness as  
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133 Nyanaponika Thera, The Power of Mindfulness. 52. 
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the combination of ongoing scrutiny of existing expectations, continuous 
refinement and differentiation of expectations based on newer experiences, 
willingness and capability to invent new expectations that make sense of 
unprecedented events, a more nuanced appreciation of context and ways to deal 
with it, and identification of new dimensions of context that improve foresight 
and current functioning.136 
 
Weick’s description of mindfulness is somewhat idealistic in calling for humans to be 
prescient of their commitments and decisions at all times.  His characterization resonates 
with the more common conceptions of “nonjudgmental observation, impartial 
watchfulness, goalless awareness, awareness of change,” and the always popular “keep 
an open mind.”137  He believes mindfulness “weakens the tendency to simplify events 
into familiar events and strengthens the tendency to differentiate events into unfamiliar 
events” by capturing “unique particulars, i.e. differences, nuances, discrepancies, and 
outliers that slow the speed with which details are normalized.”138  Weick’s application 
of mindfulness does not seem particularly useful in application, but his distinction 
between “mindfulness” and “thoughtless, faulty, uncontrolled thinking” is useful when 
distinguishing among types of sensemaking behavior that can be understood as positive 
or negative behavior.        
This study is less concerned with the topic of mindfulness and more interested in 
identifying what might be characterized as negative or biased sensemaking behavior.  
Weick’s distinction between two types of sensemaking behavior suggests that 
Sensemaking may attempt to explain a wide array of decision making behavior both 
                                                 
136 Weick et al., Managing the Unexpected. 42. 
137 Weick et al., “Mindfulness and the Quality of Organizational Attention,” 518. 
138 Weick et al., “Mindfulness and the Quality of Organizational Attention,” 518. 
 
79 
 
positive and negative.  At one end, sensemakers may recognize their own commitments 
and beliefs and remain mindful of how these prejudgments may influence the 
consideration of opposing positions.  These “mindful” sensemakers may rely on 
commitments to make sense of a situation, but prevent their commitments from 
excluding opposing positions.  Mindful sensemakers continue to explore potential 
solutions to problems without being controlled by commitments, which enable them 
both to recognize a greater number of solutions, and reach a more fully considered 
position.  In groups mindful sensemakers would remain aware that communication may 
negatively influence how others conceive of a problem, and welcome other perspectives.  
At the other end of the spectrum, “deficient” or “biased” sensemakers remain unaware of 
their commitments and the influence prejudgments have on their decisions.  In addition, 
biased sensemakers may be aware of their commitments, recognize they are pursuing 
them, but do not recognize that communication influences others’ consideration.  These 
“biased” sensemakers are controlled and influenced by their commitments, cannot 
consider opposing viewpoints, and potentially reach solutions that are limited by the 
scope of their consideration.  Although not always creating negative results, biased 
sensemakers reflect a poor level of decision making, because ignoring all possible 
solutions may cause them to overlook superior alternatives.  As biased sensemakers 
pursue solutions that appeal to prior commitments, they may also negatively influence 
how other members of a group evaluate solutions, because they may hinder the group’s 
consideration of potential alternatives.     
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Delineating between “mindful” and “biased” sensemakers requires researchers to 
pay particular attention to an actor’s communication.  Mindful sensemakers will reflect a 
more balanced engagement of issues, whereas biased sensemakers should demonstrate 
an obvious preference for a specific course of action.  For Weick, communication is the 
“action [that] effects cognition” and it influences human thought on both the individual 
and group level in complex and dynamic ways.  Biased sensemakers will use 
communication, perhaps aggressively, to cognitively reinforce their own position as well 
as influence the positions of others.   Mindful sensemakers will communicate more 
openly with others in order to engage in a sharing of information.  Under Sensemaking, 
communication “leads the sensemaking process; it does not follow it,” in other words, 
communication does not reflect the decision making process, but rather generates the 
movement towards a decision.  Following the communicative interaction of sensemakers 
becomes an important component of understanding an actor’s process of decision 
making.  With the prominent role communication plays in oral arguments at the 
Supreme Court, oral arguments provide an opportunity to observe sensemaking in 
action.  The justices and advocates’ communication shapes the sensemaking process and 
in turn the justices’ consideration of a case.   
In summary of the vast landscape covered thus far, this chapter has identified a 
crucial question at the center of studies on Supreme Court oral arguments, foregrounded 
the primary fields focused on oral arguments, exposed the differences between how each 
field approaches the study of oral arguments, laid forth a preliminary case for the 
importance of studying oral arguments from a Communication vantage point, and 
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explained the basic theoretical decision making model adopted for this study.  This 
chapter has hopefully provided readers with the necessary foundation for understanding 
the following chapters.  In the next chapter, this study will attempt to lay forth a theory 
of judicial sensemaking by articulating specific behavior of sensemaking justices.  
Methodologically, the study will also diverge from previous scholars who remained 
detached from the text of oral arguments, and who did not give close attention to the 
discursive process.  Rather than provide only a theory of decision making, the following 
chapter explains the practical implications, and dangers of justices implementing 
sensemaking in oral arguments. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
NEW QUESTION: ORAL ARGUMENTS “MATTER,” BUT HOW? 
 
PROPOSING A THEORY AND METHOD TO CAPTURE THE MADNESS 
 
The previous chapter provided an overview of the way in which various fields 
understood the role of oral argument before the Supreme Court, and sought to explain 
why various researchers may believe that oral arguments do or do not “matter” to a case.  
Previous researchers have adopted various decision making models to explain how 
justices approach oral argument, yet these popular models ironically ignore the role of 
communication in humans’ decision making process.  As a model of decision making, 
Sensemaking may prove useful to researchers who study Supreme Court oral arguments 
because it emphasizes the important role communication plays in the decision making 
process.  This chapter will build upon the previous explanation of Sensemaking by 
articulating what behavior sensemaking justices may display, and explaining why 
sensemaking may be an undesirable process of judicial decision making.  Sensemaking 
will then be situated between two prominent areas of communication: Rhetoric and 
Discourse Analysis.  Sensemaking’s connection to these areas of study leads to the 
adoption of a variety of methodological approaches in the study of oral arguments.     
In chapter II I proposed that scholars studying oral argument should consider the 
theory of Sensemaking as an alternative model to understanding judicial behavior.  My 
goal in this proposal is not to dispute or completely overturn other models of judicial 
decision making, but rather to suggest a more comprehensive model which theorizes the 
influence and importance of communication upon the human decision making process.  
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As a theory of decision making, Sensemaking’s concern with language and 
communication makes it particularly well suited to contribute toward understanding 
another dimension of oral arguments before the Supreme Court.    We have already 
discussed three theoretical models of human decision making adopted by prior scholars 
to understand the role of oral argument (strategic actor, attitudinal, and legalist).  None 
of these models, nor do prior scholars in law, political science, and psychology consider 
the role communication plays in influencing a justice’s decision making ability.  I would 
like to propose the adoption of Sensemaking when evaluating Supreme Court oral 
arguments because of Sensemaking’s emphasis upon the important role communication 
plays in the decision making process.   
Why Sensemaking at the Supreme Court? 
Karl Weick’s theory of Sensemaking follows a long history of psychological 
studies which suggest that humans respond to their personal commitments and seek to 
fulfill those commitments through the least amount of effort.139  During the process of 
reaching a decision, theories of sensemaking propose that humans will avoid searching 
for all potential courses of action because that process makes it more difficult to reach a 
decision due, in part, to time limitations, and the cognitive difficulty involved in 
selecting the best course of action among similar possibilities.  The process of 
sensemaking opposes fundamental assumptions the strategic actor model or the formal 
                                                 
139 For more broad applications of sensemaking see Gareth Morgan, Peter J. Frost, and Louis R. Pondy, 
Organizational Symbolism (Greenwhich, CT: JAI Press, 1983), 3-35.  Gerald R. Salanick and Jeffrey 
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84 
 
legalism model relies upon, and most nearly accords with the attitudinal model of 
decision making.  Although some scholars have advocated understanding Supreme Court 
justices as strategic actors or rational legalists, within oral arguments, justices’ 
statements, arguments, and questions reveal at times a clear communicative emphasis 
and preferential treatment of counsels reflecting a process more nearly associated with 
sensemaking.140  Scholars studying Supreme Court decision making should consider 
sensemaking as an alternative possibility for explaining how justices reach a decision 
because it emphasizes the importance of language in the process of decision making and 
explains behavior that lawyers and other justices can expect and react to.  Previous 
models of decision making do not suggest how justices will respond in oral arguments, 
nor provide explanations of their behavior.  The following section briefly revisits 
previous models of judicial decision making, and proposes why Sensemaking should be 
considered as an alternative theory of understanding judicial decision making, and thus 
emphasizes the importance of studying rhetorical discursive interaction in the Court’s 
oral arguments.    
Richard Posner’s How Judges Think lists nine dominant theoretical positions for 
interpreting judicial behavior; however, three theoretical perspectives seem to dominate 
the scholarly literature surrounding oral arguments.141  The formal legalist model is 
perhaps the oldest and most idealistic model of decision making applied to 
                                                 
140 By communicative emphasis I mean that justices will speak to and engage one counsel more than 
another, and they may assist one counsel by offering simple arguments or reframing a counsel’s argument 
in a manner that is more amenable to the Court.  An imbalanced focus and assistance of certain counsels 
can have an obvious impact on the manner in which justices understand a case. 
141 Richard Posner, How Judges Think (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2008). 
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understanding judges.142  Under the legalist model, judges are described as impartial and 
objective when approaching a case, using the constitution, statues and laws, and 
precedent to reach a judgment.  The legalist model assumes our country’s laws are 
always capable of determining “correct” answers to the legal questions brought before 
judges.  Judges serve as completely rational, fully impartial humans who divine legal 
frameworks to determine the fated legal judgment in a case.  “Of course, judges still 
subscribe to the legal model, at least for public consumption” because judges have a 
vested interest in the public believing that “it is law – and not the personal politics of 
individual judges – that controls judicial decision making.”143  However, humans can 
rarely separate their personal experiences from the decision making process, because 
they rely on the personal values, and life experiences that have shaped their perspective 
of the world in order to make their decisions.  Judges may be influenced by the political 
or social bent of their law school, or their experiences growing up in wealth or poverty.  
All of a person’s life experiences impact their understanding and evaluation of the 
world.  It is impossible to fully separate engrained experiences from a person’s decision 
making process.     
In reaction to the idealistic legalist model, the attitudinal model suggests that 
justices are incapable of legal objectivity, and instead their personal emotions and values 
serve as the primary guide of their decisions.  Where legalists advance rational 
                                                 
142 See Posner, How Judges Think  p. 41-56 and Segal and Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model Revisited, 48-85. 
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objectivism as the primary means of decision making, attitudinalists argue for emotion’s 
primacy in judicial decisions.  Justices’ “attitudes and values serve as filters” thereby 
causing “the decision maker to pay more attention to those arguments supporting his or 
her bias, while denigrating those arguments that do not.”144  In addition, attitudinalists 
suggest that values, and emotions resolve cases if each counsel has made equally 
compelling arguments based on the legal model.  Faced with a situation of multiple legal 
equivocalities, justices must rely on their “ideological attitudes and values” to resolve 
the case’s legal issues.145  As a compromise between the emotional extremes of the 
attitudinal model and the rational objectivism of the legalist model, the strategic actor 
model has emerged.  Chapter II spent a good deal of time discussing the strategic actor, 
so I will refrain from another lengthy explanation, but it is important to remember the 
contextual and emotional constraints that influence human decision making within the 
strategic actor model.  The strategic actor model depicts justices as information gatherers 
who attempt to account for a variety of factors (political, societal, legal, and personal) in 
order to make their decision.  Under the strategic actor model, emotions continue to play 
a role in decision making, but personal beliefs are balanced with contextual factors that 
could influence a justice’s decision. 
Each of these models provides researchers with unique approaches to 
understanding judicial decision making; however, these models often shift in their 
distinction according to each researcher, and each model has certain limitations which 
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make it ill suited to respond to particular issues.  As models of decision making, the 
previous three perspectives are focused primarily on the end result of a decision or, in 
this instance, a judge’s final vote, instead of focusing on the process that leads to the 
result, a key distinction in Sensemaking studies.  The three perspectives view judges’ 
votes as the result of their values, the political environment, or rational legal reasoning.  
Yet human decision making is often a messy affair and consists of numerous micro 
decisions that lead to the final decision, with the possibility that final decisions may be 
revised years later.  Following the process of how humans make decisions, such as oral 
arguments,  that lead towards a final decision, in this study the announcement of an 
opinion, can teach us more about how humans “make sense” of the complex decision 
making process and foreground areas of improvement.  Studying the communication 
between humans sheds light on the decision making process.  Justices’ discussion of 
legal questions, or an advocate’s ability to respond to a question or advance an argument 
would likely influence the way in which justices understand a case.  The manner in 
which justices are exposed to and consider information in oral arguments could 
drastically affect their vote, yet decision making models often overlook the process of 
decision making and the role of communication within this process.  In previous studies 
of oral argument, researchers often display a handful of statements by justices within 
oral arguments as evidence of predispositions or bias in a judges’ decision making.  In 
these instances, communication is solely reflective of an apriori belief, but researchers 
ignore the process by which oral arguments could be constructing justices’ beliefs and 
judgments instead of only reflecting them.     
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As an alternative to previous models of judicial decision making, legal scholars 
should begin understanding judges as “sensemakers,” humans trying to make sense of 
the situation.  Through the theory of Sensemaking, scholars “focus on process,” and “the 
ways [in which] people generate what they interpret” rather than emphasizing an actor’s 
relationship to their final decision.146  Through his research into organizations, Weick’s 
study of sensemaking provides a number of benefits that other decision making models 
overlook. 147  In particular, Sensemaking foregrounds the role of discourse in the 
development of a person’s understanding.  However, instead of language reflecting a 
person’s ideas, Weick suggests that the very act of speaking creates and sustains ideas, 
thus “invention . . . precedes interpretation.”148  By employing the theory of 
Sensemaking, oral arguments shift from an environment reflective of symptomatic 
models of decision making, to a rhetorical discursive site; where, through justices’ 
interaction in oral arguments, justices create their own view of a case, making oral 
arguments a site “less about the discovery” and more “about the invention” of a 
position.149  Therefore the process in reaching a decision becomes more important than 
the final decision, because how the process is conducted is largely responsible for the 
                                                 
146 Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations, 13. 
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outcome of the product or judgment.  Emphasizing the process of oral arguments 
foregrounds the importance of oral argument as a site of activity capable of both 
informing and shaping a justice’s opinion, where the presentation of information, 
arguments, and ideas may have subtle but dramatic consequences in the approach to 
their final decision.  If a justice is unable to pursue a line of questioning, then not only 
has their collection of information been hampered, but their ability to create and shape 
their opinion has also been limited.  Simply put, the manner in which justices engage in 
oral arguments influences not only the information and arguments justices are exposed 
to, but also the ability of justices to formulate their own position.   
In applying Karl Weick’s notion of Sensemaking to Supreme Court decision 
making, I am not suggesting that Weick’s Sensemaking should supplant other previous 
decision making models, but rather that Sensemaking can supplement our understanding 
of human decision making by uncovering previously overlooked rhetorical discursive 
interactions.  The strategic actor model, for example, claims that justices gather all 
possible information and then select a decision which best reflects their preferred policy 
in relationship to potential constraints (in this case the political environment, Congress, 
who could overturn their decisions, or the President, who could ignore their judgments).  
However, the process of decision making is complex and may contain elements of both 
the strategic actor model and Sensemaking.  An actor may weigh possible choices, but 
the selection of potential choices may depend on personal values; an actor’s choice may 
be related more directly with their personal values than strategic considerations.  Or the 
physical act of talking through a potential position in oral arguments, may lead a justice 
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to confirm their initial suspicions or alter a previously held position.  As a theory, 
Sensemaking foregrounds the role of communication in the decision making process, 
making it an ideal model to improve our understanding of Supreme Court oral argument.   
Theory of Judicial Sensemaking 
Weick’s theory of Sensemaking contains numerous complexities related to social 
interaction among people.  However, not all of his insights relate directly to the Supreme 
Court, and what I have explained previously, and will lay forth, is a concentrated 
distillation of Weick’s understanding of sensemaking.  As I have mentioned previously, 
Sensemaking, as a model for understanding oral arguments, excels when compared to 
other decision making models because it considers and evaluates the role of 
communication in the decision making process.  Weick’s understanding of 
communication extends past simple transmission models, adopted by other scholars 
studying the Court’s arguments.  Instead, Weick theorizes that communication plays a 
wide role in generating thought and belief rather than only reflecting it.  Applied to the 
environment of oral arguments, Sensemaking offers a wealth of insight for 
understanding the importance of oral arguments, as well as the cognitive dangers 
associated with the process of sensemaking in group settings.   
The Complexities of Oral Arguments 
Weick’s study of sensemaking as a communicative process in organizations can 
provide a window by which we may gain insight about the justices’ decision making 
process when applied to Supreme Court oral arguments.  While it is true that oral 
arguments represent a brief communicative moment in the justices’ decision making 
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process, it is a crucial time in which justices crystallize their views, and occasionally 
change their minds, as earlier quotes have revealed.  Justice Stevens has mentioned that 
“most of the time, by the time argument is over, I’m fairly well persuaded to one side or 
the other,” and Justice Scalia has also noted that “a persuasive counsel can persuade me 
that I ought to flip to this side rather than the other,” if I am “going into a case right on 
the knife’s edge.”150  Whether a justice confirms his or her suspicions, reverses a voting 
position, or seeks direction from both counsels, the justice’s approach and treatment of 
oral arguments is crucial to understanding judicial decision making, and sensemaking 
can assist us in better understanding the process of oral arguments. 
In addition to the formative role oral arguments may play in the justices’ 
understanding of a case, oral arguments are also the most public view of the decision 
making process by which the American public forms its opinion of the justices’ 
consideration of the case.  Due to its public nature, at the very minimum, the Court 
should display behavior that indicates a fair and equal representation of a case.  Justice 
Thomas has stated that “oral arguments should be a conversation with non-members of 
the Court.  They should talk to the person.  That person is not an enemy … that person is 
participating in an important decision making process and I think they should be treated 
that way with respect and dignity we expect.”151  He goes on to say that “the wonderful 
thing about oral argument is that people get to come to a final institution in our system 
and say their peace. … I would love to have them leave this building saying ‘I said my 
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peace’.”152  And if the justices do not feel that they owe the public a display of fair 
behavior, this section will conclude with a list of dangers that may be created by judges 
who unwittingly rely on sensemaking. 
The everyday mundane court case often requires judges or juries to face a 
complex environment full of ambiguity and competing perspectives.  At the Supreme 
Court, justices take on an even more daunting task because previous lower courts may 
have disagreed about reasonable understandings of the case or lower courts may be 
confused about how to resolve constitutional issues.  Cases accepted for review by the 
Supreme Court may contain numerous competing positions offered by advocates, and 
amicus curiae briefs in order to assist the Court in its decision.  Oral argument serves as 
a site where justices may ask questions or test arguments in order to begin crystallizing 
their decisions in the case.  The variety of “voices” both by the justices, and advocates, 
as well as counsels’ briefs and amicus curiae briefs all collide within oral argument; 
making oral argument the perfect environment for studying sensemaking, because 
multiple voices, or equivocality, compete for the justices’ attention.    
In oral arguments, mindful sensemaking justices will look to explore and press 
each side relatively equally in order to prevent any unnecessary influence by 
commitments.  Justices mindful of preconceptions should allow colleagues to pursue 
questioning and not engage in overly intense argumentation.  This may sound like naïve 
idealism, but it is rather a practical expectation that justices be aware of their 
commitments and interact in oral arguments with the understanding that a justice’s 
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comments influence both the way the speaker and the other justices think about and 
evaluate a case.  In general, justices should be mindful of their own biases and refrain 
from unduly influencing other justices.  Why?  Because at the highest level of decision 
making, the justices, lawyers, and the American public should expect an inquiry that 
explores all potential solutions, in order to make the best possible decision, the 
attainment and distribution of Justice. 
In contrast to mindful justices, biased sensemaking justices will look to reduce 
“equivocality” and “introduce stability into an equivocal flow of events” by limiting the 
complexity and equivocality of potential arguments.153  Biased sensemaking justices 
may simplify equivocality because of the overwhelming feeling created by multiple 
arguments, or because arguments may either appeal to or conflict with justices’ 
commitments.  Justice’s commitments “‘marshall forces that destroy the plausibility of 
alternatives and remove their/(alternatives’) ability to inhibit action.’”154  As justices’ 
commitments destroy challenging arguments, justices’ “commitments [also] elevate 
preferences and eliminate obstacles,” thereby guiding biased sensemaking justices to 
preferable alternatives.155  As a site of significant debate, oral argument provides justices 
with the opportunity to reinforce, reaffirm, or confirm their commitments.  A biased 
sensemaking justice will likely use commitments to limit exploration and simplify the 
decision making process, more heavily challenging or “pay[ing] more attention to the 
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alternatives they eventually reject.”156  Biased sensemaking justices will also look to 
advance arguments to influence their colleagues’ positions, and may aggressively 
attempt to dismantle an opposing counsel’s argument, both to confirm the justice’s own 
position, and to persuade the other justices to vote against the opposing counsel.  Justices 
who employ biased sensemaking threaten the very foundation of judicial theory by 
making obvious their inability to fairly consider a case, and by exposing a clear 
preference for one side. 
While biased sensemaking justices may attack counselors opposing their 
commitments, conversely it seems reasonable that justices would support the counselor 
with whom their commitments most align, but this support may come by way of silence 
or assistance in oral argument.  Justices assisting counsels may ask simple questions to 
allow counsels to foreground important concepts, or may rescue counsels from 
disadvantageous arguments.  Apart from personal commitments, biased sensemaking 
justices likely enter oral argument with preconceptions and prejudgments of how they 
will rule in the case because of issues identified in the case’s briefs.  The biased 
sensemaking justice would likely have a judgment in mind that he or she would seek 
confirmation and support for through the correlating counselor.  Justices using biased 
sensemaking would attack the counsel which presented an argument that opposed the 
justice’s commitments in order to limit equivocality or even publicly expose the flaws of 
the lawyer’s argument.  Justices should champion counselors who support, or attack 
those who challenge, the justices’ commitments.  Weick notes “that once a justification 
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begins to form, it exerts effects on subsequent action,” and biased sensemaking justices 
may display communicative behavior that suggests prior formed justifications and exert 
their influence on arguments opposing or supporting a position. 157  Instead of using oral 
argument as a place to test arguments for the best possible choice that will eventually 
agree with justices’ personal values, biased sensemaking justices use oral argument to 
reinforce their commitments and convince themselves of the validity of their position.  
The action of oral argument tempers and strengthens biased justices’ convictions; their 
commitments have “created a self-fulfilling prophecy that builds confidence in the 
prophecy.”  “Both the justification and the action mutually strengthen one another” so 
that justices reaffirm their principles as well as the judgment they were already 
considering delivering simply by participating in oral argument.158  Preconceptions, 
commitments, and justifications can all play significant roles by influencing how justices 
judge cases.   
Biased sensemaking justices may also vigorously pursue a position, intentionally 
or unintentionally due to an intense belief in, or strong dislike for, a position.  While not 
entirely separate from equivocality, commitments, and cognitive justifications, justices’ 
communicative interaction in oral arguments can impact how they consider and evaluate 
a case, and at times arguments can grow intense between justices or between justices and 
advocates.  The intensity by which justices pursue a position in oral arguments can also 
mentally influence them in the consideration of a case because “intense action … enacts 
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a portion of the environment people confront.”159  If a justice vigorously pursues a 
particular position either in support for, or rejection of, an argument, then the 
sensemaking justice may inhibit the ability to see other potential alternatives.  A justice’s 
“intensity guided by commitment can change the environment to resemble more closely 
the justification that was first imposed by it,” thus biased sensemaking justices may 
attempt to “impose” their view of the case on advocates and other justices by actively 
pursuing arguments that reflect favorable positions.160 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, oral arguments provide an environment 
where speech may influence cognition.  In oral arguments, justices may “learn what 
[they] believe” or “know what [they] think” as they “see what [they] say,” by talking 
through ideas, revising, refining, and structuring concepts as they proceed.  The 
communicative interaction in oral arguments proves essential to the decision making 
process as justices crystallize their beliefs, thus following and capturing the 
communicative process can provide a means of understanding how oral arguments may 
shape the manner in which justices understand a case.  As Justice Scalia has mentioned, 
justices “don’t often have their minds changed by oral advocacy, but very often have 
their minds made up” by it.161  Justice Stevens has also made a similar statement stating 
that “most of the time, by the time argument is over, I’m fairly well persuaded to one 
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side or the other.”162  Both of these statements suggest that oral argument provides the 
justices with a crucial moment in which they crystallize their views of the case, and 
therefore places oral argument under serious scrutiny because the communicative 
interaction can have significant consequences for the manner in which a justice evaluates 
a case. 
In summary of the behavior of biased sensemaking justices, we should expect to 
see justices heavily pursuing positions they will vote against, and actively support, or 
remain silent, on positions they support.  Justices will display sensemaking behavior 
through communicative interactions with their colleagues and arguing advocates.  While 
seemingly simple in premise (track how justice’s communicate), a sensemaking justice’s 
support or challenge for a position may take the form of: (1. disparities between the 
persistent interruptions counsels endure, (2. a large quantity of challenging or assisting 
statements, (3. a disparity in time by which justices challenge or assist advocates or the 
time in which justices allow advocates an opportunity to advance arguments or address 
questions, (4. the respect justices show toward arguments from both sides, and (5. the 
justices general treatment of both counsels.  Lopsided communicative behavior in oral 
arguments (i.e. speech favorable toward one counsel and not another), may indicate the 
potential existence of biased sensemaking within a justices’ decision making process.  
But regardless of the cause of lopsided communication, a justice’s physical act of speech 
may influence his or her cognition, which makes the environment of oral argument a 
significant site where the justices’ consideration of a case may be formed and finalized.  
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The articulation of behavior by sensemaking justices may seem obvious to some, 
and I would agree that justices commonly treat advocates differently; however, it is 
important to remember that current models of decision making ignore communicative 
interactions in oral argument.  Strange as it may seem, previous scholars of oral 
arguments have relied on decision making models that fail to consider the role of 
communication.  Sensemaking foregrounds the importance of communicative 
interactions within oral arguments and provides an alternative model for understanding 
oral arguments.  While Sensemaking highlights the role of communication in the 
decision making process, as a model it also helps expose the potential dangers and 
pitfalls associated with the process of sensemaking.   
Dangers of Judicial Sensemaking 
Because Sensemaking emphasizes the guiding role of a priori commitments, 
values, and emotions it is a less than ideal form of decision making for justices.  Within 
the Court’s architecture, the ubiquitous depiction of blind lady Justice with scales and 
sword in hand reveals the balanced and approach and objectivity by which the justices 
must consider a case in order to obtain justice for the parties involved.  Justices unaware 
of the process of sensemaking may fail to consider how preconceptions may influence 
their understanding of a case and any communication involved about a case.  
Sensemaking justices, through their communicative interactions, may limit the 
consideration of alternatives, or may negatively influence how their collagues 
understand the case.  Justices relying on sensemaking present a real danger to the 
decision making process at the individual and group level because their communicative 
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interactions can negatively influence both their colleagues’ consideration of the case as 
well as the sensemaking justice’s understanding of the case.  There are some obvious 
dangers resulting from sensemaking justices.  (1). Before reaching a final decision, a 
justice may explore both sides of an issue but his or her commitments may lead towards 
a decision which accords with the justice personally rather than in strict legal terms.  (2). 
Or a justice may heavily explore and challenge a disfavored position, only to reject it 
later, having wasted a counsel’s, and the other justices’ precious time.  (3). An active 
sensemaking justice may prevent counsels from effectively presenting their arguments, 
hampering other justices’ consideration of the case. (4). If a justice has already reached a 
final decision, he or she may seek to prove an advocate wrong that challenges their 
decision and conversely he or she may champion an advocate who aligns with their 
position.  Justices employing sensemaking in the decision making process fail to 
systematically and objectively evaluate the case, allowing emotions and prior 
commitments to primarily shape their consideration of a case.   
In addition to the guiding role emotions, and values may play in sensemaking 
justices’ decision making process, justices may also reach decisions without listening to 
and weighing all potential arguments because of other prior commitments developed by 
institutional constraints and previous experience.  Justices only have a limited amount of 
time to consider potential arguments and sensemaking may save them time and energy.  
In oral argument the justices only have 30 minutes by which they may explore an 
advocate’s solution to a case.  Justices may reach decisions through sensemaking 
because they do not want to expend a significant amount of time and energy dedicated to 
 
100 
 
resolving a certain case due to a variety of factors, such as the sheer volume of papers 
and arguments informing a case, approaching institutional deadlines, and other more 
socially significant cases.  Justices may use their previous legal experience to frame and 
order a case’s information and arguments in a certain manner.  Justices repeatedly hear 
arguments concerning topics that have been tempered by decades of legal practice and 
have entrenched their perspectives.  The justice’s entrenched perspectives are unlikely to 
change and may prevent justices from fairly considering both issues of a case.  Justices 
may also use their experience in sensemaking by having ready preconceived solutions, 
which may have resolved cases in the past, or hunches about how a case will and should 
develop, which may constrain an exploration of other possible options, thus making 
sensemaking a more time and energy efficient process, but in turn leading to a poorly 
evaluated case.  Cognitively relying on commitments reduces numerous possibilities and 
reduces choices to those which best align with a justice’s commitments, thereby 
minimizing an argument’s complexity and limiting the confusion caused by multiple 
possibilities.  Commitments are a valuable source for justices’ decision making, because 
they assist in reducing the complexity of an argument, the time spent on determining a 
solution, and the confusion of multiple possibilities.  However, commitments may cause 
the justices to overlook any systematic and balanced consideration of a case.   
Sensemaking proves significant to understanding judicial decision making 
because it emphasizes the role communication plays in the process by which humans 
reach a decision.  Sensemaking also foregrounds the role in which a variety of 
commitments may cognitively influence humans’ decision making process.  The 
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dynamics between communication and cognitive commitments are complex because 
communication may both reflect and create individual and group commitments.  
Sensemaking may lead justices to poor decision making, causing them to overlook 
superior arguments or more preferable outcomes.  At the individual level, sensemaking 
justices may skew how other justices understand a case, particularly within oral 
argument.  On the group level, sensemaking justices may attack a counsel so vigorously 
that they prevent the advocate from capably articulating his or her argument.  The 
justices may display a variety of communicative behavior in oral arguments, and while 
theory may help provide greater insight into the justices’ interaction, sensemaking will 
be useless unless we can identify its presence in oral argument.  The following sections 
include preliminary evidence of sensemaking from the justices’ own reflections and 
accounts of their behavior in oral argument.  Building upon the justices’ testimony, I 
move into a discussion of the critical areas of communication studies related to the 
theory of Sensemaking.  In order to study sensemaking, I propose two prevalent areas of 
communication studies that relate closely to sensemaking: discourse analysis and 
rhetorical criticism.  Finally, the chapter concludes by explaining the methods adopted to 
study Supreme Court oral arguments and the benefits and consequences related to these 
methods.  
Preliminary Evidence of Sensemaking 
As noted previously, Sensemaking is primarily concerned with explaining how 
humans determine a solution by making sense of a situation that contains numerous 
complex and reasonable variables.  Oral arguments provide a unique site where 
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advocates present highly complex and reasonable arguments to the justices.  Supreme 
Court justices have the unenviable task of determining which advocates’ arguments align 
most closely with the Constitution, or the justice’s desired preferences.  Chief Justice 
Roberts describes the complexities surrounding a case when entering oral argument:  
Some cases seem clear.  You do go in with I’m kinda leaning this way; 
usually you’ve got concerns. . . . Even when you’re tentatively leaning, 
you have issues you want to raise to give the other side a chance to sway 
you.  Some cases you go in and you don’t have a clue and you’re really 
looking forward to the argument because you want a little degree of 
certainty. . . . Other cases you go in and there are competing certainties.  
The language seems pretty clear this way, but it really leads to some bad 
results.  What are you going to do?  Or, yes this precedent does seem to 
control, but this consequence is too troubling. . . . That’s a much more 
typical situation going into oral argument.163 
 
Interestingly, Chief Justice Roberts does not mention the Constitution in the articulation 
of his decision making process, perhaps because it is implicitly understood.  Of course 
this does not mean the Constitution fails to play a role in his thought process, but his 
comments do reveal the highly complex arguments found within oral argument and the 
emotional and cognitive struggles resulting from those arguments.  Justice Stevens has 
also noted the important role oral arguments play in making sense of a case.  In response 
to Bryan Garner in which he asks Justice Stevens whether he ever leaves oral argument 
undecided about a case, Justice Stevens mentions that “most of the time when argument 
is over, I’m fairly well persuaded to one side or the other,” which suggests the justices 
use oral argument as an opportunity to confirm initial suspicions or tentative 
commitments.  As Chief Justice Brennan commented, “even though [we] have read all 
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the briefs before oral argument,” a justice’s “whole notion of a case . . . crystallizes at 
oral argument.”164  Rhetorical discursive interaction clearly plays an essential role in 
shaping the manner in which justices understand a case, and thus studying how justices 
and advocates interact in oral arguments is important in learning about how justices’ 
decision making processes are hindered or assisted by communicative interaction.   
Oral argument clearly is a complex environment that justices use to make sense 
of a case, and sensemaking as a communicative interaction can be both an intentional 
and unintentional act.  With the public’s expectation that justices remain impartial, it 
seems unlikely that judges and justices will admit to intentional adherence to their 
personal commitments.  However, justices and judges do admit to the limited ability of 
oral argument to change completely their minds.  Justice Antonin Scalia has described 
the unchanging nature or justices’ voting tendency when he stated “‘to call our 
discussion of a case a conference is really a misnomer.  It’s much more a statement of 
the views of each of the nine Justices.’”165  His characterization of oral argument as 
simply a statement of views may be one reason why Justice Scalia believes “judges 
don’t often have their minds changed by oral advocacy, but very often have their minds 
made up” by it.166  Justices likely approach oral argument with a position in mind and 
then, through acts of sensemaking by way of discursive interaction, confirm their 
suspicions.  Or justices’ legal philosophies may have been tempered by years of 
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encountering similar legal principles year in and year out, and, as Chief Justice 
Rhenquist has noted “‘it would be surprising if [justices] voted differently than they had 
the previous time.’”167  Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist both note the 
entrenched nature of justices’ commitments that heavily influence their decision making, 
identifying a clear connection to basic principles of sensemaking.   
As time tempered legal philosophies may influence the initial position a justice 
would support, briefs also play a role in presenting arguments that may sway justices to 
one side or another before entering argument.  Justice Ginsburg reveals that she has 
“seen few victories snatched at oral argument from a total defeat the judges had 
anticipated on the basis of briefs.”168 Justice Ginsburg’s statement emphasizes the nature 
by which justices approach questioning.  Their readings of the brief have already 
influenced a particular decision, and they are in turn, unlikely to change their minds.  
Although not explicit in his reference to briefs, Chief Justice Rehnquist identifies that 
“‘in a significant minority of cases in which I have heard oral argument, I have left the 
bench feeling differently than I did when I came on the bench…the change is seldom a 
full one-hundred and eighty degree swing.’”169  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s statement 
accords with Justice Ginsburg’s as he suggests that oral argument does not typically 
serve to change minds, and calls attention to the entrenched views of justices as they sit 
for oral arguments.  Chief Justice Marshall had an even more cynical view of oral 
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argument when he described that it requires “‘the ability to look a lawyer straight in the 
eyes for two hours and not hear a damned word.’”170  Marshall’s frightening approach to 
oral argument highlights the potential irrelevancy it may have if justices lack the desire 
to gather further information.   
Comments from the justices in this section suggest that oral arguments assist the 
justices in making sense of a case, either by confirming underlying commitments and 
tentative suspicions, or exploring and testing positions.  The justices’ previous 
statements suggest that when approaching oral arguments, the justices often have a 
“champion,” or a counsel whom they favor, in mind.  Justices may favor counsels for a 
variety of reasons that range from time-tempered legal philosophies to compelling brief 
writing, with commitments in mind, the foundation is set for justices to engage in 
sensemaking during oral arguments.  Instead of equally exploring both sides, with a 
preferred counsel in mind, justices may be in a dangerous position of seeking 
reinforcement for their initial position through the support of a champion, by attacking a 
challenger, or dismissing competing arguments.  To uncover sensemaking behavior, and 
the effect of justices’ rhetorical discursive interaction, this study adopts a variety of 
unique methodologies.  The following section provides the necessary background to 
explain the adopted methodologies.    
Critical Approach 
The methodology within this study relies on prominent areas of communication 
studies to inform the variety of approaches.  As a theory, Sensemaking includes a vast 
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number of psychological and communicative theories that have been interwoven to 
explain how humans make decisions.  This study would become unmanageable if it 
attempted to account for all of the possibilities within sensemaking that could explain a 
justice’s behavior in oral arguments.  However, three areas of communication studies 
seem essential to understanding the role of sensemaking in the justices’ discursive 
interactions, namely ethnography, rhetorical criticism, and discourse analysis.  
Sensemaking behavior can range widely, but I have attempted to distill its qualities and 
focus them upon the environment of oral arguments by using ethnography, rhetorical 
criticism, and discourse analysis.  Each critical approach offers its own unique 
contribution, and together form a process of triangulation that provides a more 
comprehensive view of sensemaking in the Court’s rhetorical discursive interaction in 
oral arguments.      
Weick’s Sensemaking emphasizes the role of communication in decision 
making, but he ignores any specific approach to studying communication other than 
ethnography.  Ethnographic experience can prove invaluable to researchers as they begin 
grasping the communication and culture found within environments.  As ethnographers 
enter the field, they quickly begin to realize the unique situated role communication 
plays within social settings.  Each culture, and often each communicative environment, 
contains its own norms, expectations, and behaviors that concomitantly shape both 
communication and culture.  Ethnographers often study a group’s communication first 
hand to learn more about both the culture, as well as the role communication plays in 
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constructing that culture.171  Within the Supreme Court, oral argument is a very specific 
form of communication with its own rules and norms that govern the behavior of 
justices, lawyers, and audience members.  Few researchers immerse themselves in the 
environment of oral argument and they lack an understanding of the communication 
between justices and lawyers.  I spent a significant amount of time observing nearly fifty 
oral arguments and taking copious notes regarding the Court’s rhetorical discursive 
interaction.  Yet while ethnography provides insight into the cultural and communicative 
approaches within an environment, examining a group’s particular communication 
requires more focused areas of study.    
Building upon Weick’s ethnographic approach to oral arguments, I rely upon two 
primary areas within the field of Communication, rhetoric and discourse studies.  
Sensemaking, Rhetoric, and Discourse studies all present dimensions of communication 
that focus upon unique areas of influence.  Sensemaking foregrounds the crucial role 
communication plays in influencing human cognition.  Rhetoric emphasizes the 
persuasive nature of communication, often by scrutinizing the arguments a speaker 
presents to an audience.  Discourse studies highlight the process through which 
communication generates understanding and misunderstanding in people.  Reducing 
complex areas of communication into tight descriptions invites disagreement.  Scholars 
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would likely agree that these communicative theories generally focus upon the areas I 
described, but note the theories often include much broader areas of study.  Fostering 
further ambiguity, these three communication theories may overlap in some areas 
(persuasion may assist in achieving understanding, understanding may influence 
cognition), but they also identify uniquely particular dimensions of communication and 
inform each other’s understanding of communication.  Rhetoric is not typically 
concerned with a speaker’s communication influencing their own ability to understand 
and judge opposing arguments, or in other words speech reinforcing commitments, and 
blurring impartiality.  Discourse studies often ignore the manner in which the structure 
of arguments persuades an audience and subsequently influences their understanding.  
Joining these theories with Sensemaking foregrounds the importance of communication 
and its wide reaching ability to generate cognitive positions within speakers, persuade 
audiences, and create understanding.  My integration of the term rhetorical discursive 
interaction is an attempt to draw attention to the multifaceted dimension of 
communication in the Court’s oral arguments. 
Rhetorical Criticism 
Persuasion is at the heart of communicative interaction in the Court’s oral 
arguments. 172   Justice Kennedy has noted the inherent nature of rhetoric within oral 
arguments when emphasizing the importance of oral arguments: 
of course [oral argument] makes a difference, it has to make a difference.  
That’s the passion and the power and the poetry of the law.  That 
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rhetorical case can make a difference because abstract principles have to 
be applied in real life situations.173 
 
His statement suggests that rhetoric plays an essential role in making abstract principles 
come to life in oral arguments through the compelling and persuasive power of language 
and the law.  Justice Kennedy’s description of oral argument as a “rhetorical case,” 
seems to align with Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric.  We have already emphasized 
Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric as “as an ability, in each particular case, to see the 
available means of persuasion.”174 A more modern understanding of rhetoric can be 
found in Jim Kuypers’ definition which he describes as “the strategic use of 
communication, oral or written, to achieve specifiable goals.”175  Kuypers’ definition 
limits the domain of rhetoric to oral or written communication, but scholars commonly 
take a broader view.  Sonya Foss characterizes rhetoric with an emphasis on the 
symbolic forms of communication, noting “rhetoric means the action humans perform 
when they use symbols for the purpose of communicating with one another.”176  These 
three definitions of rhetoric foreground crucial commonalities and distinctions.  Aristotle 
and Kuypers both view rhetoric as a persuasive act, although Foss suggests rhetoric is 
human communication in all forms, visual, tactile, as well as oral and written.  In this 
study, I limit rhetoric to a persuasive act, because narrowing rhetoric’s domain allows 
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me to integrate rhetorical criticism to focus upon the development of arguments and 
consider the consequences related to persuasion.177 
The definition of rhetorical criticism, like rhetoric, varies by scholarly 
perspective, but it is generally concerned with examining how human communication 
achieves a certain situation, or as Kuypers put it, “a specifiable goal.”  Typically 
criticism attempts to create understanding or make judgments.  Wayne Brockriede calls 
criticism an “act of evaluating or analyzing experience . . . by passing judgment on the 
experience or analyzing it for the sake of a better understanding of that experience.”178  
Rhetorical criticism seeks to better understand the rhetorical process by “systematically 
investigating and explaining symbolic acts and artifacts.”179  Typically, rhetorical critics 
analyze oral or written texts, at a distance, and focus on important methaphors or frames 
to explain the text’s persuasive message or argument.  Rhetorical critics may examine 
the arrangements of arguments and themes within a speech or text to understand how the 
speaker intends to persuade his or her audience.   
The study of argumentation has generated its own sub-field within rhetorical 
criticism, differentiating itself from rhetorical studies by focusing on the logical 
arrangements of arguments rather than other persuasive forms of appeal, such as emotion 
that rhetoric embraces.  “Persuasion includes appeals based on both emotion and reason. 
. . The study of argumentation focuses on how proof and reasoning are used to appeal to 
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the rational side of human nature.”180  The foremost treatise on argumentation can be 
found in Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s The New Rhetoric where they 
distinguish persuasion in rhetoric from argumentation by suggesting that rhetoric “only 
claims validity for a particular audience, and the term convincing [applies] to 
argumentation that presumes to gain the adherence of every rational being.”181  The 
distinction between argumentation and persuasion is not always so clear since “arguers 
are also persuaders.  Persuasion is an attempt to move an audience to accept or identify 
with a particular point of view.  Argumentation is the reasoning component of 
persuasion.”182  Argumentation plays a primary role in the courtroom where emotional 
appeals are often frowned upon, but are not completely ineffective on juries.  In the 
appellate courtroom, emotional appeals are rare, and argumentation between 
judge/justice and advocate follows a somewhat philosophical inquiry.  Argumentation 
has long been the preferred from of inquiry where “practical eloquence, including 
judicial and deliberative genres, was the traditionally favored field of confrontation of 
litigants and politicians who defended, by argumentation, opposed and sometimes even 
contradictory theses.”183  Argumentation within the American courtroom has followed a 
confrontational quality where parties in dispute may bring their arguments for judges 
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and juries to determine a victor.  “The American tradition emphasizes a debate over two 
sides of an issue—a verbal competition.  The two people, or sides, in a debate use the 
techniques of argumentation to convince someone, a judge or an audience, to accept one 
side over the other.”184  The struggle within the American courtroom makes 
argumentation a key area of study; however Supreme Court oral arguments, and even the 
justices’ opinions do not always follow this competitive nature.  While it is true that a 
victor often results from the Supreme Court’s decisions, oral arguments involve more 
than argumentation, and because of the complexity involved in the Court’s interactions, 
argumentation alone is insufficient to understanding the dynamic interactions in oral 
arguments.  This study will consider argumentation part of the rhetorical analysis when 
examining oral arguments, but will also consider argumentation in relation to rhetoric, 
discourse analysis, and Sensemaking.185 
Where scholars of rhetoric and argumentation agree is in the consequence of a 
speaker’s language and its persuasive effect in constructing the social and physical 
world.  Communication muck like rhetoric and “argumentation takes place all around us 
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in messages designed to influence our beliefs and behaviors.”186  Both rhetoric and 
argumentation are forms of “instrumental communication relying on reasoning and 
proof” among other techniques “to influence belief or behavior through the use of 
spoken or written messages.”187  Thus language and communication play a key role in 
constituting the physical and social world that surrounds us.188  Understanding the 
implications of language through rhetorical criticism is essential to learning about how 
language and persuasion develops within oral argument.  My own approach draws upon 
my ethnographic experience as a means of understanding the context within which 
persuasion develops.  In applying my first hand understanding to actors and rhetorical 
interactions, I am able to observe or better gauge how the flow of arguments and 
information influences a counsel’s ability to persuade a justice, or a justice’s ability to 
persuade fellow justices.  When analyzing transcripts, I am also sensitive to the manner 
in which justices may prevent or assist the development of an argument, thereby 
hindering or assisting in an argument’s persuasiveness.  Rhetorical criticism, including 
argumentation, provides the critical attention necessary to reveal rhetoric’s persuasive 
power within oral arguments.    
Discourse Studies 
While rhetoric and rhetorical criticism is primarily concerned with the study of 
persuasion, discourse studies focuses on the role of discourse to achieve understanding 
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in human’s lives.189  As the meaning of rhetoric varies by scholar, so too does the 
meaning of “discourse.”  Scholars may describe discourse as “anything beyond the 
sentence,” and this micro view may be contrasted by other scholars understanding of 
discourse as a macro view of a broad “conglomeration of linguistic and nonlinguistic 
social practices and ideological assumptions,” such as the “discourse of power” or 
“discourse of racism.”190  Definitions and uses of discourse abound, but generally 
definitions fall into “three main categories . . . (1) anything beyond a sentence, (2) 
language use, (3) a broader range of social practice that includes non-linguistic and non 
specific instances of language.”191  Scholars often distinguish between micro and macro 
uses of discourse by differentiating “Big D” from “little d.”192  Big D discourses are 
“embedded in a medley of social institutions,” and little d discourses refer to “language-
in-use or stretches of language (like conversations or stories).”193  To complicate matters 
further, “language use” in oral or written form may involve both (d) and (D) discourse as 
conversations can reflect ideological positioning, as well as utterances beyond a 
sentence.  This study will focus on oral argument as “language use” through a dialogue 
or conversation and will primarily be concerned with the interaction between speakers.  
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Since this study ignores “non linguistic and non specific instances” of language, the 
analysis conducted could be more closely aligned with (d) discourse.   
 Examining oral argument as a dialogue may seem unusual to readers, but the 
speech patterns between participants relates closely to an active conversation, because 
interruptions occur frequently, deference is shown toward senior members, lines of 
thought grow frayed as each speaker begins pursuing their own interest, and actors take 
turns speaking to one another.  Justice Kennedy has confirmed that oral argument 
typically reflects the qualities of a dialogue: 
When the people come in this room, the public, to see our arguments.  
They often see a dialogue between the justices asking the questions and 
the attorney answering it.  And they think of the argument as a series of 
these dialogues, it isn’t that. . . .What is happening is the Court is having 
a conversation with itself through the intermediary of the attorney.194 
 
Justice Kennedy has not been the only person to characterize oral arguments in this 
manner.  Former Solicitor General, Drew Days III, has also described oral argument as 
“nine people and yourself having a conversation.”195  Because oral argument displays 
qualities of a dialogue, and participants have characterized the activity as a dialogue, it 
seems reasonable to approach the study of oral arguments as a dialogue through the 
analysis techniques developed within discourse studies.   
 Where discourse studies focuses on human understanding, discourse analysis 
offers techniques to study discourse and then considers the social repercussions of the 
discourse under scrutiny.  Discourse analysis “focuses on the properties of what people 
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say or write in order to accomplish social, political or cultural acts . . . within the broader 
frameworks of societal structure and culture.”196  Discourse analysis shares a similar 
concern with rhetorical criticism in that both areas of study attend to communication’s 
constitutive social nature.  Discourse analysis tends to focus on speech, rather than 
written text, emphasizing “both the processes and the products of communication [in all 
its forms], including its cultural embededness and social consequences.”197  Studying the 
everyday communicative interaction is an essential part of understanding a group’s 
discourse, and of providing recommendations for improving communication.  Rhetorical 
criticism also considers the process and product of communication, but it does not 
typically actively seek to identify problems and recommend solutions.  “The goal” of 
discourse analysis “is to analyze, understand or solve problems relating to practical 
action in real-life contexts.”198  Because human “cognition has a social dimension and is 
acquired, used and changed in verbal and other forms of interaction,” discourse 
influences humans’ understanding of the world around them.199  Discourse’s cognitive 
dimension causes many researchers to employ discourse analysis as an approach to study 
and resolve problems related to communication.  Discourse analysts, like sensemaking 
researchers, focus on human use of dialogue to “make sense of what is said” or “how 
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people in society produce [speech to] make sense of the world about them,” in order to 
identify problems and suggest solutions.200 Although discourse analysts “may identify 
different acts or social functions at various levels” of analysis, they realize speakers 
often commit various spoken acts “sometimes even without being aware of that,” 
because of previous speech patterns humans have learned and replicated.201 
 In studying speech, discourse analysis calls for researchers to pay close attention 
to “speaker’s packaging of actions,” as a means of understanding how speaker’s 
“selection of reference terms provides for certain understandings for the actions 
performed and matter talked about.”202  In other words, discourse analysts must 
scrutinize how speakers may organize speech in terms that produce certain 
understandings in dialogue participants.  The methods discourse analysts adopt ranges 
broadly, but tends to emphasize a systematic approach reflective of its relationship to 
linguistics.  Where rhetorical criticism predominantly examines texts through a 
humanistic frame (interpretive concern for philosophy, literature, and politics among 
others), discourse analysis approaches texts through a social scientific background (focus 
on the systematic study of human social groups).   
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 Two linguists figure prominently in the methods commonly used by discourse 
analysts: John L. Austin and John R. Searle.  Austin proposed that human speech is an 
action and must take place under certain contextual situations.  He developed a theory 
upon “speech acts” which proposed that every utterance performs locutionary and 
illocutionary acts.  Locutionary acts formulate sentences with a specific sense and 
reference, while illocutionary acts perform a communicative function.  The locutionary 
act aligns with what is “said” by the speaker, while the illocutionary act is what the 
speaker “does” in using a linguistic expression.203  Searle expanded on Austin’s theory 
by systematizing speech acts, specifying further categories and acknowledging indirect 
speech acts.  Searle proposed speech acts may be grouped into five main types: 
representatives (describe a state of affairs), directives (makes listener act), commissives 
(commit hearer to action), expressive (characterize the psychological state of hearer), 
and declarations (effects a change in state of affairs).204  The accuracy or validity of 
Searle and Austin’s work is not at issue here, but scholars would agree that the 
typologies created by Austin and Searle enabled researchers to begin classifying speech 
acts within dialogues and gain a better understanding of the dynamic and multi-layers of 
communication that exist within conversations.  Speech act theory recognizes that 
“linguistic expressions have the capacity to perform certain actions such as making 
statements, [and] asking questions,” and it provides discourse analysts with “a 
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systematic classification of such communicative intentions and the ways in which they 
are linguistically encoded in context.”205   
 Other prominent systematic approaches consider the sequence, structure, 
frequency, and topic of interactions within dialogues.  Emanuel Schegloff has focused 
his research heavily upon studying the structure and routine of interaction within 
dialogues.  He and his colleagues were some of the first to identify the “turns” people 
“take” when conversing with one another.  Along with the rhythm associated with “turn-
taking,” they also began recognizing the control speakers asserted when introducing 
topics, the frequency in which speakers enter conversations, the common occurrence of 
interruptions or overlaps, and the length of time speakers held the floor.206  All of these 
characteristics within dialogues became means by which analysts could evaluate 
conversations and begin determining how speakers controlled conversations or 
prevented other speakers from entering dialogues or interrupting topics of 
conversation.207  Identifying and capturing these phenomena enabled discourse analysts 
to capture speakers’ interactions in dialogue and demonstrate where inequalities may 
exist due to the discursive interaction between participants.  By identifying inequalities 
and capturing the frequency by which inequalities occur discourse analysts are poised to 
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make significant contributions to areas of study, such as politics or law, in which they 
seek an improvement in human understanding.         
 A wide group of methods exists within the field of discourse studies, and 
discourse analysis is often adopted by a wide variety of fields, but where discourse 
analysis departs from sociology or conversation analysis, is in its concern for 
improvement of human communication and a balancing of political inequalities.  
Discourse analysis seeks to make a change where other disciplines and fields of study 
desire to accurately capture and catalog typologies of interaction.208  Because discourse 
analysis looks to improve human communication and offers a unique set of methods to 
capture the phenomena of rhetorical discursive interaction, it seems a valuable critical 
approach to understanding and hopefully improving communication in the Supreme 
Court’s oral arguments.     
My hope, after reviewing the various critical areas informing this study, is that 
readers should see the benefit of all three critical areas and how they each serve to 
strengthen one another.  All three critical areas reflect a primary concern for 
communication’s ability to constitute human thought and society.  My description of the 
various critical areas of study drew upon general characteristics.  Smaller strains of study 
within each area may overlap and the delineations between fields are not as clear as I 
have portrayed them; however, I have described them in a manner which highlights each 
area’s usefulness to this study.  Each area has its own strengths as weaknesses, but in 
                                                 
208 For more on the discussion of differences see Nelson Phillips, and Cynthia Hardy, Discourse Analysis: 
Investigating Processes of Social Construction. (London: Sage, 2002).; George Psathas, Conversation 
Analysis: The study of Talk-in-Interaction. (London: Sage, 1995);  Robin Wooffitt, Conversational 
Analysis and Discourse Analysis: A comparative and critical introduction. (London: Sage, 2005). 
 
121 
 
combination they present a more encompassing and informing view.  Rhetorical 
criticism, unlike discourse analysis or ethnography, considers persuasion through 
argument.  It typically lacks a systematic consideration of a text through its methods, 
preferring to focus on past speeches or printed texts, rather than active dialogue.  
Discourse analysis lends to rhetorical criticism a systematic approach to studying 
dialogue, a concern for understanding in communication, and a goal of identifying and 
resolving problems.  However, Discourse analysis lacks a concern for persuasion and the 
development of arguments.  It does not typically consider the persuasiveness of a 
speaker’s strategic deployment of arguments, organization of a dialogue, or adopted 
delivery style.  Ethnography brings a contextual understanding to both critical areas, and 
first-hand observations attune critics to speakers’ personalities as well as their bodily 
behavior.  Ethnography within Sensemaking is concerned about the influence of 
communication upon a person’s cognition and subsequent ability to resolve problems.  
Where discourse analysis and rhetorical criticism ignore the ability for a speaker’s 
communication to reinforce their own personal commitments, sensemaking highlights 
the ability for humans to convince themselves of a position through speech.  
 Sensemaking lacks a concern for persuasion, or arguments, or a systematic 
approach to examining active communicative interaction, but its cognitive concern 
informs an important dimension of decision making that rhetorical criticism and 
discourse analysis does not consider.  Oral argument is a highly complex environment 
where a large number of speakers enter into rhetorical discursive interaction within a 
very limited timeframe.  Oral argument involves persuasion, understanding, cognition, 
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and eventually plays a role in a final decision.  These dynamic areas require not one 
approach, but an approach from multiple perspectives, rhetorical criticism, discourse 
analysis, and sensemaking, in order to capture and critique the process by which justices 
evaluate cases.      
Paradigm Approaches    
The explanation of judicial sensemaking and the description of critical areas 
informing the methods of this study distinctly set it apart from prior studies of Supreme 
Court oral arguments and offers original research and scholarly contribution in the area 
of Supreme Court studies.  Political scientists and psychologists have traditionally 
conducted quantitative macro longitudinal studies that overlook interactional discourse, 
language’s persuasive nature, or individual judicial behavior.  In the past, researchers 
employed longitudinal methods because they sought generalizable and replicable 
findings that adhere to scientific norms and that allow researchers to make broad 
“scientific” generalizations about judicial behavior.  Conversely, this study approaches 
the topic of oral arguments from a distinctly different scholarly perspective.  Although 
not entirely separate from scientific concerns, I approach the study of Supreme Court 
oral arguments from a rhetorical discursive or interpretivist’s position, focusing more 
closely on the study of the justices’ and advocates’ situational and individual behavior 
through both quantitative and qualitative research.  My methods and approaches in this 
study will more closely reflect the contributions from members of the legal community, 
which rely on the personal observations of lawyers, judges, and justices, than from 
contributions by political scientists and psychologists.  The disparity in method and 
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scholarly approach can be explained by fundamental differences regarding theory and 
subsequent ontological and epistemological assumptions about the world and society. 
The famous metaphor of six blind men touching an elephant and describing 
distinctly separate qualities of the elephant holds true even in the realm of scholarly 
endeavors, where theoretical perspectives often influence how researchers conduct 
studies.  Scholars rely on theories to understand, interpret, explain, and predict the world 
around us, and while important to research, theories may also prevent us from fully 
recognizing other potential explanations.  Thus a macro longitudinal study about the 
Court’s oral arguments can tell us about the aggregate behavior of nine justices, but can 
tell us little about a justice’s individual behavior, or how justices may react to various 
arguments.  Conversely, a micro situational study can capture the unique behavior of a 
single justice within a specific case, but cannot reveal generalizable information about 
justices’ overall behavior across oral arguments.  Each theoretical approach has strengths 
and weaknesses in the insights developed from its position; however, the majority of 
scholarship on the Supreme Court has ignored certain theoretical positions, and this 
study seeks to fill that gap. 
Prior studies conducted by political scientists and psychologists have assumed a 
positivist or post-positivist approach to research which looks to establish a universal 
understanding of the world through objective observations that seek to contribute to the 
larger foundation of knowledge.  Researchers incorporating this post/positivist theory 
stand at a distance from their object of study and look to identify patterns of behavior 
which reveal knowledge about the world.  Capturing a pattern of behavior allows 
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researchers to predict behavior in advance, thus explaining why some academic scholars 
seek to “predict” votes in oral argument.  A prediction of the Court’s vote verifies the 
accuracy of the scholar’s findings.  While no real practical advice may be gained by the 
scholar’s endeavor, the post/positivist is concerned with establishing knowledge that 
contributes to the larger corpus of knowledge.  In contrast to the post/positivist tradition, 
interpretivists believe objective knowledge proves impossible to obtain because 
knowledge is unique and situational, which forces researchers to immerse themselves 
into a context to understand more accurately the environment under scrutiny.  Where 
post/positivists seek generalizability, interpretivists prize transferability in their findings, 
looking to discover connections among other areas of knowledge.  This study takes an 
interpretivist’s stance to studying oral arguments before the Supreme Court, because 
every case is different and causes unique responses in each of the nine justices.  To 
understand the process of oral arguments it is important to observe the act as much as 
possible and to obtain audio and typed transcripts of every argument under evaluation.  
In addition, because I have not, nor ever will, personally argue a case before the 
Supreme Court, it is important to speak with advocates who have argued before the 
Court to learn about their experiences.  Finally, and not directly oppositional to 
post/positivists, I have sought to ensure that my findings make a practical contribution to 
the legal field.   
Research Methods 
The following study examines oral argument at the micro level by studying the 
rhetorical discursive interactions between justices and lawyers to better understand how 
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judicial interaction influences information gathering and argument development.  In 
order to evaluate judicial interaction within oral arguments, I analyzed the oral 
arguments in Morse v. Frederick, Kennedy v. Louisiana, and District of Columbia v. 
Heller by posing the following questions to consider judicial communication in a variety 
of areas:    
1.  Do justices demonstrate a substantial preference for one counsel 
over another in 
 
a.   their challenging of counsels,  
b. their permitting counsels an equal opportunity to respond, 
c. their frequency at which they interrupt counsels,  
d. their assistance of counsels arguments, and 
e. their treatment of counsels? 
In responding to these questions, my analysis is heavily influenced by my observations 
of oral argument before the Supreme Court.  My firsthand observation of nearly fifty 
oral arguments, interviews with top advocates who regularly argue before the Court, and 
a discussion about oral argument with Associate Justice Stephen Breyer largely inform 
my analysis.  Witnessing oral argument and learning about the physical behavior and 
rhetorical discursive interaction of justices provided a level of understanding which more 
fully informed my reading of transcripts and development of methods.  My experience at 
the Court forced me to consider quantitative and qualitative approaches that could 
capture the dynamic interactions occurring within oral argument. Learning, first hand, 
about the justices’ rhetorical interaction, physical behavior, and unique personalities, 
helped me recognize the impact justices’ questions had on other justices.  Observation of 
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physical behavior and rhetorical discursive interaction at the Court revealed the 
displeasure justices display when their line of questioning has been interrupted or when 
they are unable to ask a question due to more active justices.  At times, justices would 
lean forward to ask a question, and before uttering their remark, another justice would 
speak first and shift the course of inquiry. Justice Scalia’s persistent questioning often 
redirected lines of questioning that other justices were pursuing, and his frequent 
comments regularly prevented other justices from asking questions.  Justices grew 
irritated by the rhetorical interaction of other justices, and I could not help but wonder 
how many justices still held questions they wanted to ask, or how many questions were 
never answered because of another justice’s interruption.  Chief Justice Roberts strictly 
enforces the time limit for oral argument which often results in some justices being 
unable to ask questions.  Chief Justice Roberts would occasionally terminate an oral 
argument as another justice was leaning forward to ask a question.  In another incident, 
Chief Justice Roberts interrupted Justice Breyer, as Justice Breyer interrupted an 
advocate’s response to Justice Alito, and called for Justice Breyer to allow the advocate 
to respond to Justice Alito’s question.  Finally, absent from transcripts and only available 
from first hand observation is the justices’ tendency to occasionally perform for the 
audience, using humor to generate laughter and break up the tedium of arguments, or use 
hand gestures to dismiss arguments.  Justice Breyer tends to be very animated in 
arguments that pique his interest, and will throw up his hands, shake his head, or nod in 
approval.  Justice Scalia also remains active as he rocks back and forth in his chair 
nodding approval or shrugging his shoulders.  A significant dimension of understanding 
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about the process of oral arguments would be lost without the experience of witnessing 
the justices’ rhetorical discursive interaction first hand.  
In conjunction with ethnographic research, I obtained oral argument transcripts 
from the Supreme Court website, and listened to oral arguments on Oyez.org in those 
cases in which I was not present.209  Listening to oral arguments helped me gain a better 
understanding of justices’ intentions behind a statement or question.  Recognizing 
supporting or challenging statements often depended upon the tone of justices; sarcasm 
and humor were not uncommon and gave a very different meaning to a statement than 
what the written record showed.  My analysis of rhetorical discursive interactions within 
arguments drew heavily upon the concepts discussed earlier that are related to Austin, 
Searle, and Schegloff’s contributions to discourse analysis.  I have revised versions of 
speech act theory and Schegloff’s developments in conversation analysis to better align 
with the formalized and challenging environment of oral arguments.   
In analyzing arguments, I collected the number of instances in which justices 
interrupted lawyers based upon the actual transcript as well as listening to the argument.  
Argument transcripts only record mid sentence interruptions, but audio files enabled me 
to discern interruptions not captured in the transcript.  While interruptions can reveal a 
more challenging rhetorical environment, understanding how frequently justices 
challenged, assisted, or neutrally questioned counsels is also important in understanding 
rhetorical discursive bias.210  To determine whether justices equally challenged counsels, 
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I divided justices’ statements or questions between those they made during the 
petitioner’s and respondent’s oral argument, and then categorized statements or 
questions based upon whether they challenged or supported the advocate’s argument, or 
neutrally impacted the argument.  I also listened to the tone of their voice for any sense 
of hostility or sarcasm that might shift the literal reading of the transcript.  I deemed 
challenging statements/questions those which questioned the argument or proposed a 
hypothetical which tested the counsel’s argument (e.g. “That doesn’t make any sense to 
me.  Does it depend on his intent, whether or not he intended to be truant that 
afternoon?”). 211 I considered assisting statements/questions to be helpful to the lawyer 
in framing or emphasizing aspects of the argument (e.g. Scalia: “This banner was 
interpreted as meaning smoke pot, no?”  Starr: “It was interpreted exactly, yes”).212  I 
recorded neutral statements/questions as those statements by justices asking for small 
matters of fact, or references in the brief (e.g. “Can I ask you another record point, just 
so I know where to look”).213  By achieving a more nuanced understanding of justices’ 
statements, we can better recognize rhetorical discursive bias in judicial interaction.  
Finally, in order to determine equal speaking times, I timed speaking moments for all 
participants in oral argument.  I did not include moments in which a justice or lawyer 
was forced to repeat a statement or question.  Quantitative recordings provide an 
                                                                                                                                                
arguments, my interest lies in studying how their rhetorical discursive interaction in oral arguments may 
influence the flow of information and arguments, as well as how discourse impacts a justice’s ability to 
evaluate a case. 
211 Morse v. Frederick (55:16-18) 
212Morse v. Frederick (8:14-18)).   
213Morse v. Frederick (46:7-9)).   
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efficient means of capturing iterations providing readers with a list of assisting or 
challenging statements made by the justices.  Qualitative analysis compliments 
quantitative findings by providing a more transparent examination of the justices’ 
treatment of counsels.   
Using a more qualitative approach to understand whether justices showed 
preference for one counsel over another, I compared whether or not justices assisted 
counselors equally, by providing them with frames or arguments that strengthened their 
position.  I also compared whether justices equally ridiculed or denigrated counselors to 
determine if justices treated counselors preferentially.  This qualitative approach enables 
me to provide poignant examples to readers that capture justices’ rhetorical discursive 
bias and treatment of lawyers in their own words.  While quantitative analysis reveals 
the frequency at which justices interact, qualitative analysis allows readers to judge for 
themselves whether arguments fulfill the categories I have created. 
Conclusion  
This chapter has covered wide ground in the theoretical exposition of judicial 
sensemaking, a discussion of its potential dangers in judicial decision making, critical 
areas of communication studies relevant to studying sensemaking in oral argument, and 
an articulation of the study’s adopted methods.  In oral argument and as a result of 
rhetorical discursive interaction, judicial sensemaking presents a host of obvious 
problems that could impact justices who are active in their communicative interactions, 
as well as less active justices desiring to ask questions or resolve misunderstandings 
about the case.  To analyze and examine sensemaking behavior, this study requires 
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methods concerned with persuasion, understanding, and contextually situated 
communication.  Rhetorical criticism, discourse analysis, and ethnographic study all 
provide approaches that reveal the inherent complexities of oral argument.  These three 
areas work in concert to focus on areas one specific approach might overlook and 
provide the most comprehensive picture of the justices’ rhetorical discursive interaction 
in oral arguments.    
This study’s methods and primary research questions seek to identify 
sensemaking behavior, but the study does not attempt to explain why justices act as 
sensemakers.  Why justices display sensemaking behavior is less important than 
identifying how sensemaking behavior in oral argument may influence both 
sensemaking and non-sensemaking justices’ understanding of the case.  To explain or 
identify why justices behave as sensemakers would be a goal more closely related to a 
psychological study, whereas this study emphasizes communication’s impact within the 
environment of oral argument, and theorizes how justices’ understanding of a case may 
have been influenced.  We can never definitively be sure how oral arguments may have 
influenced a justice’s perspective, either in generation or reflection of ideas.  While 
underlying motivations are interesting, they are not the primary concern of 
communication scholars.  Communication scholars more generally concern themselves 
with understanding the role of communication between humans.  In this study, I am 
interested in understanding the role of communication within oral arguments and how 
sensemaking behavior may influence the justices’ understanding of a case.   
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 The overriding goal of this study is not to wholly establish sensemaking as a 
model of decision making, but rather to present scholars with enough evidence to 
consider its usefulness in explaining judicial behavior, and at the very least, that scholars 
begin to realize the importance of rhetorical discursive interaction within oral arguments.  
The following chapters begin to make the case for the applicability of sensemaking in 
oral arguments.  The next chapter explains the context of oral argument by describing 
each justice’s personal rhetorical discursive style for readers to reach an understanding 
of each justice’s interactional style.  Chapter IV concludes with a comparison between 
the strategic actor model and sensemaking in an analysis of rhetorical discursive 
interaction from Morse v. Frederick.  The analysis identifies sensemaking and strategic 
decision making behavior, giving initial support to the use of sensemaking in the 
analysis of oral arguments. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
ORAL ARGUMENTS MATTER BECAUSE . . . 
 
PRELIMINARY REVELATIONS OF METHOD AND THEORY 
 
The prior chapter proposed theoretical expectations and drawbacks associated 
with judicial sensemaking, and articulated unique methodological approaches that may 
assist uncovering answers to the question “Oral arguments matter, but how?”  This 
chapter offers preliminary analysis of the Supreme Court’s rhetorical discursive behavior 
in oral arguments by providing a description of the variety of purposes informing oral 
argument, a summary of the justices’ individual rhetorical style, and an examination of 
oral arguments from Morse v. Frederick, thus establishing the effectiveness of 
methodological approaches and the validity of Sensemaking as an alternative model to 
understanding rhetorical discusrive interaction in oral arguments.  A description of the 
complexities surrounding the Court’s communicative interaction will enable readers to 
understand the context of oral arguments’ challenging environment and the multiplicity 
of purposes that contribute to the significance of oral argument.  As previously 
discussed, scholars have sought to establish singular or limited purposes for oral 
argument without fully recognizing its dynamism.  My description of oral arguments 
builds upon prior concepts, and foregrounds additional significant dimensions 
surrounding oral argument.  After a description of the Court’s rhetorical discursive style, 
an articulation of each justice’s individual communicative style will provide readers and 
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scholars with an understanding of each justice’s unique approach to oral argument.214  
Finally, the chapter concludes with an analysis of oral arguments from Morse v. 
Frederick, the famous “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” case, which reveals weaknesses surrounding 
the strategic actor model and foregrounds the strengths associated with implementing 
Sensemaking as a model for understanding the significance of oral arguments.  The 
analysis of Morse v. Frederick provides initial validity for both the methodological and 
theoretical approaches used in the study’s subsequent cases.      
The Court’s Rhetorical Discursive Interaction 
As noted previously, Justice Kennedy has characterized oral argument as a place 
where the Court has a dialogue with itself and his metaphor briefly foregrounds the 
dynamic interplay involved.  In dialogues, speakers and audiences may have differing 
purposes; some speakers may want to understand, others may want to persuade, and 
others may want to listen.  Observers may see speakers’ communication as a process of 
investigation, argumentation, or indifference.  Because oral argument, as a site of 
communication, involves a wide spectrum of people, ranging from justices and 
advocates to lay audience members, oral argument has a variety of functions and 
purposes, often overlapping simultaneously.  The multiple functions of oral argument 
derive from the unique communicative style each justice applies to oral argument, and 
the separate meanings oral argument may hold for advocates and observers.  The 
differing perspectives of audience members, advocates, and justices create a complex 
                                                 
214 While a taxonomy of the Court’s oral argument may seem mundane and uninteresting, strangely, 
scholars have ignored describing individual justices’ rhetorical discursive styles, and the following 
descriptive section attempts to fill the scholarly gap. 
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communicative interplay.    Previously Dickens and Schwartz listed eight functions for 
oral argument, but the following research provides a more comprehensive list of over 
twenty functions for oral argument, most importantly including the addition of 
sensemaking. 
Country and Citizenry 
On the broadest and most general level oral arguments plays an important role 
for our country and its citizenry.  (1. The Court’s arguments validate and carry out the 
constitutional function of the Court’s ability to review and hear cases.  While the Court’s 
“legitimacy is in the Constitution,” their “power rests on public faith in their 
independence and impartiality.”215 (2. As a communicative act the Court’s arguments 
symbolize the pinnacle of law where the greatest minds struggle with some of the 
nation’s most pressing and difficult issues surrounding the interpretation of the 
Constitution.  It is remarkable that a 200 hundred year old document continues to control 
the nation’s governance, but how Americans should interpret the Constitution can be a 
divisive topic in oral arguments.  Justice Scalia does not believe “the Constitution has 
become any more clear or means anything different from what it originally meant.”216  
Yet Justice Kennedy sees clarity surrounding the Constitution as a result of “two 
hundred years of history of detachment in which we can see the folly of some ideas, the 
                                                 
215 Narrator, “The Supreme Court of the United States” York Associates Television, nd. 
216 Antonin Scalia, “Supreme Court Interviews” Lawprose.org (2006): accessed 10/1/2008. 
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wisdom of others.”217  Justice Ginsburg recognizes the Constitution as an evolving 
document: 
We don’t have the Constitution that was written in 1787 or even 1791 when the 
Bill of Rights was added. We have the post Civil War Amendments, we have the 
19th amendment.  Remember that “we the people” was composed of a very small 
part of the people in fact inhabiting these shores, no women could vote, people 
were held in bondage, native americans were not treated as citizens of equal 
stature and dignity, so those people do count among “we the people” our 
Constitution embraces today, although it didn’t at the start. 
 
The justices’ diverse positions regarding the Constitution often results in divisive 
arguments based upon their interpretive perspective.  (3. Highly symbolic, but equally 
practical in nature, the Court’s arguments serve as a place to resolve mundane matters 
that have divided the lower courts, serving a vital function to reach agreement over 
dividing legal principles, and “giving guidance” to lower courts in “other cases.”218  
Justices and advocates often debate the future effects of the Court’s potential decision, or 
use oral argument as a time to resolve ambiguous rulings that have resulted in problems 
for lower courts.  In regards to government matters, the Court also is “repeatedly called 
upon to draw the boundaries of government power, telling the president Congress, and 
the States, what they may or may not do.”219  The Court’s practical tasks and symbolic 
nature in oral argument foster a complex environment where the public may view the 
justices at work. 
                                                 
217 Anthony Kennedy, “Supreme Court Interviews” Lawprose.org (2006): accessed 10/1/2008. 
218 Anthony Kennedy, “Supreme Court Interviews” Lawprose.org (2006): accessed 10/1/2008. 
219 Narrator, “The Supreme Court of the United States” York Associates Television, nd. 
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The public’s presence in oral argument should not be understated.  (4. The 
public’s observation provides a view of our government’s legal process at the elite level 
where for “an hour of high drama where nine of the nation’s highest officials do their 
work in public.”220  The Court regularly reserves seats for the public, varying between 
20 and 100 seats, depending upon the popularity of a case.  Lawyers, homeless people, 
protesters, and students all stand in line together, sometimes standing in line for days 
waiting to gain entrance to high profile arguments.  In Heller v. D.C., lines for oral 
argument began three days in advance.  The Court actively discourages law clerks from 
holding spots for lawyers, encouraging an egalitarian environment, and fostering an 
inviting atmosphere where all people are welcome to bear witness to the Court’s 
proceedings.   
First timers to the Court are regularly awed by the process and the close 
proximity they sit to the justices.  Many observers remark that the Courtroom feels like a 
church.  Images of the Ten Commandments, Moses, Muhammad, and Angels only 
compound religious connections.  Unfortunately, the Court’s oral arguments are not 
always entertaining and disputes of codes and statutes can create a tedious technical 
argument that baffles most people in the courtroom.  It is not unusual for visitors to fall 
asleep and even the justices succumb to drowsiness occasionally.  While the justices 
may doze lightly, police officers prevent anyone else in the audience from sleeping, 
occasionally scaring nodding high school students as they sternly whisper for them to 
stay awake.  (5. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the public expects the Court to 
                                                 
220 Narrator, “The Supreme Court of the United States” York Associates Television, nd. 
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seek Justice when resolving disputes.  “Equal Justice Under Law” stands emblazoned 
over the Court’s primary entrance, and as both an ideal symbol and practical entity the 
American people expect justice from the Supreme Court.  Americans view the Court as 
an “institution, [with] a willingness to protect the unpopular, to stand against the 
temporary political tide, a concern for principles beyond today’s politics.”221 Statues of 
blind justice abound in the Court and even the title of “Justice XYZ” suggests the 
justices intended purpose.  It may seem idealistic for citizens to expect objectivity and 
impartiality from humans charged with delivering justice, but it is an important driving 
ideal that justices should strive for and hold.  (6. I believe the justices desire Justice in 
every outcome, but also recognize the practical nature of their task.  Justice Souter has 
noted:  
most people are willing to accept the fact that the Court tries to play it straight.  
That acceptance has been built up by the proceeding hundred justices of this 
Court going back to the beginning. We are in fact trading on the good faith and 
the conscientiousness of the justices who went before us.  The power of the Court 
is the power of trust earned, the trust of the American people.222 
 
Lawyers and Clients 
 (7. Arguing a case before the Supreme Court is a rare opportunity for most 
lawyers and provides them an opportunity to bring their client’s claims to the highest 
court in the land.  Justice Thomas reflects that “the wonderful thing about oral argument 
is that people get to come to a final institution in our system and say their peace.”223  (8. 
                                                 
221 Narrator, “The Supreme Court of the United States” York Associates Television, nd. 
222 David Souter, “The Supreme Court of the United States” York Associates Television, nd. 
223 Clarence Thomas, “Supreme Court Interviews” Lawprose.org (2006): accessed 10/1/2008. 
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Both a revered ritual of the legal academy as well as a part of the legal process, lawyers 
primarily use oral arguments to address the key issue upon which their case turns.  
Identifying the essence of a case creates the opportunity for lawyers to communicate the 
importance of an issue that justices may have overlooked in the briefs.  Oral argument 
saves the justices time by enabling them to “obtain the essence of the case . . . and to be 
able more quickly to separate the wheat from the chaff.”224   At a minimum, justices are 
responsible for about 500 pages of documents, often upwards of 2,000 in major cases 
(briefs from both sides, lower court rulings, transcripts, fact findings, as well as amicus 
curiae).  Oral argument provides lawyers with the moment to crystallize the appeal by 
clearly and concisely extracting the essence of a case and persuading the justices why 
they should rule in his or her favor.  Cutting through the briefs to the heart of a case in a 
clear manner is an essential skill which can reduce the complexity of a case, and can 
assist justices in finding a path to resolve a case.  Although this task seems 
straightforward, very few lawyers can articulate the essence of their case amidst the 
chaos of the justices’ questioning.    
Experienced advocates typically handle the justices’ questioning with greater 
skill, and their oratorical delivery provides a level of confidence which manages the 
justices’ questioning.  Justices will treat inexperienced lawyers more gingerly than 
experienced lawyers by beginning with a slow rate of questioning.  If inexperienced 
advocates are well prepared and capable of maneuvering the intellectual gauntlet, then 
the justices tend to treat them respectfully; however, if neophytes are unprepared for the 
                                                 
224 Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 61-62 (1928). 
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variety of the justices’ questions, then they may suffer an abusive onslaught that an 
experienced advocate could gracefully skirt past.  For lawyers, oral argument before the 
Supreme Court is like the Super Bowl and few lawyers are willing to turn their case over 
to a more experienced advocate.  This is a prideful mistake that does substantial injustice 
to clients.  Experienced advocates bring a refined skill and level of knowledge that can 
only be gained by a near obsessive dedication to the art of oral argument.   
Lawyers should consider that most elite Supreme Court advocates, who have 
argued over 25 cases, such as David Frederick, Ted Olson, Seth Waxman, Carter 
Phillips, Tom Goldstein, Maureen Mahoney, and Miguel Estrada, spend a minimum of 
80 hours on a case and at most 200 hours for the most complex cases.  These top 
advocates typically argue a minimum of three to five moot courts before they make their 
final argument before the Court.  Aside from the lack of time and attention to devote to 
their client’s case, most inexperienced lawyers face a greater task than simply 100 hours 
of preparation, because they must practice extensively to bolster their rhetorical skills to 
attain the mental acuity and oratorical delivery the Court requires of them, unfortunately 
this task is truly only honed through a significant number of arguments before the Court.  
Even good lawyers, who have argued a few times before the Court, will lack the 
dynamic behavior of experienced advocates that can maintain the Court’s attention and 
truly advance their client’s case.  Novice lawyers also make the mistake of surrounding 
their arguments with legal jargon which may prove confusing to some of the justices 
unfamiliar with the specialized language of certain legal areas (e.g. tax, patent, 
technology, or certain statutes).  While the justices each have their particular specialized 
 
140 
 
legal background, skilled advocates will present their arguments in a manner that even 
lay people can understand.  A clear presentation enables all justices to achieve an 
understanding, and can create a real advantage when an advocate’s opponent cannot 
break from their confusing jargon.        
 (8. Advocates may also use oral arguments to provide the justices with new 
information that has developed in a case, or information they could not include in the 
briefs because of brevity requirements.  (9. In supplying the justices with new 
information, advocates may also alleviate a justice’s confusion about information or 
facts in a case.  Oral arguments are almost as if the justices invite counsel into a 
conference where advocates may “serve as a resource providing information needed to 
clarify the thinking of justices, and to bring an organizing theme, emphasis, and note of 
drama to marshal the information in a meaningful way.”225  (10. Advocates may also be 
able to persuade justices to vote with them, by either changing a justice’s mind, a tall 
order and rare occurrence, or by reinforcing a justice’s predilection in the case.  (11. But 
at times even new information, clarification, or persuasive articulation of a case may not 
persuade all the justices, and advocates must consider how they should lose a case.  
While this may sound strange, the manner in which an advocate loses a case can have 
significant repercussions for the country.  Cases may be lost on minor points, which may 
change very little in the legal landscape, or they may be lost in significant ways that 
could drastically alter society.  Advocates want to be remembered for their great 
victories, and not significant defeats.  However, advocates must “grapple with the 
                                                 
225 Stephen M. Shapiro, “Questions, Answers, and Prepared Remarks.” 15 Litigation 33, 34 (Spring 1989). 
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difficult legal issues presented by the case” and remain focused, win or lose, on how the 
case’s resolution “will affect the development of the law.”226  Because lawyers never 
address the issue of a possible loss in their briefs, oral argument provides advocates, 
when asked by justices, with an opportunity to articulate how justices might decide 
against them with a modest change to the legal landscape.  Advocates should be 
prepared for this uncomfortable moment, because even in strong cases, justices may 
push for alternative means of resolution.  Although often overlooked, oral argument is 
the site where advocates must be prepared to explain a manner in which justices may 
rule against them, yet do the least amount of damage to their case. 
 (12. Although losing a case may not seem an opportunity to persuade a justice, 
because it does not change their vote against a lawyer, it does provide a lawyer with the 
chance to persuade a justice of a certain course of legal reasoning in their opinion. Rex 
Lee has suggested that a “good oral argument” may be more likely to “result in a better 
opinion than in a changed vote.”227  The Court’s opinion obviously can have great 
significance upon the social fabric of our country, and lawyers should not avoid 
considering how to lose advantageously.  (13. In contrast to losing a case but winning an 
advantageous opinion, lawyers will often have justices present them with an opportunity 
to persuade them of their position.  In these instances, justices will pinpoint their 
disagreement with lawyers and then ask why they are incorrect in their position.  Justice 
                                                 
226 Catherine Valerio Barrad, “Successful Oral Arguments Do Not Involve Any Arguing,” San Francisco 
Daily Journal 8/4/2004, p. 5.  
227 Rex Lee, “Oral Argument in the Supreme Court,” American Bar Association Journal 72 p.60 (June 
1986). 
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Scalia  “give[s] counsel his or her best shot” to persuade him by stating “ ‘Here’s what’s 
preventing me from going along with you.  If you can explain why that’s wrong, you 
have me.’”228  When justices present advocates with the chance to persuade them, this 
can be a genuine opportunity for the advocate to shift a justices’ position, but it can also 
be an articulation of a justices’ intractable position that the advocate would be wise to 
simply move past.  Justice Breyer regularly explains his problem with a case, allowing 
counsel an opportunity to persuade him differently.  On the other hand, Justice Scalia, in 
contrast to his prior claim, will explain his disagreement with an advocate, only to 
consistently dismiss the lawyer’s arguments and waste valuable argument time.  Some 
scholars believe that justices enter oral arguments with their minds already made up, and 
while this is true to a degree, justices will regularly change how they understand a case, 
in turn shaping how the opinion develops, and the law that shapes our country.  Justice 
Stevens has remarked that he has changed his mind “after argument, after conference, 
and after I’ve started writing the opinion.”229  Advocates should not overlook the ability 
to change a justice’s mind because “you cannot assume that your case will not be one of 
them.”230   
Justices 
 Already thirteen functions of oral argument have been listed, yet the justices add 
even more of a multivariate purpose to oral argument, particularly because their behavior 
                                                 
228 Joseph W. Hatchett and Robert J. Tefler III, “The Importance of Appellate Oral Argument,” Stetson 
Law Review 33 P. 142 (2003). 
229 John Paul Stevens,“Supreme Court Interviews” Lawprose.org (2006): accessed 10/1/2008. 
230 Rex Lee, “Oral Argument in the Supreme Court,” American Bar Association Journal 72 p.60 (June 
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and purpose can change so dramatically in cases.  (14. At the most mundane level, oral 
arguments legitimize the purpose of the Court, giving validity to the justices’ position 
and their authority to resolve legal disputes at the highest level.  (15. Justices may also 
use oral argument as a time to clarify information.  (16. And they may also try to gather 
more information about a case.   There is an “exchange of information among the 
justices” and advocates.231  (17. Often the clarification of information and gathering of 
new information helps the justices to create a coherent narrative or understanding of 
events in a case.  Justices are charged with the unenviable task of discerning a clear 
understanding of events, or narrative, from two competing advocates.  Neither advocate 
wants their portrayal of events to hurt their case, so both advance a set of events which 
may eschew and emphasize certain happenings.  These competing narratives leave the 
justices in a position where they must discern for themselves a coherent frame of events 
upon which they can base their legal ruling.  Oral argument is the first site in which 
justices must hash out the particulars of competing narratives, and advocates who are 
unable to present a clear picture of events will often leave the justices confused, and at 
the mercy of an advocate who can provide a more clear understanding.  In fact, the 
explanation of the Court’s written opinion often begins with a narrative that emphasizes 
certain events in order to support the Court’s decision.  Dissenting opinions will portray 
a series of events which opposes the majority’s decision and clearly supports the 
dissenter’s perspectives. 
                                                 
231 Justice Scalia in Joseph W. Hatchett and Robert J. Tefler III, “The Importance of Appellate Oral 
Argument,” Stetson Law Review 33 P. 142 (2003). 
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 (18. As justices negotiate narrative complexities, they also begin to tentatively 
advance their personal arguments, or conversely their opposition to or dismissal of an 
argument.  These tests help the justice understand the limits of a lawyer’s argument and 
further conceptualize the potential ramifications involved in ruling in favor of a lawyer.  
The Court’s justices “want to know how the principle of law works out in other 
situations,” because they care about “the legal issue that is going to decide not just this 
case, but hundreds of other cases.”232  Novice advocates are often caught off-guard by 
the justices attempt to expand a lawyer’s legal argument past the case at hand and into 
potential future legal scenarios.  If an advocate is incapable of addressing, or has not 
considered, the far reaching consequences of his or her argument, then he or she will 
likely lose the case.  Because, while the novice advocate cannot satisfy the justices’ 
inquiries, a more skilled opponent will likely articulate the benefits of their own position 
as well as the damaging consequences of their opponent.  Advocates will also suffer 
from the comments of an opposing justice who will reduce their argument ad absurdum.  
(19. As justices test their support or opposition to an argument and legal theory, they 
most commonly employ a hypothetical situation.  Unfortunately, hypotheticals prove to 
be a site of great confusion because justices and advocates often use the same words for 
different meanings, resulting in cross talk and wasting valuable time as justices try to 
clarify their hypo and advocates attempt to provide a satisfactory answer to a muddled 
hypo.  Justices place great importance upon hypotheticals and advocates would be wise 
to address or bypass hypotheticals without referring to the trite line “that is not this 
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case.”  Justice Scalia, “if [he] had to grade advocates” “would really [give] a C for 
saying ‘this is not this case.’”233  When advocates state this line, they are often met with 
the justices’ angry glares or eye-rolling exasperation.   
 (20. Hypotheticals can create strange intellectual explorations of issues that may 
not be personally intriguing to a justice, but have no real bearing in a case. Justice 
Stevens will often ask advocates about their arguments’ relationship to various 
international laws.  If Justice Scalia does not call the argument back to a more focused 
examination of an issue before the advocate can respond, then exploratory questions can 
result in an uncomfortable moment for the inexperienced or underprepared advocate.  
Off topic explorations can also eliminate valuable time for more productive arguments. 
Tentatively exploring a position can also be significant in both the understanding for 
justices, but also in the Court’s development of voting blocs.  (21. While testing 
arguments with advocates to resolve their own questions, justices are also revealing to 
the rest of the Court their potential voting positions.  It may seem strange that justices 
are learning for the first time the voting positions of their colleagues, but generally 
justices do not discuss the case or tentative voting positions before oral argument.  So 
oral argument serves as a crucial moment in which justices begin to reveal where they 
stand in a case.  Justice Stevens uses oral argument to make the other justices aware of 
certain points.  He describes the process as “hav[ing] a point in mind that you think may 
not have been brought out in the briefs well, but you want to be sure your colleagues 
don’t overlook it. . . .You’re not necessarily trying to sell everybody on this position but 
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you want everyone to at least have the point in mind.”234  Sharing arguments and 
perspectives can be a valuable moment for justices in which they may be convinced that 
a counsel’s argument “was either right or wrong, and during the course of the case a 
point made by me or by one of my colleagues has completely changed one’s view.”235  
(22. Learning each other’s arguments and tentative positions creates a unique situation 
because justices begin to jockey for the primacy of certain arguments, forming alliances 
with other justices, or trying to vigorously convince other justices to vote with them.  
(23. This strategy may result in a group of justices stridently attacking an advocate in 
order to discredit an argument and win a fifth vote for their alliance.  In this instance, 
oral argument becomes a very hostile environment in which consideration of issues and 
an advocate’s argument is less important than discrediting an advocate’s argument to 
win a fifth vote.  Unfortunately, this tactic appears more frequently in highly political 
and significant societal cases where citizens would hope for more careful consideration 
instead of strategic attacks.      
(24. Although testing theories and revealing tentative voting positions is 
common, justices may also enter arguments with a clear voting position and use 
arguments to articulate how they believe the Court should rule in this case.  In this 
instance, justices are trying to persuade each other of how they should rule in a case, and 
the opinions they should adopt.  This rhetorical situation often results in Justice 
Kennedy’s analogy of a dialogue.  The justices will use the advocates as sounding boxes, 
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in which they articulate various positions, stating “Don’t you mean to argue XYZ,” or 
“Isn’t a better argument ABC.”  These situations can prove entertaining to the audience 
because the advocate simply serves as a conduit for justices to argue between 
themselves.  Advocates may agree with a justice’s advantageous argument, and after 
agreeing with the justice they will be met with a challenging hypothetical from an 
antagonistic justice.  The antagonistic justice will often be answered, not by the 
advocate, but by a justice who favors the advocate’s position.  Justice Breyer and Justice 
Scalia regularly spar through the advocates, creating a humorous situation, because the 
advocates are often befuddled as to how they should respond, as well as whether they 
should interrupt the argument of the two justices to advance their own position.  The 
argument for a position can often get heated as justices vigorously attempt to convince 
other justices to join with their opinion.  If a few justices are each advancing their own 
opinion of how they ought to rule in a case, it may result in a fragmented argument in 
which an argument’s persuasiveness is diluted by other justices advancing their own 
views. As justices advance particular arguments, they also will resist and identify 
potential obstacles the Court should be aware of if they want to gain their support.  (25. 
This behavior begins another unusual process of public debate in which justices begin 
trying to persuade that justice of how to bypass the personal obstacle or suggest other 
potential theories which may satisfy that justice. 
These internal arguments between the Court, as well as an advocate’s ability to 
persuade justices of particular points should not be overlooked.  (26. In oral arguments, 
the greatest function is perhaps the ability for a well articulated argument to shape a 
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justice’s written opinion.  It is unusual for justices to fully change their voting position 
from when first entering a case’s oral arguments, but it is common for justices to have a 
different understanding in how they may write the opinion to justify their decision.  
Justices will commonly concede to a different view of an argument than what they 
previously entered, and Justice Breyer often will admit in oral arguments that he now 
sees the case differently because of an advocate’s arguments.  The oral arguments 
provide advocates with the opportunity to discuss a variety of possibilities justices may 
rule in their favor.  (27. Justices enjoy strategizing about how they might craft an opinion 
in oral argument, because it begins the practical nature of addressing a problem with the 
philosophical nature of employing legal ideals.  If advocates can provide justices with a 
variety of options for resolving the current issue before the Court, then justices will 
begin to isolate one particular argument that suits a group of them.  Strategizing the 
resolution of a case helps the justices explore the political, cultural, and Constitutional 
repercussions of their potential decision, helping lead them to an advocate’s desired 
outcome.   
(28. Finally, and most important to the function of oral arguments is the physical 
act of communication and its influence upon cognition.  Through the explanation of 
Weick’s Sensemaking, I have already detailed at length the important connection 
between speech and cognition.  Oral arguments may present a site where justices, both 
aware and unaware, may use language and communication to inhibit their ability to 
carefully weigh arguments from both sides of a case.  Justices may also dominate an 
argument through over active interaction, preventing advocates from advancing 
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persuasive or important information that could influence how other justices evaluate a 
case.  Communication’s influence on cognition highlights one of the primary reasons 
justices’ interactions should be studied and understood.  Oral arguments play a crucial 
role in a justice’s ability to evaluate a case, and for justice to be obtained, advocates 
should expect fair treatment from all the justices.  Conversely, justices should expect 
their colleagues to engage in balanced questioning to prevent interactions from clouding 
judgments. 
Although Justice Kennedy’s comparison of oral argument as a dialogue provided 
a rich metaphor to unpack, the Court’s oral argument more closely mirrors the dynamic 
nature and complex process of a discussion at a large family dinner.  Discussing a 
controversial topic at the dinner table can foster a variety of responses and blocs of 
members will form in their opinion of topics.  Those managing the discussion must try to 
discern the motivation of family members as well as respond to various communicative 
idiosyncrasies particular to each member.  A site of significant interruptions, where 
members interpret stories and ask questions whenever they would like, discussions at 
family dinners may become fragmented and disjointed, lacking cohesive organization.  
Humor also plays a role in family dinners, often used as a means of bonding and 
breaking down social barriers.      
Clearly the Court is not a family dinner, but the simile is helpful to grasp the 
complexity of the justices’ purposes as well as the difficulty advocates face in 
articulating a coherent argument through the justices’ various interruptions and 
challenges.  Although the Court is a place where lawyers are expected to show deference 
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to justices, justices often approach oral argument with less pretension, desiring a more 
informal and productive discussion.  Justices overlook advocates confusing them with 
other justices, and they use humor to alleviate the tension or kindly call attention to an 
advocate’s mistake.  They are also capable of anger and frustration when an advocate 
advances a poor argument, fails to answer a question, or cannot manage a hypothetical’s 
complexities.  In part, this frustration is largely due to an advocate’s lack of preparation 
and his necessary understanding of a case.   
The top Supreme Court advocates often make their deliveries as if they are 
speaking to a large family.  Although they are very respectful to the justices, they push 
back and talk past justices to reach justices who may be more agreeable to their position.  
One famous advocate told me that when a justice begins to get overly antagonistic and 
petty, he will stop looking at that particular justice, making eye contact with other 
justices whom he believes will be open to his arguments.  The lawyer will still answer 
the justice’s questions but does so in a manner favorable to his own argument, and his 
eye contact maintains the attention of the other justices.  Another famous advocate will 
use his hands to hold back justices from asking questions while he is making a point.  
This particular advocate is very skilled at using his hands to prevent a question for just a 
few seconds before he turns his attention to the justice he has put on hold.  His hands 
also serve to call attention to another justice on the other side of the bench.  If Justice 
Souter advances a favorable position, this advocate will use a sweeping motion in his 
response to emphasize how Justice Souter’s position aligns with Justice Breyer.236  Or if 
                                                 
236 Justice Breyer and Souter sat on opposite sides of the bench. 
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the advocate is interrupted by another justice, the same advocate will keep his hand up, 
pointing to the justice he was responding to as he answers the interrupting justice, in 
order to signal to the Court that he plans to return to the original question.  Another 
tactic that should not be overlooked is the variant intonation, rhythm, and speed of a 
skilled lawyer’s delivery.  Oral arguments can be a tedious process and a monotone 
advocate will lose the justices’ interest; however, an advocate with too rapid a delivery 
can also hamper their case by creating confusion.  Successful lawyers arguing before the 
Court will use their voice to maintain the justices’ attention.  As justice Alito begins to 
nod off, an advocate who requires his vote may turn his direction and raise his voice to 
catch the justice’s attention.  All of these particular skills are those common at large 
family dinners where disagreement, interruptions, and distractions are common.   
However, oral argument should not reflect the interactional style of family 
dinners.  Oral argument should be a place where the greatest legal minds discuss the 
most difficult legal issues in a balanced, fair, and systematic manner.  Given the 
complexities surrounding oral argument, it is the most difficult form of human oratory.  
No other form of communication compares to its communicative and intellectual 
complexity.  Yet because oral argument is such a complex and tedious process, for both 
advocates and justices, the communicative act should be treated with a diligent level of 
care and attention.      
Oral argument provides a variety of purposes to both citizens, lawyers, and the 
justices; most importantly, from the perspective of Communication, the physical act of 
speech leads to cognition and influences understanding.  Rather than reflecting the 
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traditional model of speech reflecting thought, speech serves to create thought as actors 
work through their ideas and move towards personally amenable positions.  How justices 
reach these positions can vary and each justice has his or her own rhetorical discursive 
style which may or may not reflect sensemaking, depending upon their level of 
interaction; however, justices must be careful about how speech not only influences how 
others think, but also about how it may impact their own ability to evaluate a case.  As 
this study examines the manner in which justices and lawyers communicate, it seems 
reasonable to provide a summary of each justice’s rhetorical discursive style so readers 
may grasp an understanding of their typical interactions.   
The Justices’ Individual Rhetorical Discursive Styles 
As a whole, the Court has a unique character that can largely be generalized, but 
each justice also has their own unique style.  The following description of each justice’s 
rhetorical discursive behavior reflects their level of rhetorical discursive activity in 
arguments.  Each justice’s participation could vary depending on the case, but generally 
their interactions fall within a typical rate of engagement.  At times Chief Justice Roberts 
is more active in oral arguments than Justice Scalia, but it often depends on his interest 
in the case.  The press rarely mentions Justice Souter’s activity in oral argument, but he 
is a formidable justice who sets more hypothetical traps than any other justice, causing 
advocates to regularly walk unwittingly into his traps.  Justice Breyer is infamous for his 
long winded hypotheticals, but they have a knack for striking at the heart of a case and 
forcing an advocate to answer in a certain directed manner.  Justice Ginsburg is fairly 
active in oral argument, but at times she has difficulty being heard above the other 
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justices’ question.  Justice Stevens also suffers from a soft voice as a result of his age, 
and he often uses oral arguments as a place to philosophize about general legal and 
humanitarian principles.  Justice Kennedy can be somewhat grouchy, but both lawyers 
and other justices frequently address him when making arguments because he is often 
the swing justice in many cases.  Fairly new to the Court, Justice Alito still appears to be 
getting comfortable with the process of oral arguments.  Justice Thomas is silent, not 
having spoken in over 200 hours of oral argument.  The nine justices are each quirky and 
unique; it is their individual communicative style which makes oral argument an 
insightful and at times an entertaining intellectual engagement.  The following 
description moves from the most to least active justice in oral arguments, fittingly we 
begin with Justice Scalia.   
Justice Antonin Scalia is by far the most consistently active justice on the bench.  
He has developed a famous reputation for being the most talkative as well as the most 
pugnacious justice on the Court.  Justice Scalia enjoys debate, and he equally enjoys 
dismissing an advocate’s argument.  His tone and demeanor often reveals his preference 
for advocates’ positions.  Justice Scalia will often rescue advocates from other justices’ 
hypotheticals, regularly saving counselors favorable to his position from Justice Souter’s 
hypotheticals.  In addition, Justice Scalia commonly helps advocates frame their 
arguments in a position favorable to the Court.  It is not uncommon for Justice Scalia to 
argue with Justice Breyer through advocates, and while this can foster humorous 
moments, Justice Scalia’s tone can turn nasty and arrogant, resulting in awkward 
moments for counsels.  Likewise, Justice Breyer occasionally grows annoyed when 
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Justice Scalia’s interrupts his hypotheticals.  Justice Scalia’s interaction is most active in 
the advocate’s arguments with whom he disagrees, and will likely vote against.  His 
behavior in oral arguments makes it very clear which side he supports and will vote in 
favor of winning the case.  Although Justice Scalia’s behavior can be disagreeable, he 
also jokes frequently with advocates, often in a gentle fashion.  His humor can displace 
tension, but his sarcasm can make the courtroom an uncomfortable setting.  Justice 
Scalia’s arrogance is apparent in his attitude in the courtroom, but he is not above 
mistakes, albeit rare, and he is capable of admitting them when he makes them.    
Chief Justice John Roberts is the most experienced Supreme Court advocate to 
have ever recently served on the Court, having argued more than 50 cases before the 
Court.  His experience in oral arguments makes him a formidable justice to face, and he 
quickly recognizes an advocate’s attempt to evade his questions.  Chief Justice Roberts’ 
activity in oral argument often rivals that of Justice Scalia, and when the two begin 
attacking a lawyer’s argument, it can seem more like a feeding frenzy than a methodical 
legal inquiry.  The two will commonly follow the same line of questioning and explain 
to advocates the reasoning behind each other’s questions.  Chief Justice Roberts’ 
questions often reach to the crux of an argument where a case could move in either 
direction depending on the competency and soundness of an advocate’s argument.  Like 
Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Roberts’ activity is typically most prominent in an 
advocate’s argument with whom he will vote against.  His interaction in oral arguments 
will vary with the cases, and simply because Justice Scalia is heavily involved in a case 
does not mean that Justice Roberts will be engaged.  With the greatest power to control 
 
155 
 
the flow of oral arguments, Chief Justice Roberts holds the unique ability to influence 
the justices’ questions.  I have witnessed numerous occasions when he ended oral 
argument while other justices were leaning forward to ask questions.  But I have also 
seen occasions when justices will ask for a few more minutes to resolve important 
questions in a case and he will permit the time necessary to resolve lingering questions.  
At times, Chief Justice Roberts also prevent justices from interrupting an advocate’s 
response during heavy handed questioning; a tactic I would like to see him use more 
often.  His control of the Court has grown in time, and when the more senior justices 
begin stepping down, I believe we will witness a Court that is more measured and 
controlled in its questioning.  Given Chief Justice Roberts powerful position, he is 
ironically the most polite and considerate justice when it comes to the treatment of 
advocates.  He often will give the petitioner’s advocate an extra two minutes for a 
rebuttal even when they have exhausted their thirty minute limit due to vigorous 
questioning by the Court.  In addition to controlling oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts 
is also responsible for conducting the business of the Court in admitting lawyers to the 
Supreme Court Bar.  He makes this a situation in which lawyers genuinely feel 
welcome, no small feat since he welcomes lawyers every day before the beginning of 
oral argument.  He has a kind sense of humor which he may use to gently tease a lawyer 
or correct a mistake.  During one instance, in which a group of lawyers was being 
admitted into the bar, the nominating lawyer failed to recite the mandatory statement of 
“I am satisfied they possess the necessary qualifications.”  Without sternly chastising the 
lawyer, Roberts grinned and asked “and how do you find their qualifications?,” followed 
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by a roar of laughter from the audience.  The lawyer jumped to the podium and 
sheepishly read his statement while Roberts looked on with amusement, nodding his 
head after the lawyer’s statement.  More than any other justice, I believe we will see 
Chief Justice Roberts approach to oral argument change as he matures into his role as 
chief.  The Rhenquist court was known for its fervent and passionate approach to oral 
arguments, but I believe Robert’s court will reflect a very different personality, in part 
because he will have so many new justices joining him on the Court.  Justices Stevens, 
Ginsburg, Souter, Scalia, and possibly Thomas will most likely all step down within ten 
years, providing Roberts with the opportunity to mold and shape the behavior of the new 
incoming justices.     
When I began my observation of the Court, many lawyers and scholars urged me 
to pay attention to Justice Scalia’s dangerous hypotheticals which they claimed would 
often trap advocates in their own arguments.  However, in my time at the Court, I 
witnessed Justice David Souter lay far more traps for advocates than any other justice, 
and most advocates walked blindly into his setup.  Justice Souter’s mental acuity in 
cases can be somewhat astounding and overwhelming.  He is capable of using simple 
hypotheticals to draw out significant connections to the case at hand, and he often 
pursues a line of questioning until it has been directly answered by the advocate.  He and 
Justice Scalia spar regularly through advocates, and he often appears irritated when 
Justice Scalia prevents an advocate from walking into one of Justice Souter’s traps.  A 
patient and polite justice, he will regularly allow other justices to finish their line of 
questioning before pursuing his own, but this occasionally causes him to be left with 
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questions at the end of oral arguments without the time with which an advocate may 
answer them.  Chief Justice Roberts will regularly end oral arguments while Justice 
Souter is leaning forward to ask a question.  If Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts 
are occasional teammates in oral arguments, then Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg 
may also assist one another.  Justice Souter will regularly defend Justice Ginsburg’s line 
of questioning, following a line until he believes her position to be satisfied.  In fact 
many advocates regularly confuse Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg in oral argument, 
occasionally calling Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg.  Where Justice Ginsburg can be 
polite and soft-spoken, though not un-opinionated, Justice Souter is more direct and 
stern in the control he applies to oral arguments.  In one oral argument I observed, 
Justice Souter disdainfully remarked to a lawyer who had been evading his questions 
that he found her argument “utterly irrational.”237  It was the only moment of 
discourteous behavior I witnessed from Justice Souter.  Although Justice Souter and 
Justice Scalia regularly find themselves on different sides of a case, Justice Souter often 
has a more balanced approach to asking questions in oral arguments.  This should not 
suggest that he does not pay more attention to the side with whom he will vote against, 
but that he does so with less frequency than Justice Scalia or Chief Justice Roberts.  
Strangely, Justice Souter and Justice Scalia will talk amongst themselves occasionally at 
oral argument, and they appear to have a friendly relationship despite their legal 
differences.  Finally, Justice Souter has the polite habit of always waiting for Justice 
                                                 
237 See oral argument for Cone v. Bell , 556 U.S. ___ (2009).  
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Ginsburg to exit the courtroom before he does, a courteous habit that does not go 
unnoticed. 
Justice Stephen Breyer may be one of the most intriguing justices on the bench 
because he displays the most visceral reactions to advocates’ statements.  Justice Breyer 
sits on the end of right side of the bench.  At this position he cranes his neck to make eye 
contact with advocates, and his reactions to advocates’ statements may be easily 
overlooked because he sits at the periphery.  Justice Breyer is prone to shaking his head 
or shrugging his shoulders in disagreement.  He may hold his hand over his brow while 
listening, then quickly snap it forward in response to an advocate’s statement, lean back 
in his chair with his arms crossed rocking back and forth, shaking his head in 
disagreement.  During moments of excitement, Justice Breyer will lean forward and turn 
to make eye contact with his colleagues as support for a particular position.  He also 
regularly bypasses the comments of an advocate, speaking directly to other justices 
about the propositions they have made.  This can generate confusing moments for 
advocates because they are uncertain whether Justice Breyer is addressing their 
comments or the comments by another justice.  His physical behavior is by far the most 
animated of the justices and assists observers in understanding where he stands on 
issues. 
Justice Breyer is notorious for asking long winded hypotheticals, and he can 
occasionally get lost in his own hypotheticals, but generally I have found that they cut to 
essence of the case.  He has the ability to frame a hypothetical in such a way that 
foregrounds the tension between the advocate’s arguments in a case, and will clearly ask 
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for a lawyer to convince him of their position based upon his hypothetical.  His behavior 
in oral argument suggests that he may be more open to advocates’ attempt at persuasion 
than other justices.  Justice Breyer also occasionally asks the Court to allow an advocate 
to reply to his specific question for one minute.  The other justices respect this unusual 
tactic, giving Justice Breyer his minute, and Justice Breyer will let the advocate know 
when the minute is up, and at this point the other justices will begin to interrupt with 
their own questions.  Although the other justices respect Justice Breyer’s hypotheticals 
and timed responses, sometimes his excitement in oral arguments prevents him from 
reciprocating a similar respect.  He regularly interrupts advocate’s responses to other 
justices, provoking irritation and consternation from some justices.  I have witnessed 
Chief Justice Roberts prevent Justice Breyer from interrupting an advocate’s response to 
one of Justice Alito’s hypotheticals.  More than any other justice, Justice Breyer is 
candidly honest, telling advocates where he has problems with their argument, 
explaining the strengths or weaknesses in their case, and revealing where he stands and 
why.  His openness and honesty seem to provide advocates with a unique chance either 
to persuade him based upon his openness, or abandon pursuit for his support because of 
his staunch opposition.            
In a brief discussion with Justice Breyer, I asked about how he prepares for oral 
argument.  He mentioned that his clerks write up a memo concerning the case.  He reads 
the brief before reading the memo, making questions about the case as he goes.  He then 
reads the memo from his clerks and reads the briefs again making further questions if 
necessary.  Justice Breyer emphasized that he reads every brief twice before oral 
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argument, and mentioned that his approach to oral argument is “straightforward” 
because he simply asks the questions he develops from the lawyer’s briefs and his 
clerk’s memos.  He seemed somewhat puzzled that I might find any significance to his 
preparation for arguments.  Following up this question I inquired about his style of 
argument because of his unique hypotheticals.  He replied that his hypotheticals are 
designed to be very clear in both the question he is asking as well as the implications 
surrounding an advocate’s.  Specifically, Justice Breyer credited his style in oral 
argument to his time as a teacher which made him sensitive to understanding that his 
questions needed to be stated in a certain fashion to achieve the necessary response from 
students.  To his credit, Breyer’s approach to oral argument is clear and concise, causing 
advocates very little confusion in his questions.  While reading an opinion, Justice 
Breyer continues his pedagogical demeanor, explaining the case’s history and the 
Court’s judgment in an egalitarian manner which most lay people in the courtroom can 
follow.  Making complex legal issues intelligible to lay people proves a difficult skill, 
but Justice Breyer excels in this task, and the crowd seems to appreciate understanding 
the rationale behind the Court’s decision. 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg is a deceiving figure on the Court.  Her age seems 
to be quite literally pushing her down as her shoulders continue to stoop lower.  While 
looking up at the Court, it is difficult to see Justice Ginsburg, and when she leans back, 
some advocates may not see her at all, one reason why advocates may confuse her with 
Justice Souter.  Her soft voice also makes it difficult to hear her questions.  Despite her 
petite frame and soft voice, Justice Ginsburg can be a formidable force in oral argument.  
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She does not shy away from asking questions, although she can tend to be more reserved 
while other justices are more active.  Most of the justices respect Justice Ginsburg’s line 
of questioning without interrupting or steering the debate to a different issue, and she 
will pursue her line of questioning until the advocate has satisfied her inquiry.  She 
remains feisty enough to spar with Justice Scalia when he makes his aggressive quips.  
More than any other justice, Justice Ginsburg treats oral arguments very seriously, and I 
have never witnessed her make a joke or laugh during the Court’s humorous moments. 
Similar to Justice Ginsburg, Justice John Paul Stevens is also showing his age.  
The oldest member of the Court, 90 years old, he will likely be retiring soon.  A fairly 
active participant, Justice Stevens tends to be more engaged in issues that are of direct 
interest to him.  He has a habit of asking questions that are philosophically interesting to 
him, but not directly relevant to a case.  For example, he may inquire into a foreign 
country’s stance on certain issues, just to satisfy his own interest or prompt the other 
justices to think past the Constitution.  With a softer voice than any other justice, 
advocates occasionally have difficulty hearing questions from Justice Stevens.  Often 
times in good humor, Justice Stevens regularly smiles and will make jokes with the 
advocates and other justices.  A beloved member of the Court, his insight and questions 
provide lawyers with a real challenge at times.   
Justice Anthony Kennedy may be one of the most important justices on the Court 
at this time.  His presence mediates the liberal and conservative voting block, regularly 
supporting each side depending on the issues in a case.  Because Justice Kennedy is 
often the “swing” vote in a case, advocates will often address their arguments to gain his 
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favor.  Other justices will also try to win his support by either heavily attacking a lawyer 
or assisting a lawyer by providing another possible argument. Similarly, other justices 
look to make eye contact with Justice Kennedy when making their arguments to the 
Court.  In a Court with so many other dynamic justices, Justice Kennedy is the most 
highly scrutinized because his vote will often decide a case on contentious social issues.  
While onlookers closely observe Justice Kennedy’s behavior in oral argument, he 
provides little to suggest how he may be leaning in a case.  Justice Kennedy remains 
fairly stoic during arguments, resting his head on his fist while leaning back in his chair, 
his furrowed brow giving indication of thought, but not prejudice.  When Justice 
Kennedy grows excited or agitated, he begins to rock back and forth in his chair and will 
suddenly lean forward to ask an important question.  His quiet demeanor should not be 
taken for granted because if an advocate fails to answer one of his positions, or if Justice 
Kennedy vehemently disagrees with the advocate’s position, then Kennedy’s disdain 
becomes apparent as he vigorously argues with the advocate bobbing back and forth 
between his chair and his microphone.  Observers can frequently witness Justice 
Kennedy’s frustration and his anger can make for tense moments in the courtroom.  
Justice Samuel Alito does not usually ask many questions during oral arguments, 
and it is unclear whether he is adjusting to his position on the Court, if his seat at the far 
left of the bench prevents interaction, or if he simply has few questions to ask about a 
case.  Justice Alito regularly leans forward on the bench resting his head on his hand; 
however, he does not seem to pay advocates much attention in oral arguments, regularly 
appearing bored by the process.  Justice Alito often closes his eyes and fights to stay 
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awake during oral arguments, especially during the second and third argument of the 
day.  Justice Alito addresses and questions advocates in a respectful manner, but other 
justices tend to interrupt his line of inquiry, leaving his questions unanswered unless a 
lawyer is astute enough to return to his question. 
Between Justice Souter’s luddite practices, Justice Scalia’s pugnacious 
arrogance, and Justice Breyer’s never ending hypotheticals the Court is full of 
characters; however, none are quite as intriguing as Justice Clarence Thomas who has 
not spoken a word in oral argument in over four years, or more than 300 court cases.  
Justice Thomas last spoke on February 22, 2006 in Bowles v. South Carolina, and his 
critics regularly suggest that his silence proves that oral arguments make little difference 
to him.  Some of Justice Thomas’ behavior seems to support his critics, particularly 
when he leans back in his chair and puts his hand over his eyes.  While on the surface, 
covering one’s eyes may suggests indifference, it can also suggest intense listening or 
thought, especially when after a few minutes with his eyes covered Justice Thomas will 
respond to an advocate’s statement by bolting upright in his chair and flipping through 
the briefs before him.  Justice Thomas’ physical activity in oral argument exceeds that of 
any other justice.  He requests more cases that advocates cite in their arguments, and he 
reads through more of the briefs than any other justice.  While the other justices appear 
to be involved in oral argument because of the rate in which they asks questions, Justice 
Thomas’ behavior evokes the image of a justice who listens and considers an advocate’s 
argument, rather than a justice who argues, disagrees, strategizes, and analyzes an 
argument only to find its weaknesses instead of its validity.    
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Justice Thomas’ also has an unusual habit of speaking with Justice Breyer and 
Justice Kennedy during oral argument, often laughing raucously with Justice Breyer.  
His behavior with the other two justices distracts the audience at times, and must prove a 
difficult interruption for advocates to overcome.  Reporters and lawyers have often 
wondered at the justices’ engagements, pondering what could provoke so much laughter 
between them.  In a discussion with the clerks of the Court seated behind Justice Breyer 
and Justice Thomas, they disclosed that the two justices speak and joke primarily about 
legal matters.  When asked if the two justices ever stray into discussions outside of legal 
matters, the clerks could not remember a particular incident in which the justices spoke 
of extra-legal matters, but also mentioned that if they did, then it was only very rarely 
because they spoke so frequently about legal concerns.  Justice Thomas’ oral activity in 
arguments is scant.  He has spoken 281 words since the Court began identifying justices 
in their transcripts in the beginning of the 2004 term.238  And he, perhaps more than any 
other justice on the bench, is an enigma because he so rarely voices his opinion in oral 
argument.    
Each justice’s unique rhetorical discursive style adds a dimension to the Court’s 
communicative interaction, and they all use oral argument for a variety of purposes.  
Some justices tend to use it as a platform to persuade other justices to adopt their 
argument, others use it more for a careful consideration of issues, and each probably 
understands the function of oral arguments somewhat differently than their colleagues.  
Yet all would probably agree that they want to fairly consider a case, as well as provide 
                                                 
238 Mark Sherman, “Silent Justice Thomas: Not a Word Spoken,” www.USA Today.com 5/18/2007.  
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advocates with a fair opportunity to present their case.  “Equal Justice Under Law” may 
be an ideal, but it is an important one justices should strive to uphold, even in oral 
arguments, because oral argument is a site where justices rhetorical discursive 
interaction could both negatively influence their ability to evaluate a case, as well as 
hamper an advocates’ ability to deliver his or her argument.  The very act of justices 
speaking in oral arguments and the disruption of argumentation impacts their decision 
making ability.   
Arguing about “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” 
 Justices may employ a variety of styles of decision making, and scholars often 
attribute justices with a particular philosophical tradition.  However, legal scholars, 
political scientists, and psychologists have largely ignored the role communication in 
oral arguments plays in influencing a justice’s decision making ability.  While the 
previous section highlighted the various functions of oral argument and generalized each 
justices’ rhetorical discursive style, the following section analyzes the oral argument 
from Morse v. Frederick.  Because Timothy Johnson’s research suggests that the 
importance of oral argument revolves around the justices’ ability to gather information 
as strategic actors, an examination of oral arguments should reveal a relatively measured 
approach by justices in their pursuit of a fair decision.  Johnson’s determination about 
justices’ behavior derives from longitudinal studies with little concern for individual 
differences between justices.  He ignores micro level interaction between advocates and 
justices and emphasizes strategic decision making on the larger macro level in which 
oral arguments are only one key component.  Johnson’s study fails to consider how 
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communicative interaction within oral argument could impact how justices gather 
information, and hence behave in contrast to the strategic actor model.  This case study 
attempts to reveal how justices’ interactions may oppose the strategic actor, thus 
introducing Sensemaking as an additional model of decision making which may account 
for justices’ communicative interactions in Morse v. Frederick’s oral argument.  I have 
chosen to use Morse v. Frederick because it serves as an ideal case that foregrounds both 
sensemaking and strategic actor behavior by the justices. 
Morse v. Frederick was a highly publicized 2007 case in which a student, Joseph 
Frederick, claimed First Amendment protection for his sign that read “Bong Hits 4 
Jesus.”  The student unfurled his banner across the street from where his fellow high 
school students were gathering to watch the passing of the Olympic torch.  Principal 
Deborah Morse believed the sign promoted the use of illegal drugs and directed 
Frederick to take down the sign.  When Frederick refused to take the sign down, Morse 
confiscated the sign and later suspended him.  Frederick appealed the suspension to the 
school’s superintendent who upheld his suspension.  In 2007 the Supreme Court handed 
down a 5-4 ruling in favor of Morse, determining that schools have an interest in 
safeguarding students from speech that can be reasonably interpreted to encourage 
illegal drug use.  Kenneth Starr and Edwin Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General) 
represented Deborah Morse, and Douglas Mertz represented Joseph Frederick.  
Topically, the case provides an interesting and controversial issue of First Amendment 
rights from which to gauge justices’ behavior.  Oral argument in the case was vigorous 
and nearly all the justices were involved in questioning at some stage.  I have repeated 
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some of the methodological approaches listed in chapter III to remind readers of the 
various categories implemented in the study. 
The following case study examines oral argument at the micro or rhetorical 
discursive level by studying the communicative interaction between justices and lawyers 
to better understand how judicial interaction influences information gathering and 
argument development.  In order to evaluate judicial interaction within oral arguments, I 
analyzed the oral arguments in Morse v. Frederick by posing the following questions to 
consider judicial communication in a variety of areas:    
1. Do justices demonstrate a substantial preference for one counsel 
over another in their: 
 
a. challenging of counsels,  
b. permitting counsels an equal opportunity to respond, 
c. frequency at which they interrupt counsels,  
d. assistance of counsels arguments, and 
e. treatment of counsels? 
 
To evaluate the case, I obtained transcripts of oral argument from the Supreme Court 
website, and listened to oral arguments on Oyez.org.  In analyzing arguments, I tallied 
the number of instances in which justices interrupted lawyers based upon the actual 
transcript as well as listening to the argument.  Argument transcripts only record mid 
sentence interruptions, but audio files enabled me to discern interruptions not captured in 
the transcript.  While interruptions can reveal a more challenging rhetorical environment, 
understanding how frequently justices challenged, assisted, or neutrally questioned 
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counsels is also important in understanding rhetorical discursive interaction.  To 
determine whether justices equally challenged counsels, I divided justices’ statements or 
questions between those they made during the petitioner and respondent’s oral argument, 
and then categorized statements or questions based upon whether they challenged or 
assisted the lawyer’s argument.  I also listened to the tone of their voice for any sense of 
hostility or sarcasm.  This enabled me to determine how commonly justices supported or 
challenged counsels.  I deemed challenging statements/questions those which questioned 
the argument or proposed a hypothetical which tested the counsel’s argument (e.g. “That 
doesn’t make any sense to me.  Does it depend on his intent, whether or not he intended 
to be truant that afternoon?”).239  I considered assisting statements/questions to be 
helpful to the lawyer in framing or emphasizing aspects of the argument (e.g. Scalia: 
“This banner was interpreted as meaning smoke pot, no?”  Starr: “It was interpreted 
exactly, yes”).240  I recorded neutral statements/questions as those statements by justices 
asking for small matters of fact, or references in the brief (e.g. “Can I ask you another 
record point, just so I know where to look”).241  By achieving a more nuanced 
understanding of justices’ statements, we can better understand justices’ rhetorical 
discursive interaction.  Finally, in order to determine equal speaking time, I timed 
speaking moments for all participants in oral argument.  I did not include moments in 
which a justice or lawyer was forced to repeat a statement or question.  Quantitative 
                                                 
239 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. ___ (2007) 55. 
240 Id. at 8. 
241 Id. at 46. 
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recordings provide an efficient means of capturing iterations without listing to readers 
each assisting or challenging statement made by the justices.  Qualitative analysis 
compliments quantitative findings by providing a more transparent examination of the 
justices’ treatment of counsels.   
Using a qualitative approach to understand whether justices showed preference 
for one counsel over another, I compared whether or not justices assisted counselors 
equally, by providing them with frames or arguments that strengthened their position.  I 
also compared whether justices equally ridiculed or denigrated counselors to determine 
if justices treated counselors preferentially.   
Lastly, my analysis has been informed by my firsthand observations of nearly 
fifty oral arguments before the Supreme Court, interviews with top advocates who 
regularly argue before the Court, and a discussion about oral argument with Associate 
Justice Stephen Breyer.  Witnessing oral argument and learning about the physical 
behavior and rhetorical discursive interaction of justices provided a level of 
understanding which more fully informed my reading of the transcript from Morse v. 
Frederick.  My experience at the Court forced me to consider quantitative and 
qualitative approaches that could capture the dynamic interactions occurring within oral 
argument.  Observation of physical behavior and rhetorical interaction at the Court 
revealed the displeasure justices feel when their line of questioning has been interrupted.  
At times, justices would lean forward to ask a question, and before uttering their remark, 
another justice would speak first and shift the course of inquiry.  Justices appeared to be 
irritated by the rhetorical interaction of other justices, and I could not help but wonder 
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how many justices still held questions they wanted to ask, or how many questions were 
never answered because of another justice’s interruption.  
Rhetorical Discursive Interaction in Morse v. Frederick 
 In considering the rhetorical discursive interactions of justices, readers should 
keep in mind that the strategic actor model suggests that we should witness a balanced 
approach by justices in their gathering of information.  Realistically, we should not 
expect justices to have an identical number of questions or statements for each advocate, 
but we should expect to see a relatively balanced approach.  The analysis begins with 
considering quantitative data: frequency of interruptions, tally of the types of statements 
and questions uttered by justices, and the speaking time frames for both justices and 
lawyers.  Quantitative data captures the phenomena of rhetorical discursive interaction in 
ways that qualitative methods cannot, such as providing information on frequency rates 
and speaking times.242 Following the quantitative data, qualitative data presents a picture 
of the justices’ treatment of counsels.  Both quantitative and qualitative analysis present 
a comprehensive understanding of the justices’ rhetorical discursive interaction and its 
impact upon information gathering and argument development.  As the term rhetorical 
discursive interaction suggests, readers should consider how the justices’ interactions 
influence persuasiveness and understanding.  Justices’ lopsided or unbalanced 
                                                 
242 Traditional quantitative analysis cannot be applied reliably to the communicative interaction captured 
by quantitative frames. T-tests and Chi squares cannot be used to reveal much because each oral argument 
is different and we cannot assume that each case should, or will, elicit the same, or “average,” level of 
interaction by the justices.  In addition T-tests and Chi squares prove unreliable because questioning by 
justices can be lopsided with different justices taking similar amounts of time when speaking to different 
counsels, thus negating any “statistical significance.”  
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interactions will be referred to as “rhetorical discursive bias,” but this communicative 
“bias,” should not necessarily be equated directly with judicial bias.243 
This case study begins with an evaluation of interruptions.  Interruptions provide 
a basic means of understanding how justices controlled oral arguments for both parties.  
If one lawyer suffered significantly less interruptions than the competing lawyer, then it 
seems likely that some justices may be reflecting a communicative bias in their 
questioning and gathering of information.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4.1 lists the number of interruptions generated from both transcript and  
 
audio file. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 Interruptions 
 
                Scalia   Roberts    Kennedy   Alito   Breyer   Thomas   Souter   Ginsburg   Stevens   Total 
 
  Petitioner 8 3  6  3      4         0        11           4           6    45 
 
  Respondent 19 13 9 0       11            0         3           8           0    63 
 
  
 
                                                 
243 In using the term “bias” while referencing a justice’s position, I am referring to a hunch or leaning, as 
well as a solid conclusion.  Justices will likely have a position they are leaning towards, and they may also 
have a primary party in mind who should win the case.  An interactional bias refers to lopsided 
communication or speaking more in one party’s argument than in another.  The significance of this 
interactional bias lies in communication’s ability to shape cognition and thereby influencing justices’ 
decision making ability.  
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Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts voted in favor of the 
petitioner, while Justices Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens voted for the 
respondent.  Interestingly, some justices questioned the counsel whom they voted against 
more vigorously than the counsel they ended up supporting.  Justice Scalia and Chief 
Justice Roberts interrupted respondent’s counsel significantly more than they interrupted 
petitioner’s counsel.  Justice Scalia interrupted over twice as often in respondent’s 
argument than he did in petitioner’s argument.  Likewise Chief Justice Roberts 
interrupted over four times as often in respondent’s argument than in petitioner’s.  
Justice Breyer also interrupted nearly four times as often in the respondent’s time than in 
the petitioner’s.   Although Justice Breyer did not join the majority he concurred and 
dissented in part.  At the time, Justice Breyer believed the Court “need not and should 
not decide this difficult First Amendment issue on the merits.  Rather [he] believ[ed] that 
it should simply hold that qualified immunity bars the student’s claim for monetary 
damages and say no more.”244  In effect, Justice Breyer joined the majority in ruling 
against Joseph Frederick’s right to collect monetary damages.  Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Scalia and Breyer’s rhetorical discursive interaction reflects a clear 
communicative bias and potential judicial bias in their approach to  questioning, given 
their taxing interruptions of respondent’s counsel versus their minor involvement in 
petitioner’s argument.  In contrast with the majority’s opinion but reflective of biased 
communicative interaction, Justices Souter and Stevens were much more active in 
                                                 
244 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. ___ (2007). 
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petitioner’s argument than they were in respondent’s.  Justices Kennedy, Alito, and 
Ginsburg’s interaction reflect less of an interactional bias. 
The number of interruptions only provides a partial sense of understanding 
justices’ rhetorical discursive interaction, and fails to provide a more nuanced 
understanding of why justices interrupted.  Yet what this table does accomplish is to 
reveal the disparity in which justices can treat opposing counsels.  Based on 
interruptions in oral argument, the justices do not seem to be interacting equally with 
counsels, indicating a potential for rhetorical discursive bias.  This table coupled with the 
next provides a better understanding of how and why justices may have interrupted 
lawyers.  
 The statements a justice makes allows us to better understand the purpose of their 
interruptions, but it also provides a means of learning how justices may have challenged 
or supported each counsel.   Table 4.2 lists the number of challenging (C/), assisting 
(A/), or neutral  (N/) statements or questions posed to each counsel by the justices. 
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Table 4.2 Statements 
 
               Scalia     Roberts  Kennedy     Alito     Breyer    Thomas    Souter    Ginsburg    Stevens 
 
C/pet. 1 2 7 2 5  0  9  6  5 
 
A/pet. 7 1  0 0  0  0  0  0 0 
 
N/pet. 0  0 3 1  0  0 3 0 2 
 
Total 8 3 10 3 5  0 12 6 7 
 
 
C/resp. 28 14 10 0 9  0  4 5 0 
 
A/resp. 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 2  0 
 
N/resp. 0 1 0 0  10  0 0 2 0 
 
Total 28 15 10 0 19  0 4 9  0 
 
  
 
 Table 4.2 provides a better understanding of the justices’ rhetorical discursive 
interaction because it breaks down how justices challenged, assisted, or neutrally posited 
questions for counsels.  In conjunction with Table 4.1, the data reveals that Justice Scalia 
kindly assisted the petitioner’s counsel seven times, while heavily challenging the 
respondent.  Justice Roberts appeared to minimally assist the petitioner’s counsel, but 
also strongly challenged the respondent’s counsel.  Although in Table 4.1, Justice Breyer 
appears to overly interrupt the respondent’s counsel, this table clarifies that his 
interruptions were most likely due to neutral brief oriented questions or statements, in 
which he inquired about where to read various affidavits in the brief.  Justices Souter and 
Stevens both questioned the petitioner’s counsel more stringently than the respondent’s 
counsel.  Table 4.2 further indicates a presence of rhetorical discursive bias in the 
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justice’s interactions, but how much actual time do the justices control versus the 
lawyers?  
 Speaking time is an important component because lawyers only receive 30 
minutes for oral argument, and if a justice dominates the speaking time of a lawyer, then 
it can substantially limit what a lawyer can communicate about his or her case.  Table 
4.3 displays petitioner’s oral argument including rebuttal time.  Total speaking time 30 
minutes 46 seconds.  Table 4.3 also displays respondent’s oral argument.  Total speaking 
time 30 minutes 16 seconds. 
Table 4.3  Speaking Time 
 
Petitioner 
   Starr  Kneedler   Scalia  Roberts  Kennedy  Alito  Breyer  Thomas  Souter  Ginsburg  Stevens 
 
Seconds 476 321    82         79             88          43       96             0           284         145            51 
 
Total              Pet. = 893 (14 minutes 53 seconds) Justices = 868 (14 minutes 28 seconds) 
 
Respondent 
                  Mertz     Scalia      Roberts     Kennedy   Alito    Breyer  Thomas Souter Ginsburg Stevens    
 
Seconds 674 289 197 58 0            308 0        101        84        0 
 
Total           Resp. = 674 (11 minutes 14 seconds) Justices = 1037 (17 minutes 17 seconds) 
 
 
 
 
A comparison between petitioner and respondent reveals a substantial difference 
in the amount of speaking time afforded to each counsel.  Oddly, during respondent’s 
argument, justices controlled more speaking time than the actual lawyer, and they 
presented an obvious advantage to the petitioner’s counsel.  Petitioner’s counsel 
presented for 3 mintues and 39 seconds longer than the respondent, over a 10% time 
advantage.  Justices largely controlled the three minute time difference in their 
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questioning.  Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts engaged in questioning over five 
minutes longer in respondent’s argument than petitioner’s.  Between Justices Breyer, 
Scalia, and Chief Justice Roberts, the three controlled over 13 minutes and accounted for 
nearly 77% of justices’ speaking time during respondent’ oral argument.  During both 
petitioner’s and respondent’s oral arguments, these three justices accounted for over 
55% of justices’ entire speaking time; this third of the justices clearly dominated the 
time accorded to the other two-thirds of the Court. 
For those justices who both participated in oral arguments and voted against the 
respondent (Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer), these justices controlled 82% of the 
justice’s speaking time during respondent’s oral argument.  Likewise, those justices who 
voted against the petitioner’s counsel (Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer (since he 
concurred and dissented in part)) controlled over 66% of justices’ speaking time during 
petitioner’s oral argument; without Justice Breyer the trio still controls over 55% of 
justices’ speaking time.  The justices’ support for a counsel whom they end up voting 
against suggests behavior more in accordance with sensemaking than the strategic actor.   
One would expect to see a clear rhetorical discursive bias in judicial interaction towards 
a counsel who justices support rather than with whom they disagree; however, justices 
seem to actively refute and undermine the argument which threatens the position with 
which they most identify, as if they have a “champion” who they want to win the case.  
Justice Scalia appears guilty of this championing behavior as he assisted the petitioner’s 
lawyers seven times in making their argument, and attacked the respondent’s lawyer 28 
times.  Chief Justice Roberts follows a similar pattern of interaction.  Although he did 
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not assist the petitioner’s lawyers, but in one instance, he only challenges the petitioner’s 
lawyers twice, and he heavily attacks the respondent’s lawyer 14 times, taking up over 
three minutes of speaking time.  The attacks upon an oppositional counsel may indicate 
sensemaking behavior as justices eliminate oppositional perspectives and cognitively 
talk themselves into a position of dismissing oppositional arguments. 
How did the justices’ domination and control of speaking times impact the 
advocates? And why are speaking frames important?  The amount of time justices afford 
to an advocate to articulate a complex argument is a significant advantage.  The more 
time a speaker has to put forth an argument then the clearer and more persuasive their 
message may become.  Thirty minutes is already an exceedingly difficult timeframe in 
which a lawyer must present arguments and answer questions, but if each response is 
limited by justices’ interruptions, then the task grows even more Sysphean. 
 Table 4.4 displays the number of speaking instances in which lawyers were able 
to speak for a certain timeframe. 
 
Table 4.4  Lawyer’s Speaking Timeframes 
 
Seconds         1-10           11-20            21-30           30-40                    40-50             50+ 
 
Petitioner        27                 18  7  6  3  1 
 
Respondent    57                  15  3  3  0  0 
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Obviously, given the difference in speaking times justices provided each counsel, 
we should not expect similar numbers, yet the disparities in speaking timeframes are 
substantial.    If justices’ interruptions limit the timeframe of a response, then advocates 
lack the time to appropriately respond to questions, or lack the time to articulate the 
intricacies of an idea.  Advocates enjoy rambling explanations, and justices should step 
in to redirect lawyers if necessary, but in this case, the respondent’s counsel was forced 
to make 57 statements in ten seconds or less, meaning 73% of the advocate’s statements 
were limited to responses in ten seconds or less.  In contrast, the petitioner’s advocate 
made 27 or 44% of their statements in ten seconds or less, and they were provided with 
other opportunities to present complex responses to justices, which were withheld from 
the respondent.       
Quantitative Summary 
 A summary of quantitative analysis suggests that justices’ rhetorical discursive 
interactions may reveal preferential treatment for counsels.  In general, the respondent’s 
counsel faced significantly more questions and a much more aggressive style of 
questioning than did the opposing counsel.  The respondent’s counsel was also 
interrupted more frequently and his response time was significantly more limited than 
the petitioner’s.  The petitioner faced more stringent questioning by those justices who 
voted against them as well, but not to the degree in which the respondent’s counsel was 
questioned.  Furthermore, Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Ginsburg all maintained 
relatively balanced questioning and did not reflect a significant bias in their rhetorical 
discourse.  Lastly, justices did assist one counsel more than the other, but Justice Scalia 
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was the only justice who significantly and disproportionately assisted one counsel more 
than another.  However, any assistance from a Supreme Court justice can be substantial 
for one’s case, because a counsel now has an advocate who carries legal and social 
authority that can defend and advance an argument for him or her. 
Qualitative Analysis 
While the quantitative data enables us to answer the research areas abstractly, qualitative 
analysis provides the opportunity to reveal the level of respect or disrespect justices 
show towards counsels.  In this case, qualitative data confirm that justices were less 
concerned with gathering information and exploring all possible arguments through fair 
interactions with counsels.   This section provides further evidence of rhetorical 
discursive bias in justices’ interactions by examining how justices assist counselors in 
both constructing arguments, and denigrating a counselor’s position within oral 
argument.   
It seems unusual for justices to help an advocate frame an argument or rescue 
them from another justice’s hypothetical situation.  However, because justices have read 
the case’s briefs and have some intimate knowledge of their fellow justices’ inclinations 
“judges may use oral argument as a form of internal advocacy.  They may stake out 
tentative positions in advance of the decision conference” to persuade their colleagues of 
certain positions.245   In order to generate favor for their own positions, justices may help 
the advocate, whom they prefer, to construct an argument favorable to the justice’s 
                                                 
245 Ruggero Aldisert, Winning on Appeal: Better Briefs and Oral Argument 32 (Notre Dame Law School 
2003). 
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position.  In Morse v. Frederick justices assisted both counsels but to disproportionate 
degrees.  For example, Justice Scalia helps Mr. Starr avoid an unfavorable hypothetical 
advanced by Justice Breyer:   
Justice Scalia: So you want to get away from a hypothetical then.  I don’t know 
why you try to defend a hypothetical that involves a banner that says amend the 
marijuana laws.  That’s not this case as you see it, is it? 
 
Mr. Starr: Well it’s certainly not this case, but— 
 
Justice Scalia: This banner was interpreted as meaning smoke pot, no? 
 
Mr. Starr: It was interpreted—exactly, yes . . . .246  
     
Justice Scalia not only presents Mr. Starr with an escape from Justice Breyer’s 
unfavorable hypothetical, but he also assists Mr. Starr in framing his argument around “a 
banner that was interpreted as meaning smoke pot.”  Justice Scalia narrows the realm of 
judicial inquiry by establishing early on in Mr. Starr’s argument that Frederick’s banner 
advocated drug use.  Justice Scalia assists Mr. Starr with his argument again when he 
redirects Justice Kennedy’s inquiry: 
Justice Scalia:  Why do we have to get into the question of what the school 
board’s policy is and what things they can make its policy?  Surely it can be 
the—it must be the policy of any school to discourage the breaking of the law.  I 
mean suppose this banner had said kill somebody, and there was no explicit 
regulation of the school that said you should not, you should not foster murder.  
Wouldn’t that be suppressible? 
  
Mr. Starr: Of course.  That is not— 
  
Justice Scalia: Of course it would, so— 
  
Mr. Starr: The answer is yes. 
 
                                                 
246 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. ___ (2007) 8.    
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Justice Scalia: Why can’t we decide this case on that narrow enough ground that 
any school, whether it has expressed the policy or not, can suppress speech that 
advocates violation of the law? 
 
Mr. Starr:  I think it can . . . .247 
 
Justice Scalia again provides a favorable situation with which Mr. Starr can simply 
agree.  Justice Scalia’s distillation and clarification of the case provides a compelling 
argument for Mr. Starr, and Justice Scalia’s comments could easily have presented the 
case in such a way as to agree with or influence the commitments of other justices.  
These two examples represent four out of the eight speaking turns taken by Justice 
Scalia in the petitioner’s portion of oral argument, and they clearly benefitted Mr. Starr’s 
argument and the standing of the petitioner’s position.  As we shall soon see, Justice 
Scalia provided no similar assistance to Mr. Mertz, going so far as to even ridicule his 
position.  
As Justice Scalia provided significant assistance to Mr. Starr, so too did Justice 
Ginsburg aid Mr. Mertz in the framing of his argument, though not to the same degree as 
Justice Scalia.  Justice Ginsburg interrupts one of Justice Scalia’s many questions, but 
instead of redirecting her inquiry as Justice Scalia had done in the previous two 
examples, she clarifies Justice Scalia’s line of questioning:   
Justice Ginsburg:  But couldn’t the school, couldn’t the school board have a time, 
place, or manner regulation that says you’re not going to use the halls to 
proselytizer your cause, whatever it may be? 
 
Mr. Mertz:  I believe that’s correct. 
 
                                                 
247Id. at 8. 
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Justice Ginsburg:  You could have reasonable rules of decorum for what goes on 
inside the school building. 
 
Mr. Mertz: Right.248  
 
Justice Ginsburg’s questioning assists Mr. Mertz in making his case, but her assistance 
should not be considered a sign of favoring his position, because she later ridicules one 
of his arguments, stating “I couldn’t understand that somehow you got mileage out of his 
being truant that morning?”249  Although Justice Ginsburg assists Mr. Mertz in framing 
his argument, her action should probably be understood as an act of clarification rather 
than preferential treatment.   
Thus far justices have helped both counsels, although to varying degrees, but 
when coupled with the treatment of both counsels a new picture begins to develop.  
Justices disparage the arguments of petitioner’s counselors only once when Justice Alito 
tells Mr. Kneedler “I find that a very, a very disturbing argument . . . .”250  Justice 
Alito’s response to Mr. Kneedler’s argument suggests that he disagrees with Mr. 
Kneedler’s position, but this is the only instance in which the justices critique the 
petitioner’s argument.   
                                                
Conversely related to the experience of the petitioner’s counsel, justices heavily 
ridicule and denigrate Mr. Mertz’s arguments, at times, even laughing at his position.  
Following Mr. Mertz’s opening statements, in which Mr. Mertz claims “this case is 
about free speech.  This is not a case about drugs,” Chief Justice Roberts sets the tone for 
 
248  Id. at 40. 
249 Id. at 50.  
250 Id. at 20.  
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Mr. Mertz’s oral arguments stating “It’s a case about money.  Your client wants money 
from the principal personally for her actions in this case.”251  Chief Justice Roberts 
aggressively reframes Mr. Mertz’s argument in an adversarial manner suggesting 
Frederick’s true motivation is greed.  Of further consequence to Chief Justice Roberts is 
a personal concern that “principals and teachers around the country have to fear that 
they’re going to have to pay out of their personal pocket whenever they take actions 
pursuant to established board policies.”252   Chief Justice Robert’s comments 
immediately frame Mr. Mertz’s argument in an unfavorable light, by which Mr. Mertz 
must now defend his client’s position from the greedy and socially dangerous argument 
Roberts advanced.  Chief Justice Roberts forces respondent’s counsel into a defensive 
position before he can even begin to articulate his opening arguments.  Chief Justice 
Roberts clearly takes exception to Mr. Mertz’s case and appears to approach the case 
with a clear interactional bias against respondent’s counsel.  While Chief Justice 
Robert’s questioning is obviously value laden, his approach seems tame to Justice 
Scalia’s approach.  Justice Scalia aggressively questions Mr. Mertz, at times preventing 
him from responding: 
Justice Scalia: Nonviolent crimes are okay, it’s only violent crimes that you 
can’t, you cannot promote, right? Right? 
  
Mr. Mertz: I think there is a— 
   
Justice Scalia: “Extortion is Profitable,” that’s okay? 
  
Mr. Mertz:  Well— 
                                                 
251 Id. at 29. 
252 Id. at 30.  
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Justice Scalia:  This is a very, very, with all due respect, ridiculous line. . . . .253   
 
To claim “with all due respect” and then state Mr. Mertz is advancing a “ridiculous 
line,” Justice Scalia’s sarcasm demeans Mr. Mertz.  Justice Scalia not only aggressively 
challenges Mr. Mertz to relent to his position by repeating “right? Right?,” but he 
prevents Mr. Mertz from clarifying or defending his position by not allowing him to 
respond and dismissing his argument as a “ridiculous line.”   
Later Justice Scalia joins in laughter prompted by a sarcastic statement made by 
Justice Kennedy, and then perpetuates the laughter by stating “because you’re both a 
truant and a disrupter, you get off. (laughter)./ Had you just been a disrupter, tough luck. 
(laughter).”254  Justice Scalia’s sarcastic comments denigrate and ridicule Mr. Mertz’s 
position, and Justice Scalia’s comments, more than 28 of them, seem to substantially 
undermine Mr. Mertz’s ability to generate a successful argument, or even advance a 
reasonable position.  Justice Scalia’s rhetorical discursive interaction heavily reflects a 
clear communicative and likely judicial bias against respondent’s counsel.  His 
comments account for almost a third of the justices’ comments, and he appears as an 
advocate of the petitioner, attacking and attempting to overturn Mr. Mertz’s position.   
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia are not the only justices who engage in 
ridiculing Mr. Mertz’s position.  The justices appear to encourage and play off of each 
other’s behavior.  In one instance, Chief Justice Roberts asks a question in response to 
                                                 
253 Id. at 35.  
254 Id. at 53.  
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Mr. Mertz assertion that Principal Morse had working knowledge of free speech cases 
related to schools: 
Chief Justice Roberts: And so it should be perfectly clear to her exactly what she 
could and couldn’t do. 
 
 Mr. Mertz: Yes. 
  
Justice Scalia: As it is to us right? (laughter) 
 
Justice Souter:  I mean, we have had a debate here for going on 50 minutes about 
what Tinker means, about the proper characterization of the behavior, the non-
speech behavior. . . . We’ve been debating this in this courtroom for going on an 
hour, and it seems to me however, you come out, there is reasonable debate.255  
 
Missing from oral argument transcripts is the tone of each justice.  In audio files, all 
three justices adopt a sarcastic tone when questioning Mr. Mertz, which again 
undermines any reasonable response he could provide.  Justice Scalia’s laughter would 
only be appropriate in an environment of sarcastic questioning, and his laughter only 
further denigrates Mr. Mertz’s position, rendering a compelling retort impossible.  
Justice Kennedy joins the other justices in belittling Mr. Mertz’s argument by framing 
his position in a ridiculous light: 
So under your view, if the principal sees something wrong in the crowd across 
the street, had to come up and say now, how many of you here are truants . . . I 
can’t discipline you because you’re a truant, you can go ahead and throw the 
bottle (laughter).256  
 
Justice Kennedy’s hypothetical ridicules Mr. Mertz’s line of questioning by arguing ad 
absurdum.  This would clearly not be a position a litigant would adhere to, nor does it 
apply to a free speech case.  Justice Kennedy’s hypothetical seems to be designed to 
                                                 
255 Id. at 49. 
256Id. at 52.  
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provoke laughter that would undermine Mr. Mertz’s argument and eliminate his ability 
to provide a persuasive response.257  In general, justices appear more engaged in 
attacking Mr. Mertz than listening to his arguments.   
The justices rhetorical discursive interaction in oral arguments reveal distinct 
divisions between counsels, often supporting counsels or allowing them to pass 
unchallenged if they ended up voting for them, and attacking and ridiculing counsels 
whom they voted against.  The frequent interaction by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer likely significantly hindered the respondent’s ability to 
articulate their argument in a persuasive manner, or even explain information which may 
have been misunderstood by the justices.  Justice Ginsburg never received an answer 
regarding the student’s truancy and it could have had a real impact, possibly preventing 
Justice Kennedy from joining in Justice Scalia’s disparagement.  At the very least 
readers should agree that Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Scalia did not approach this 
argument with fairness or equal consideration for both counsels in mind.  In fact, the 
justices attacked respondent’s counsel with an aggression seemingly designed to 
undermine his case, possibly in the hopes of winning a swing vote in Justice Kennedy.  
With Justice Kennedy joining in the ridicule of respondent’s counsel, it seems as if a 
solid five justices will be voting against the respondent.  It is not an uncommon tactic 
among justices in divisive cases to try and win the swing vote to their side.  When 
                                                 
257 Justice Kennedy’s participation in the ridicule of Mr. Mertz is also significant because of his swing 
vote position.  The disparagement of Mr. Mertz by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Scalia, may have 
also encouraged Justice Kennedy to join in the game, potentially influencing his consideration of the case.  
At the very least, Justice Kennedy fails to fairly consider the case, and has likely impacted his own 
judgment by joining in the ridicule of a counselor.   
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reviewing the analysis, it appears difficult to understand how respondent’s counsel 
would have had the opportunity to persuade any swing justice with the limited time he 
was given.    
In responding to the research questions, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices 
Scalia, Breyer, Souter, and Stevens reveal a significant preference for one counsel over 
another in their challenging of counsels, allowing counsels an equal opportunity to 
respond, frequency at which they interrupt counsels, assistance of counsel’s arguments, 
and general treatment of counsels.  The disparity, in which justices treated counsels, at 
the very least, points to a bias in rhetorical discursive interaction and an inherent 
unfairness in the proceeding.  Interactional bias does not necessarily mean there was 
judicial bias, although for some justices it seems a reasonable explanation.  The justices’ 
interactional bias raises concerns regarding the Court’s ability to impartially evaluate 
both arguments.  For those active justices, Sensemaking suggests that their judgment 
could be impaired because of frequent participation in the rejection or attack of an 
argument, or the occasional support of a counsel which may confirm their a priori 
commitments.  Active justices may have also prevented less active justices from 
resolving essential questions or problems.  At both the individual and group level active 
justices may have created an environment which skewed justices’ ability to impartially 
consider the case.  Readers would probably agree that Americans should expect more 
from the nation’s highest court, at the very least we should be able to expect fairness and 
measured inquiry.    
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Because a clear bias was present in some justices’ rhetorical discursive 
interaction, Sensemaking seems a more appropriate model for understanding justices’ 
biased interaction, rather than the more popular strategic actor model.  The analysis in 
this case reveals that rather than gathering information from both sides to seek the best 
possible solution, some justices sought to eliminate arguments that opposed their 
seemingly preferred position.  In the scholarly realm of political scientists and 
communication scholars, biased rhetorical discursive interaction dramatically alters how 
prior models have explained the ways in which justices should act.  The strategic actor is 
the primary model for considering Supreme Court interaction both in oral argument and 
outside of it. Closely related to the rational actor, under the strategic actor model, 
justices should gather as much information as possible in order to find the best possible 
solution in accordance with their preferences.  The strategic actor model suggests a 
relatively even process of information gathering to reach the best possible decision; 
however, biased rhetorical discursive interaction offers an alternative understanding that 
opposes the strategic actor model, informing a new dimension of justices’ 
communication.258   
As this paper has revealed, some justices did attack counselors who opposed their 
commitments, and they also supported the counselor with whom their commitments 
most nearly aligned.  The justices’ interactional bias may have resulted from 
commitments developed through counsels’ briefs, amicus curiae briefs, or previous 
                                                 
258 As stated above, not all justices demonstrate a communicative bias in their rhetorical discourse, and for 
those justices who do not demonstrate a communicative bias, perhaps the strategic actor is a reasonable 
explanation for these moderate justices. But those justices who act strategically may still be hindered in 
their ability to gather information by communicatively biased justices. 
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historically shaped views concerning the issues.  Already familiar with the case’s 
arguments, justices likely entered oral argument with preconceptions and prejudgments 
of how they would rule in the case.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Breyer, 
Souter, and Stevens all seemed to have a judgment in mind.   Holding a priori 
commitments opposes the strategic actor model which suggests justices should either 
attempt to set aside personal commitments to evaluate arguments equally and enter oral 
argument with the desire to test all possibilities, or the strategic justice may have a 
tentative judgment in mind to test the proposition upon both counsels.  Justice Ginsburg 
appeared to act in a balanced fashion and more closely reflected the strategic actor rather 
than the sensemaker in her exploration of issues.  Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice 
Scalia appear as sensemakers by seeking support for a priori commitments and assisting 
preferred counsels.  In addition Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia attacked the 
counsel who opposed the justices’ commitments  potentially as a means of limiting 
equivocality.  These two justices were joined by Justices Breyer, Souter and Stevens, but 
the latter three justices did not attack opposing counsels at a similar same rate as Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia.  Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Scalia also heavily 
championed the counsel who supported their preferred position.  The danger of this 
biased interaction lies in speech’s cognitive affect.  “Once a justification begins to 
form,” in a justice’s mind “it exerts effects on subsequent action,” that can impair 
justices’ ability to impartially evaluate a case.259  Instead of using oral argument as a 
place to test arguments for the best possible choice that agrees with personal 
                                                 
259Id. at 23.  
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commitments, justices used oral arguments in this case to reinforce commitments and 
convince themselves of the validity of their position.  Biased rhetorical discursive 
interaction in oral argument tempers and strengthens justices’ convictions; their 
commitments and interactions have “created a self-fulfilling prophecy that builds 
confidence in the prophecy.”260 “Both the justification and the action mutually 
strengthen one another” so that, in this oral argument, justices reaffirmed principles as 
well as the judgment they were already considering, through biased intreaction.261  
Justices’ rhetorical discursive interactions likely played a significant role in the 
development of their understanding about the case.  After oral argument in Morse v. 
Frederick, Justices Scalia and Breyer, Souter, Stevens and Chief Justice Roberts most 
likely left the courtroom with a firm conviction for which side they would vote.  It is 
probable that they entered the courtroom with a view of how they would vote, but their 
rhetorical discursive interaction may have further entrenched and probably solidified the 
counsel for whom they would vote.  The justices’ rhetorical discursive interaction 
exhausted a substantial amount of time, possibly interfering with other justices’ ability to 
resolve questions or issues.  Regardless of the reasoning behind their behavior, the active 
justices in this case clearly impacted how other justices were able to gather information 
and weigh arguments. 
Traditionally, we understand justices to determine the law, “not according to his 
own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land;” “the 
                                                 
260 Id. at 28. 
261Id. at 28.  
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judges’ techniques were socially neutral, his private views irrelevant; judging was more 
like finding than making.”262  However, instead of approaching a case with objective 
and socially neutral views, it seems more reasonable that justices already have a perso
position regarding legal and social issues.  Their age and experience have exposed the 
justices to a diversity of arguments from which they have been able to shape and temper 
their view of the world.  Justices likely approach oral argument with both their historical 
bias in tow as well as their bias regarding the case at hand, relying on their bias or 
commitments to make sense of the case before them.  Sensemaking offers not only an 
alternative perspective of judicial decision making that foregrounds communication, but 
it also offers a more potentially realistic approach to evaluating the way humans solve 
problems. 
nal 
                                                
Conclusion 
 This chapter provided a context for readers to understand the multiple purpose 
informing the environment of oral argument and grasping the unique interactional styles 
of individual justices.  After establishing a context for readers, I analyzed the oral 
arguments in Morse v. Frederick using the theories, critical areas, and methods proposed 
in chapter III.  Methods developed from the three critical areas worked in conjunction 
rather well to reveal justices rhetorical discursive bias in their interactions.  Analysis 
with methods also exposed the limited utility of the strategic actor model and bolstered 
support for the integration of Sensemaking as a model of judicial decision making.  The 
majority of justices appeared to enter oral argument with clear commitments and 
 
262 Segal and Spaeth 2002, supra n. 8 at 87. 
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preferences for a particular side.  Justices sought confirmation of personal commitments 
by supporting counsels who expressed a preferred policy and opposing counsels who 
offered arguments that challenged justices’ commitments.  By supporting preferred 
arguments and attacking challenging counsels, justices largely reinforced, validated, and 
entrenched initial commitments, endangering their ability to impartially weigh 
information and fairly consider both sides.   
 This chapter legitimated sensemaking as a potentially useful theory to apply in 
understanding rhetorical discursive interaction in oral arguments, and in turn 
foregrounded the importance of judicial interaction in the Court’s oral arguments.  
Chapter V includes a more extensive analysis of another case: Kennedy v. Louisiana.  I 
witnessed the argument for Kennedy v. Louisiana first hand, and offer exploration of the 
justices’ reactions to issues regarding the death penalty for the rape of a child.    
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CHAPTER V 
 
KENNEDY V. LOUISIANA 
 
A FIRSTHAND OBSERVATION   
 
The prior chapter served to examine the validity of using Sensemaking as a 
model to explain the justices’ rhetorical discursive behavior in oral arguments.  In 
detailing the justices’ behavior, the strategic actor failed to account for a number of the 
justices’ actions and Sensemaking offered a more reasonable explanation.  To further 
challenge the potential applicability of Sensemaking, I observed firsthand the oral 
arguments in Kennedy v. Louisiana to determine again whether the justices’ rhetorical 
discursive behavior may have reflected Sensemaking.  This chapter considers whether 
firsthand observation may lend additional details that can assist in accounting for 
sensemaking, and it also provides a case where mixed methods excel if one approach 
does not accurately capture the justices’ interactions.   
Kennedy v. Louisiana 07-343 stood before the Supreme Court in 2008 for 
consideration of whether or not the death penalty may be applied to criminals convicted 
of a raping a child.  Louisiana state law allowed for prisoners convicted of child rape to 
be sentenced to death.  Like most Supreme Court cases, Kennedy v. Louisiana raised a 
number of complicated issues with which the justices were forced to struggle, and 
provides a case where equivocality spans widely across a number of issues.  In regards 
to precedent regarding the death penalty, the Court decided in 1977 by a 7-2 vote that 
“the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment for the rape of an adult woman,” in 
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Coker v. Georgia.263  However, Coker is limited to the rape of an adult woman, and the 
justices had to consider whether the rape of a child constitutes a new category to which 
the death penalty should apply based upon “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society,” previously established by Atkins v. Virginia in 2002.264  
The precedents grant justices the freedom to determine if states’ laws proscribing the 
death penalty for child rape constitute a trend of evolving standards, or if the death 
penalty should be reserved only for crimes of murder, or if states should be permitted to 
attempt to establish a trend.  Texas Solicitor General Ted Cruz has suggested that states’ 
evolving decency standards reflect “the appreciation that society has for the enormous 
trauma and the enormous harm that child rape produces.  That’s why there has been a 
consistent trend among the states toward increasing punishment for child sexual 
assault.”265  
 In addition to the legal precedents, the justices must also struggle with the 
concerns of child advocacy groups who argue that applying the death penalty for child 
rape may actually further endanger children rather than offering protection to them.  
Victoria Camp of the Texas Association Against Sexual Assault points out that Justice 
Department statistics reveal “more than 90 percent of child assault victims were abused 
by a family member or close family friend.”266 By permitting the death penalty for child 
rape, Camp argues “‘It’s too hard for a child to have to testify against ‘Uncle John’ when 
                                                 
263 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.___(1977), 
264 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.___(2002). 
265 Nina Totenberg, “Justices Weigh Death Penalty for Child Rape,” www.NPR.org 4/16/08, p.2.  
266 Dennis Powell, “Supreme Court to Hear Child Rape Case,” www.abcnews.com, 1/4/07 p.1. 
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they know he may be put to death.’”267  Children also prove vulnerable to questioning by 
police and often fall victim to police coercion in order to escape an uncomfortable 
environment, or gain the approval of an authority figure. 
 Finally justices must determine the facts of the case, and whether or not the 
current Louisiana state law functions effectively, or is largely used by prosecutors as a 
coercive tactic.  The facts of the case present a troubling picture to distill a clear picture 
of the prisoner’s guilt or innocence, particularly when the prisoner has maintained his 
innocence for the crime.  The case resulted from a violent sexual assault on an eight year 
old girl in 1998.  Patrick Kennedy, the eight year old’s stepfather, called 911 to report 
the rape stating “‘She was off in the yard and she said two boys grabbed her and raped 
my child.’”268  Kennedy’s stepdaughter initially told police “she was sorting Girl Scout 
cookies in the garage when she was assaulted by two boys.”269  She later elaborated to a 
psychologist that the boys “dragged her over to the side yard, and as she put it, one of 
them put his ‘thing’ in her ‘pee pee.’”270 After 20 months elapsed, state social workers 
suggested to the mother that “the child’s return would depend on her facing up to the 
stepfather’s role. The child then changed her story,” stating “‘I woke up one morning 
and he was on top of me” when prompted for specifics the child murmured “he just 
raped me.”271  While the child’s later testimony implicates the stepfather, no DNA 
                                                 
267 Dennis Powell, “Supreme Court to Hear Child Rape Case,” www.abcnews.com, 1/4/07 p.1. 
268 Nina Totenberg, “Justices Weigh Death Penalty for Child Rape,” www.NPR.org 4/16/08, p.2. 
269 Associated Press, “Court Mulls Death Penalty for Child Rape,” www.usatoday.com, 1/4/08, p.2.  
270 Nina Totenberg, “Justices Weigh Death Penalty for Child Rape,” www.NPR.org 4/16/08, p.2. 
271 Nina Totenberg, “Justices Weigh Death Penalty for Child Rape,” www.NPR.org 4/16/08, p.2. 
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evidence or physical evidence links the stepfather to the crime, and where the truth lies 
is unclear.  No clear picture develops from the facts and testimony involved in the case, 
and a much murkier understanding results when involving the previous legal precedent, 
and social repercussions of child rape laws.   
In order to resolve this case, the Supreme Court is faced with a variety of 
reasonable options that may result in serious social repercussions.  As Dahlia Lithwick 
summarizes: 
the problem with measuring ‘evolving standards of decency’ is that they tend to 
evolve and devolve in numerous directions at the same time.  Kennedy’s lawyers 
are right about the broad U.S. distaste for executing non-murderers.  But 
Louisiana is also right that the trend is shifting toward extending the types of 
crimes eligible for the death penalty. . . .For the high court, it’s a challenge: 
distilling all these trends and countertrends into some broad constitutional rule—
for a public that increasingly seems to like the idea of capital punishment more 
than the reality of it.272 
 
Reflecting Max Weber’s understanding of multiple rationalities, the Court’s oral 
argument must explore the tensions and struggles involved in the complex social web 
woven throughout this case.  Because multiple rationalities and serious social 
repercussions may result from their ruling, this case provides a great opportunity for 
evaluating justices’ rhetorical discursive interaction.  It would seem that high profile 
cases would require stringent and balanced consideration and evaluation by justices 
under the strategic actor model.  Studying the justices’ discursive interactions may reveal 
how carefully they are considering arguments, and at the very least it should reveal 
                                                 
272 Dahlia Lithwick, “The Supreme Penalty for Rape,” www.Newsweek.com 4/21/08, p.2. 
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whether justices approach this case with an unbiased and fair consideration of arguments 
by both parties.   
 On the day of oral argument for Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Court made an 
unusual and seemingly strategic announcement of a previous case, Baze and Bowling v. 
Rees.273  Chief Justice Roberts read the Court’s 7-2 opinion supporting Kentucky’s use 
of lethal injection for capital punishment.  Robert’s announcement shifts the rhetorical 
ground of the day’s oral argument.  Initially the counsel for Patrick Kennedy, Jeff Fisher, 
seems “to have the better argument” since “national consensus has recently been to limit 
rather than expand the death penalty; no one has been executed for rape since 1964.”274  
Robert’s announcement of a 7-2 decision introduces a new sense of doubt about the 
Court’s consideration of the death penalty, immediately placing Jeff Fisher into a 
difficult and unforeseen rhetorical environment of uncertainty concerning a speaker’s 
audience.  The optimism for death penalty opponents vanished as the Court’s words 
propelled the executions of nearly a dozen stayed executions.  
 In summarizing the Court’s oral argument for the day, the justices’ rhetorical 
discursive interaction was vigorous, ranging from inquiries about Louisiana’s state law, 
to pushing for a description of heinous child rape.  Lawyers from both parties were 
challenged heavily by the justices with some justices playing obvious favorites in their 
treatment of counsels.  In particular, Justice Scalia was aggressive in his questioning of 
                                                 
273 Baze and Bowling v. Rees 553 U.S.___(2008)  
274 Dahlia Lithwick, “The Supreme Penalty for Rape,” www.Newsweek.com 4/21/08, p.2. 
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petitioner’s counsel and at times plainly rude.  Chief Justice Roberts also heavily 
engaged petitioner’s counsel in a one sided theory game, but remained respectful.  The 
justices’ arguments were so vigorous, at times, that active justices prevented other 
justices from asking questions to counsels.  Occasionally oral arguments may reveal a 
case’s potential turnout, but this oral argument was uncertain in its outcome, perhaps 
because the Court’s decision largely rested with Justice Kennedy as a swing vote, and 
his participation proved minimal.   
During the following analysis, readers should keep in mind justices’ final votes 
for this case.  Justices’ interactions may reveal how they intend to vote, although this 
would oppose the strategic actor model.  Kennedy v. Louisiana resulted in a 5-4 vote 
with Justice Kennedy writing the majority opinion with whom Justices Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined; Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito.  
Rhetorical Discursive Interaction in Kennedy v. Louisiana 
 Table 5. 1 lists the number of interruptions generated from both transcript and  
 
audio file.275 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
275 In table 5.1 interruptions are listed for each justice during each counsel’s oral argument time.  The 
petitioner’s tallies include rebuttal. 
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Table 5.1  Interruptions 
                Scalia   Roberts  Alito  Thomas   Kennedy    Breyer    Souter   Ginsburg  Stevens     Total 
 
  Petitioner        18 10          2        0    3        0        3        6                0             39 
 
  Respondent     6 1            0            0            2          10        3             1               4  27 
 
 
 
 
 When comparing the number of interruptions, it becomes clear petitioner’s 
counsel experienced significantly more interruptions than the respondent’s counsel, a 
significant disadvantage of over 30%.276  Rhetorically, interruptions prevent cohesive 
messages that mitigate influence and may diminish justices’ ability to understand an 
argument or explanation.  During petitioner’s oral argument Justice Scalia was most 
active in interrupting the advocate while Chief Justice Roberts also frequently 
interrupted the argument.   These two justices did not engage in the same number of 
interruptions during respondent’s oral argument, only interrupting respondent’s counsel 
seven times compared to the 28 interruptions during petitioner’s time.  Similarly, Justice 
Breyer interrupted respondent ten times without once interrupting petitioner.  Justice 
Ginsburg and Stevens may have also interrupted disproportionately but with minor 
differences between counsels.  Although it may be unclear why the justices interrupted 
at differing levels between petitioner and respondent’s counsels, it is interesting to note 
                                                 
276 One means of beginning to learn about justices’ rhetorical discursive interaction is through their 
interruptions of counsel.  Interruptions provide a basic means of understanding how justices controlled 
oral arguments for both parties.  If one lawyer suffered significantly less interruptions than the competing 
lawyer, then it seems likely that some justices may be reflecting a preference in their questioning and 
gathering of information.  Mapping individual justice’s interruptions may also reveal whether a justice 
disproportionately interrupted a counsel, suggesting a potential hostility towards a particular position.   
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the significant interactional differences and the manner in which they directed their 
attention toward particular counsels.  A consideration of the justices’ statements will 
help further explain the justices’ intentions behind their interruptions.    
 Table 5.2 lists the number of challenging (C/), assisting (A/), or neutral (N/) 
statements or questions posed to each counsel by the justices. 277 
 
Table 5.2  Statements 
 
               Scalia     Roberts     Alito     Thomas   Kennedy  Breyer      Souter    Ginsburg    Stevens 
 
C/pet. 16 11 2 0 4  0  0  6  0 
 
A/pet. 0 0  0 0  0  0  1  1 0 
 
N/pet. 2  0 0 0  2  0 2 0 0 
 
Total 18 11 2 0 6  0 3 7 0 
 
 
C/resp. 3 0 0 0 2 10  4 0 5 
 
A/resp. 6 1 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 
 
N/resp. 0 0 0 0  3  5 2 1 2 
 
Total 9 1 0 0 5 15 6 1  7 
 
 
 
 Table 5.2 provides a better understanding of the justices’ rhetorical discursive 
interaction because it reveals the purpose or consequence their statements may have had 
                                                 
277 Justices’ statements were coded in relationship to the counsel who was arguing.  In understand that 
statements may be both challenging to one position and assisting towards another, but my concern lies in 
understanding how a justice’s statement may influence the rhetorical or discursive ability of a lawyer to 
advance their argument.  
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upon the argument. 278  Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts heavily challenge the 
petitioner during his argument, making 29 of the total 47 statements uttered, or 
comprising 61 % of the spoken statements.  While Justice Scalia and Chief Justice 
Roberts heavily challenged petitioner, Justice Breyer more stringently tested 
respondent’s arguments. Justice Stevens also engaged more often with respondent’s 
counsel, but his interaction pales in comparison to those of Justices Scalia, Breyer, and 
Chief Justice Roberts.  Generally, justices assisted counsels less often than they 
challenged them, but Justice Scalia assisted respondent six times.  When comparing the 
rhetorical discursive interaction of the justices, Justice Scalia appears to have provided 
preferential treatment to respondent’s counsel, while heavily challenging petitioner.  
Similarly Chief Justice Roberts frequently challenged petitioner without even once 
challenging respondent.  Justice Ginsburg was also guilty of challenging petitioner, 
without equally challenging the respondent, but a handful of her statements were 
required to reassert her argument as other justices were interrupting her line of 
questioning.  This forced Justice Ginsburg to reiterate the same challenging line of 
argument in order to get a clear response from petitioner.  The more active justices in 
petitioner’s argument were more likely to blame for her repeated questioning than any 
undue attention.   
                                                 
278 The statements a justice makes allows us to better understand the purpose of their interruptions, but it 
also provides a means of learning how justices may have challenged or supported each counsel.  In the 
coding of challenging, assisting, or neutral statements, I gauged challenging statements by justices as those 
which forced counsels to defend a position, or may have revealed a weakness in their argument.  Justices’ 
assisting statements typically highlight strengths in a counsel’s argument, or rescue a counsel from another 
justice’s line of questioning.  Neutral statements by justices were factual or record related questions which 
were of little consequence to the counsel’s argument. 
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In conjunction with Table 5.1, the data reveal a clearer picture of rhetorical 
discursive interaction and suggest that the justices’ behavior may reveal biased 
interactions.  Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Breyer were heavily engaged 
in challenging one counsel without similarly challenging the other.  Justices Scalia also 
aided one counsel and overlooked similar assistance with the opposing counsel.  The 
direction and type of rhetorical discursive interaction accords with the justices’ final 
votes.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia voted against petitioner, while Justices 
Breyer voted in favor.  Tables 5.1 and 5.2 point to the presence of rhetorical discursive 
bias in justice’s interactions, but how much actual time do the justices’ control versus the 
lawyers?  
 Table 5.3 displays petitioner’s oral argument including rebuttal time.  Total 
speaking time 30 mintues 46 seconds. Table 5.3 also displays respondent’s oral 
argument.  Total speaking time 30 minutes 16 seconds. 
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Table 5.3  Speaking Time 
Petitioner 
             Fisher   Scalia   Roberts  Alito    Thomas   Kennedy      Breyer      Souter   Ginsburg   Stevens 
 
Seconds  1025        251       299         29           0            63                0      39          215             0 
 
Total              Pet. = 1025 (17 minutes 5 seconds) Justices = 896 (16 minutes 56 seconds) 
 
Respondent 
                Clark  Cruz  Scalia  Roberts  Thomas  Alito  Kennedy  Breyer  Souter  Ginsburg     Stevens    
 
Seconds     467    525     100 15              0            0           80          295         310          25               90 
 
Total           Resp. = 992 (16 minutes 32 seconds)                 Justices = 915 (15 minutes 15 seconds) 
 
 
 
A comparison between petitioner and respondent’s speaking time reveals that 
counsels were given relatively equal speaking times, but when dividing up the speaking 
time according to the justices’ final votes, a more disproportionate picture develops.  
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia accounted for nearly 62%, or over nine minutes, 
of the justices’ speaking time during petitioner’s oral argument.  Similarly, Justices 
Kennedy, Breyer, Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens spent over 65%, or more than 13 
minutes, of the justices’ speaking time during respondent’s oral argument.  Conversely, 
the same justices only used 35% of the time in petitioner’s oral argument, and Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia took up less than 13% of the justices’ time in 
respondent’s argument.   
Justices again appear to be reflecting biased sensemaking behavior, as they did in 
Morse v. Frederick, by engaging the advocate with whom they will eventually vote 
against.  Justice Scalia appears guilty of this championing behavior as he assisted the 
 
204 
 
respondent six times in making their argument, and attacked the petitioner 16 times.  
Chief Justice Roberts follows a similar pattern of interaction. Although he did not assist 
the respondent’s lawyers but once, he did not challenge them either.    Justice Breyer 
heavily challenged respondent without once speaking during petitioner’s argument.  The 
justices exert a significant amount of control over oral argument, and it is interesting to 
note that out of a 30 minute oral argument, counsels only spoke in between 16-17 
minutes, and determining the limited time frames justices provided advocates also 
informs the hindrances the advocates faced. 
 Table 5.4 displays the number of speaking instances in which lawyers were able 
to speak for a certain timeframe. 
 
Table 5.4  Lawyers’ Speaking Timeframes 
 
Seconds  1-10     11-20        21-30        31-40        41-50        51-60        61+ 
 
Petitioner 21        8           6               2   3     4              3 
 
Respondent 19        7           4               7               0               0              4 
 
 
In this case, speaking time frames were relatively equal, though not captured in 
the table are the length of Mr. Cruz’s 60+ speaking time frame.  It is unusual to provide 
lawyers with lengthy speaking time frames and even more unusual that the justices 
allowed four lengthy time frames of 120, 147, 84, and 74 seconds.  Mr. Fisher was kept 
close to the 60 minute mark with one retort lasting 90 seconds.  It seems unlikely that 
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either counsel held a distinct persuasive or communicative advantage based on an 
analysis of the speaking frames.  
A summary of quantitative findings suggest that some justices’ rhetorical 
discursive interactions were directed disproportionately towards one counsel or another, 
revealing a potential preference for one counsel, or at the very least exposing unequal 
treatment of counsels by individual justices.  Petitioner’s counsel suffered more 
interruptions than respondent’s counsel by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia.  
Likewise, Justice Breyer interrupted respondent’s counsel dramatically more than 
petitioner.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia vigorously challenged petitioner and 
Justice Scalia even repeatedly assisted the respondent without ever aiding petitioner.  
Speaking time frames revealed that justices who largely dominated the oral argument of 
a particular advocate ended up voting against that party.  In general, quantitative data 
suggest potential sensemaking behavior through a bias rhetorical discursive interaction 
for some justices and may reveal a preferential treatment for counsels.  Qualitative data 
provides further clarification of the justices’ initial sensemaking behavior. 
Qualitative Findings 
From first-hand observations, justices’ interaction in Kennedy v. Louisiana 
prevented other less active justices from asking questions.  Justice Scalia’s rhetorical 
discursive interaction prevented Justice Stevens from asking questions multiple times.  
Justice Stevens would lean forward to turn on his microphone and before he could ask a 
question, Justice Scalia had already begun making further remarks.  In another instance, 
Chief Justice Roberts prevented Justice Souter from asking a question to respondent’s 
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counsel by ending counsel’s argument time.  These small interactional cues can have 
dramatic consequences, and do not reflect balanced consideration of the issues, but 
instead suggest that aggressive rhetorical discursive interaction may actually be harming 
justices’ ability to consider a case, particularly if they cannot get their questions 
answered.   
During petitioner’s oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia were 
the most active of the justices in challenging petitioner’s arguments.  Yet while Chief 
Justice Roberts was respectful in his opposition, Justice Scalia heavily ridiculed and 
denigrated counsel’s arguments, drawing laughter from the crowd in at least three 
separate moments.  Petitioner’s counsel did find respite in assistance from Justice Souter 
and Justice Ginsburg, but Justice Scalia’s aggressive rhetorical onslaught was glaringly 
obvious in the courtroom.      
Justice Scalia places petitioner’s counsel, Jeff Fisher, immediately on the spot 
when he interrupts Mr. Fisher’s opening remarks, challenging him to provide details as 
to how a sexual assault on a child might be considered “heinous.”279   
Justice Scalia: How would you describe a particularly heinous rape of a child 
under 12?  What would make if particularly heinous? 
 
Mr. Fisher: Well there could be several aggravating facts that would make a rape 
of a child or indeed of any person, a particularly egregious crime, but in Coker 
against Georgia, this Court did not simply hold that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibited imposing the death penalty for the crime of rape; it held that this Court 
- - that the Eighth Amendment prohibited imposing the death penalty for rape 
with aggravating circumstances. 
 
                                                 
279 07-343 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 4.  
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Remember in Coker against Georgia, there were two aggravating circumstances 
in that case.  First the offender was a recidivist.  He had been convicted of rape 
three times, was a convicted murderer who had escaped from prison..  Second, he 
committed the rape in the course of committing other very serious felonies, 
including kidnapping and robbery. 
 
And so at the very minimum, the State stands here with the burden today to say 
that an average child rape is worse than the crime in Coker, that this Court held 
was not sufficiently superior - -  
 
Justice Scalia: Suppose - - suppose the State says that all recidivist rapists of 
children under 12 will - - will suffer the death penalty.  Does it have to narrow 
that class further?  I mean, the need for narrowing depends upon how narrow the 
class is described in the first place.  Right? 
 
Mr. Fisher: If - -  
 
Justice Scalia: I mean, if the law says you have to be a recidivist, you have to 
have all the other factors that you mentioned, if - - if the law said that, would you 
come in and say “Oh no, you can’t - - you can’t just give everybody who 
commits that crime the death penalty”?  You have to narrow the class.280 
 
Justice Scalia’s opening question regarding places Mr. Fisher in an extremely 
uncomfortable and difficult rhetorical situation.  The Courtroom is not typically the 
venue where graphic details are discussed, and Mr. Fisher must offer a response that 
eschews graphic details but yet responds to Justice Scalia’s challenge.  Justice Scalia’s 
question also puts Mr. Fisher in a disadvantageous position before he is able to fully 
articulate his primary arguments.  After less than a minute, Justice Scalia disrupts Mr. 
Fisher’s ability to present the first key arguments, signaling the rest of the Court’s 
justices to begin their questioning, and hindering Mr. Fisher’s ability to finish his 
opening arguments and establish a foundation for his arguments.   
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Minutes after his first challenging questions, Justice Scalia continues his 
aggressive attack of Mr. Fisher’s arguments when he disagrees with how Mr. Fisher has 
constructed a controlling opinion out of a fractured majority.   
Mr. Fisher: Well, my understanding of this Court’s Marks rule is that the 
narrowest opinion that commands a majority - - so Justice Powell’s opinion was 
actually a seventh vote.  If you count the two justices on this Court who held the 
death penalty was unconstitutional across the board and add the four that 
constituted the plurality in Coker, we think the plurality opinion becomes - - 
 
Justice Scalia: That’s a - - 
 
Mr. Fisher: - - the controlling one. 
 
Justice Scalia: That’s a strange way of making a majority, isn’t it? (Laughter).  
Two people who think even the death penalty for murder is no good, they’re 
going to form the majority of people who consider whether a lawful death 
penalty can be imposed for rape.  I think at least in those circumstances, you have 
to discount the people who would not allow the death penalty under any 
circumstances for any crime. 
 
Mr. Fisher: Well, I’m not aware of any wrinkle in this Court’s jurisprudence that 
says that if a Justice is too far out of the mainstream that their vote is discounted- 
- 
 
Justice Scalia: He - - he is not considering the issue that is before the Court.  The 
issue before the Court is whether - - whether a permissible death penalty can be 
imposed for this crime.  These parties say there’s no such thing as a permissible 
death penalty.  I mean it would be - - if that wrinkle isn’t there, we should iron it 
in pretty quickly. (Laughter).281 
 
Justice Scalia remarks “that’s a strange way making a majority, isn’t it?,” draws laughter 
from the audience, once again placing Mr. Fisher in an unenviable position as the butt of 
a justice’s joke.  When Mr. Fisher attempts to offer an explanation with a strange phrase 
“I’m not aware of any wrinkle in this Court’s jurisprudence,” Justice Scalia again 
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prompts laughter as he retorts “if that wrinkle isn’t there, we should iron it in pretty 
quickly.”  Justice Scalia’s humor draws laughter from the entire audience and his humor 
creates a very difficult situation for Mr. Fisher to regain his composure and maintain the 
focus of his argument.  In addition to drawing laughter, Justice Scalia also asserts that 
“he is not considering the issue that is before the Court,” suggesting that Mr. Fisher’s 
remarks do not address the case at hand.  Justice Scalia’s comments and humorous use 
of language discredit and demonstrate a lack of respect for Mr. Fisher’s position.  If 
Justice Scalia used the same disrespectful tactics and humorous chiding during the 
respondent’s argument, then perhaps his behavior would be considered equally 
disrespectful and thus balanced.  But his denigrating humor and heavy-handed criticism 
was only directed at Mr. Fisher and he creates another difficult rhetorical situation 
because Mr. Fisher must regain the credibility which Justice Scalia disparaged, along 
with resetting the course of his argument. 
Following Justice Scalia’s castigating humor and criticism, Justice Souter rescues 
Mr. Fisher by helping him reframe the argument:   
Justice Souter: Even - - even with respect to - - now, I’m asking you to - - 
 
Mr. Fisher: Right. 
 
Justice Souter: - - to forget my question again for a minute. 
 
Mr. Fisher: Okay. But - - 
 
Justice Souter: Even - - even on the - - on the plurality analysis, your argument, 
as I understand it is, if there is any question left in Coker, in effect it’s answered 
by Edmund/Tilson. 
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Mr. Fisher: I think that’s right, and it’s also answered by simply the empirics 
across the country right now, if you did nothing more than applies the Roper and 
Atkins cases. 
 
Justice Souter: Okay, but then that’s a different reason. 
 
Mr. Fisher: Yes. 
 
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg had previously questioned the role of a majority opinion in 
Coker which Mr. Fisher suggested as a controlling precedent.  Mr. Fisher was unable to 
satisfy the justices’ inquiries and so Justice Souter resolves the justices’ dispute 
suggesting “as I understand it, if there is any question left in Coker, in effect it’s 
answered by Enmund/Tilson.”282   This provides the opportunity for Mr. Fisher to agree, 
“I think that’s right,” and then expand on his reasoning.  Unfortunately Mr. Fisher does 
not get to provide a significant explanation before Chief Justice Roberts steps in, 
derailing Justice Souter’s assistance, but Justice Souter’s help may have provided Mr. 
Fisher with an argument that persuaded Justice Ginsburg.283 
 During Mr. Fisher’s response to Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia proceeds to 
criticize Mr. Fisher’s argument by suggesting that Mr. Fisher’s argument cuts against the 
case he has brought before the Court.  
Chief Justice Roberts: Well, speaking of Roper and Atkins, is it - - does it only 
work in one way?  How are you ever supposed to get consensus moving in the 
opposite direction?  In other words, you look to the number of states under Roper 
and Atkins who impise it and you say, well, most of them are abolishing it, so we 
think it’s unconstitutional, combined with other factors. 
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Now if there’s going to be a trend the other way, how does that happen?  As soon 
as the first state says, well, we’re going to impose the death penalty for child 
rape, you say, well, there isn’t a consensus, so it’s unconstitutional.  I mean do 20 
states have to get together and do it at the same time?  Or how are they supposed 
to move the inquiry under Atkins and Roper in the opposite direction? 
 
Mr. Fisher: Well, I think it’s possible but this Court has understood - - I think 
well understood that it is a practical problem.  It is one that gives this Court 
caution before ruling a law unconstitutional.  Here I don’t think - - 
 
Justice Scalia: That’s nice. 
 
Mr. Fisher: - - you’re going to need to gravel - - 
 
Justice Scalia: I say that’s nice.  We’re in effect prohibiting people from 
 changing their mind. 
 
Mr. Fisher: I don’t - - 
 
Justice Scalia: - - about what - - what justifies the death penalty. 
 
Mr. Fisher: I don’t think that’s necessarily the case, Justice Scalia.  And of course 
there are narrower ways to decide this case that could leave open the possibility 
of future developments. 
 
But Justice - - Mr. Chief Justice, I want to answer your question and say I think 
there may be a misunderstanding that this Court really needs to address that in 
this case, because we have had, since 1995 when the State of Louisiana passed 
this law and the year after when the supreme court of Louisiana upheld it in a 
very widely covered opinion from which this Court denied certiorari, there has 
been a national debate for 12 or 13 years already as to the propriety of imposing 
the death - - 
 
Chief Justice Roberts: And the trend - - the trend since 1995, ’90, has been more 
and more States are passing statutes imposing the death penalty in situations that 
do not result in death. 
 
Mr. Fisher: I think that’s right.  So you have to ask yourself the question whether 
that is enough.  And if we - - 
 
Justice Scalia: Didn’t we say in  - - in Atkins that it’s the trend that counts; it’s 
 not the numbers. 
 
Mr. Fisher: I think the Court said in Atkins - - 
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Justice Scalia: It’s the trend - - you’ve heard the expression ‘hoisted by your own 
petard.’ The trend here is clearly in the direction of permitting more and more - - 
of more and more States permitting the capital punishment for this crime. 
 
In this instance, Chief Justice Roberts has asked a question that poses a 
significant problem to Mr. Fisher’s case, and Mr. Fisher requires a response that 
appropriately addresses Chief Justice Roberts’ question because it is likely a question 
held by a number of the other justices.  As Mr. Fisher attempts responding to Chief 
Justice Roberts’ question, Justice Scalia interrupts his response by sarcastically 
dismissing it as he states “that’s nice.  I say that’s nice.  We’re in effect prohibiting the 
people from changing their mind.”284  Justice Scalia’s sarcastic tone dismisses the 
relevancy of Mr. Fisher’s argument, instead of confronting the issue, and more 
importantly he prevents Mr. Fisher from addressing Chief Justice Roberts’ question.  
Justice Scalia once again places Mr. Fisher in a defensive position in which Mr. Fisher 
must defend himself from the justice’s criticism.  Mr. Fisher attempts to return to 
addressing the Chief Justice, but before he can provide a satisfactory response, Justice 
Scalia offers his own judgment regarding the case.  Stating “you’ve heard the expression 
‘hoisted by your own petard,’” Justice Scalia provides his early judgment in the case to 
suggest that Mr. Fisher’s case may potentially be over based upon his own arguments 
cutting against the case.  If Justice Scalia’s earlier behavior were not enough to display 
bias, with this comment, Justice Scalia easily tips his hand and reveals his biased 
standing in the case, as he essentially declares the case to be over. 
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Following Justice Scalia’s prejudgment in the case, his scathing sarcasm 
continues when Mr. Fisher again attempts to respond to the same topic from one of 
Chief Justice Roberts’ questions. 
Mr. Fisher: Well, a State could do something like what Georgia has done, which 
is pass a law that says that - - that the death penalty is permissible in a given 
crime - - in, for example, rape - - to the extent allowed by the United States 
Supreme Court, or to the extent allowed by the Eighth Amendment. 
 
If several States pass laws like that, eventually this Court even - - let’s say the 
Court decides this case in my favor today.  Eventually this Court could take 
notice of that and take certiorari and again decide whether or not the Eighth 
Amendment was - - 
 
Justice Scalia: They don’t even have to say “to the extent allowed by the 
Supreme Court.”  They can pass a law that - - seems to contradict a prior opinion 
of ours; can’t they? 
 
Mr. Fisher: Of course. 
 
Justice Scalia: Abraham Lincoln said they could, anyway (untranscribed 
 laughter). 
 
Justice Scalia frames one of Mr. Fisher’s arguments in an absurd legal light as he 
describes that states “can pass a law that seems to contradict a prior opinion of ours; 
can’t they. . . . Abraham Lincoln said they could, anyway.”285  Justice Scalia’s comment 
once again draws laughter from the crowd and his comments suggest that Mr. Fisher 
lacks a historical and legal understanding of states’ rights.  Justice Scalia’s sarcasm 
again damages Mr. Fisher’s credibility and may negatively have influenced other 
justices’ consideration of Mr. Fisher’s arguments.   
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Justice Scalia does not only hinder Mr. Fisher’s response to Chief Justice 
Roberts, but in three very significant opportunities for Mr. Fisher, Justice Scalia also 
disrupts Mr. Fisher’s ability to respond to Justice Kennedy’s questions.  Justice 
Kennedy’s questions provide Mr. Fisher with an opportune moment to address his 
particular concerns.  Mr. Fisher’s response to Justice Kennedy is so crucial because 
Justice Kennedy will likely be the swing vote for this case.  As a death penalty case, 
many justices have staked out their positions prior to the case, but Justice Kennedy often 
stands in between the justices who frequently oppose and those justices who regularly 
support the death penalty.  Because Mr. Fisher’s case is a new test to the limits of the 
death penalty, Justice Kennedy’s position is not well known.  Justice Kennedy provides 
Mr. Fisher with the unique opportunity to respond to his questions and concerns as he 
tests Mr. Fisher’s argument concerning the limits to the death penalty by asking “what 
about treason. . . . Even the countries of Europe which have joined the European 
Convention on human rights, I believe they make an exception to the prohibition of the 
death penalty for treason.”286  Before Mr. Fisher can finish his first sentence in response 
to Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia launches a quick succession of leading questions that 
distract from Mr. Fisher’s opportunity to respond to Justice Kennedy.  Justice Scalia 
interrupts Mr. Fisher’s retort:  
Justice Scalia: Isn’t there a Federal Treason Statute? 
 
Mr. Fisher: Of course.  There is a every reason to believe - - 
 
Justice Scalia: And that doesn’t require murder; does it? 
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Mr. Fisher: No it does not.  It requires a - - 
 
Justice Scalia: Do you think that’s unconstitutional? 
 
Mr. Fisher: No, your Honor.  And I think if anyone thought that the treason laws 
were implicated here - -           
 
Justice Scalia: Wow 
 
Mr. Fisher: you might have different parties before the Court today. 
 
Justice Scalia: Do you think treason is worse than child rape?287 
 
 
And at this point during Mr. Fisher’s response, Chief Justice Roberts steps in, further 
preventing Mr. Fisher from responding to Justice Kennedy.  Justice Scalia’s rhetorical 
discursive interaction is both hostile, aggressive, and significantly hinders Mr. Fisher’s 
ability to respond to a key justice.  Justice Scalia’s interaction also prevents Mr. Fisher 
from responding to other justices who may have a similar concern as Justice Kennedy’s.  
His actions disrupt the flow of information, hamper Mr. Fisher’s ability to construct an 
argument towards Justice Kennedy’s position, and displays preferential treatment 
towards one counsel because he does not behave in a similar fashion during respondent’s 
argument. 
 In another instance, and perhaps the most crucial, Justice Kennedy asks Mr. 
Fisher a question before he steps down from the podium to preserve time for his rebuttal.  
This is Mr. Fisher’s opportunity to again respond to one of Justice Kennedy’s concerns, 
a rare opportunity for most advocates.  It is often a moment in oral argument, that other 
justices refrain from interrupting an advocate’s response because they want their 
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colleagues to have their questions resolved, and they may want to prevent wasting any of 
the advocate’s time for rebuttal.  Justice Kennedy interrupts Mr. Fisher’s attempt to step 
down from the podium by asking:  
Justice Kennedy: Mr. Fisher.  Your white light is on, and you want to protect 
your rebuttal right, but you began by indicating that this statute could be 
narrowed. It could be narrowed by a requirement of recidivist behavior.  Are 
there any other narrowing categories? 
  
Mr. Fisher: Well, I think there are two ways to decide this case on more narrow 
grounds, perhaps this answers your question.  First, this Court could say that 
Louisiana is the only State that doesn’t require recidivism, so it fails the 
substantive Atkins-Roper analysis.  It could also say that - - that Louisiana’s law 
isn’t sufficiently narrow.  Yes, Justice Kennedy, I think if the question is could 
there be another particularly heinous circumstance that you, just in the context of 
narrowing would be enough, one might imagine other aggravating circumstances.  
The ones in Coker wouldn’t be enough. 
  
Justice Scalia: Well - - 
  
Justice Kennedy: What would they be? 
  
Mr. Fisher: One could imagine something like torture or extraordinarily serious 
harm in a case, something like that.  But again, that would do nothing - - 
  
Justice Scalia: How do you view recidivism?  I mean, I assume even if you don’t 
oppose the death penalty, you’re going to get a good number of years, right?  So 
you are going to be 40 years in person, come out and do it again?  I don’t think 
so. 
  
Mr. Fisher: I’m not sure what the question is? 
  
Justice Scalia: I mean, it is an unrealistic condition that you have raped a 12-year 
- - a child twice.  The first time you do it and are convicted of it, you’ll be sent up 
for long enough that you won’t have the chance to do it a second time. 
  
Mr. Fisher: I think that’s right, Justice Scalia.  Perhaps the States want to speak 
to that.  They’re the ones that put it in their law.288 
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Mr. Fisher begins by stating “Well I think there are two ways to decide this case on more 
narrow grounds,” and he is able to explain the first path, but before he is able to discuss 
a second path Justice Scalia interrupts his response.289  In an attempt to reassert control 
Justice Kennedy asks again “What would they be,” and again before Mr. Fisher is able to 
finish his second sentence, Justice Scalia interrupts him, derailing the argument, 
terminating Mr. Fisher’s argument time, and preventing Mr. Fisher from addressing 
Justice Kennedy for a second time.290  Not captured in the transcript is Justice 
Kennedy’s strain to speak over Justice Scalia in order to get his questioned resolve
Justice Scalia’s interaction prevents Justice Kennedy from getting his question answere
and several seconds after making his last statement he concludes his argument to protect 
time for his rebutt
d.  
d 
al.   
                                                
In the previous selection, Justice Scalia’s final comments provide an ideal 
example of how justices may use oral arguments to evaluate and work their way through 
positions.  He advances a position which implicitly over turns the need for a death 
penalty by stating “it is an unrealistic condition that you have raped a 12-year - - a child 
twice.  The first time you do it and are convicted of it, you’ll be sent up for long enough 
that you won’t have the chance to do it a second time.”  His comment seems to reject the 
recidivism qualification Mr. Fisher earlier described, but the statement also calls into 
question the need for a death penalty.  It is almost as if Justice Scalia has been “hoisted 
 
289 07-343 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 27. 
290 07-343 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 27. 
 
218 
 
by his own petard.”  However, in biased sensemaking fashion, he seems to reject his 
own insight for his personal preference. 
In a third instance, Justice Kennedy challenges Mr. Fisher’s argument during his 
rebuttal time.  Mr. Fisher is presented with the unusual opportunity to once again address 
Justice Kennedy.291   
Justice Kennedy: I don’t understand - - is that in front of us here? 
 
Mr. Fisher: It is in the respect of narrowing, because Mr. Cruz - - the only answer 
to that, I think is what Mr. Cruz - - 
 
Justice Kennedy: This is not a speech case where you have standing to object to 
the statute that can - - would be unconstitutional as applied to others - - 
 
Mr. Fisher: We absolutely do - - 
 
Justice Kennedy: Or I mean - - or is there precedent that contradicts? 
 
Mr. Fisher: There’s square precedent, unanimous holding of this Court in 
Maynard against Cartwright so that you can’t justify a statute that fails to narrow 
on as applied grounds.  The constitutional infirmity is the fact that it gives 
unfettered discretion to prosecutors and juries to choose who to give the death 
sentence to - -  
 
Justice Scalia: But I - - I don’t understand the difference.  If you have a general 
murder law with an aggravating factor of killing of a law officer, okay, the jury 
can decide the whole category of killings of law officers who gets the death 
penalty and who dosen’t.  Why is that any different from what happens when you 
have a statute that makes it a capital offense to kill a law officer, without any 
further qualifications? 
 
It’s exactly the same result.  It goes to the jury.  This person killed a law officer.  
It is up to you whether you give him the death penalty or not.292 
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After his second sentence directed toward Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia once again 
disrupts Mr. Fisher’s response.  At this final crucial moment, Justice Kennedy’s tone 
suggests disapproval and in the last remaining seconds Mr. Fisher must persuade Justice 
Kennedy of the validity of his argument.  Before he is able to finish responding to 
Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia challenges Mr. Fisher’s response.  Following Mr. 
Fisher’s response to Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Roberts also interrupts Mr. Fisher’s 
response to Justice Kennedy.  Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia’s disruptions 
force Mr. Fisher away from his response to Justice Kennedy, and take up the remaining 
amount of Mr. Fisher’s argument time. 
Respondent’s counsel faces a dramatically different attitude from the justices.  
Justice Scalia is respectful, helpful, and even saves the respondent from another justices’ 
hypothetical.  Chief Justice Roberts only interacts with the counsel once and his 
argument assists respondent’s argument.  Although Justice Breyer presents a number of 
challenging questions and hypotheticals, he often will say “thank you” following the 
respondent’s retort.  The questioning proves so different that Ms. Clark pauses toward 
the end of her delivery because she had already covered her major points.  Justice 
Stevens has to prompt her to use more time by asking “If you’re looking for time, let me 
ask you one question that interests me but is a little divorced from the terms of the 
argument so far” (42).  Justice Stevens proceeds to ask a philosophical question about 
applying international law to the death penalty in the U.S.  His question presents more of 
an opportunity for intellectual banter than for close consideration of the case at hand.  
While Ms. Clark experiences a dramatically different form of questioning from the 
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justices, Mr. Cruz encounters a similarly relaxed bench.  Justices provide him with the 
opportunity for numerous lengthy responses, four significantly exceeding the one minute 
mark.  Mr. Cruz even has an opportunity from Justice Kennedy at the end of his 
argument to address one of Justice Kennedy’s questions, nearly an identical situation 
that Mr. Fisher faced.  Unlike Mr. Fisher’s questioning, Mr Cruz has the opportunity to 
respond to Justice Kennedy, and even is able to respond to Justice Kennedy’s follow up 
question without the justices interrupting him.  Mr. Cruz’s response to Justice Kennedy 
is long enough to exhaust the remaining amount of his argument time.  The Court 
provided him with a valuable opportunity to address the key swing vote justice without 
interruption; unfortunately Mr. Fisher was not provided with the same treatment. 
The justices’ treatment of respondent’s counsel is so dramatically different that 
Justice Scalia actually defends and supports Ms. Clark’s arguments to his fellow justices.  
In one instance, Justice Breyer inquires that in order to resolve this case the Court is 
“going to say legislatures all over the country have the right under the Constitution to go, 
try to categorize horrible by horrible, not just death.  Not just murder.”293  Justice Scalia 
interrupts Justice Breyer’s comment piping in “Just the way they used to.  Right,” Ms. 
Clark affirms Justice Scalia, stating “Exactly, your honor. I would agree.”294  Annoyed 
with Justice Scalia’s remark and his intrusion, Justice Breyer responds by remarking 
“Perhaps at the time, 200 years ago, that’s true,” drawing a hearty round of laughter 
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from the audience.295 Justice Scalia’s sarcasm does not derail Justice Breyer and he 
continues pursuing his question, but Justice Breyer’s irritation with Justice Scalia’s 
actions were apparent in the courtroom. 
In a second instance in which Justice Scalia intrudes on another justices’ line of 
questioning, he rescues Ms. Clark from one of Justice Souter’s hypotheticals.  In this 
instance, Justice Souter has presented a hypothetical that discredits Ms. Clark’s reliance 
on a precedent. 
Justice Souter:  . . . . So all I’m saying is I don’t think the fact that your capital 
murder passed muster under Lowenfield is authority for saying that the child rape 
statute passes muster here. 
 
Ms. Clark: No - - Well, I agree with you on that, though I think that perhaps - -  
 
Justice Scalia: Do you?  Do you really? (untranscribed laughter). 
 
Ms. Clark: Well, not - - I agree in the sense that - - 
 
Justice Souter: Well, let’s find out how much. (Laughter). 
 
Justice Scalia: Didn’t the - - didn’t the Louisiana statute that - - that was at issue 
in Lownfield produce the result that if you committed intentional murder of a law 
enforcement officer, it was up to the jury whether to give you the death penalty 
or not? 
 
Ms. Clark: Yes, correct, your Honor. 296 
 
Ms. Clark attempts to answer Justice Souter’s question, but before she finishes 
responding, Justice Scalia questions her approach which prompts Ms. Clark to 
backpedal, as Justice Scalia discusses the implications of her response, and in turn 
reframes it within a more advantageous light.  In the courtroom laughter erupted from 
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Justice Scalia’s act.  He appeared to bolt to the microphone to prevent Ms. Clark’s 
response.  Justice Souter’s response to Justice Scalia’s incredulity in the form of “Well, 
let’s find out how much,” is a very different type of humor than Justice Scalia’s.  Where 
Justice Scalia has generated humor from ridiculing an advocate, Justice Souter’s humor 
derives from poking fun at a fellow justice.  Justice Souter’s retort draws a round of 
laughter from the crowd, but undeterred Justice Scalia explains to Ms. Clark the 
implications of agreeing to Justice Souter’s hypothetical.  Justice Scalia’s rescue of Ms. 
Clark sparks an instance in which the two justices are debating each other through Ms. 
Clark without providing her an opportunity to respond.  The unusual situation of two 
justices arguing so directly through an advocate prompts another round of laughter in the 
room, particularly because Ms. Clark has difficulty regaining control of the argument.297  
In this instance, Justice Scalia provided significant assistance to Ms. Clark, and his 
support of the advocate was so obvious it prompted laughter from the audience and 
caused his colleague to tease him by suggesting “let’s find out how much [she agrees].” 
Justice Scalia’s support is not limited to Ms. Clark, but he extends the same 
courtesy to Mr. Cruz.  When Justice Breyer asks for clarification of a statute from Mr. 
Cruz, Justice Scalia answers for him, articulating the Mr. Cruz’s response for him, and 
allowing Mr. Cruz to simply reply by stating “that’s exactly right.”298   
Justice Breyer: You started out by saying it’s the worst casees of child abuse, and 
that’s - - child rape - - and that’s why I was interested in this definition.  It seems 
to me this definition simply covers all instances of some kind of physical 
intercourse with a child, including oral, vaginal, anal.  I can’t imagine one that 
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wouldn’t be covered if the victim of this is under the age of 13.  Am I right in 
thinking it’s not the worst instances; it’s every instance of rape defined that way? 
 
Mr. Cruz:  You’re not exactly right, Justice Breyer. 
Justice Breyer: Thank you. 
Mr. Cruz: The statute that is being challenged in this case was the pre-amended 
 statute. 
 
Justice Breyer: So the amendment - - 
Mr. Cruz: So oral was not in it.  And it wasn’t 13; it was 12.  So the statute under 
which Patrick Kennedy was convicted was only vaginal or anal rape. 
 
Justice Scalia: It was not all child rape. 
Mr. Cruz: Exactly. 
Justice Scalia: It was not all child rape.  It was only child rape up to the age of 
 11. 
 
Mr. Cruz: That’s exactly right.  And so that was a substantial narrowing.  It was 
11 and younger and it was only vaginal and - - 
 
Justice Breyer: Thank you.  I see.299 
As Justice Scalia makes these comments, he is turning towards Justice Breyer.  So 
instead of addressing Mr. Cruz, his responses are directed squarely at Justice Breyer to 
clarify the argument Mr. Cruz is advancing.  Justice Scalia offers Mr. Cruz a distinct 
advantage by addressing Justice Breyer for Mr. Cruz.  In addition to Justice Scalia’s 
overt assistance, his silence also proves an advantage to Mr. Cruz because no other 
justice interrupts as frequently as Justice Scalia, and this presents Mr. Cruz with an 
opportunity to advance a lengthy and potentially persuasive argument, not granted to 
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petitioner’s counsel.  Justice Scalia’s silence also provides Mr. Cruz with the opportunity 
to address two of Justice Kennedy’s questions that occurred near the end of argument 
time.  In one response Mr. Cruz speaks for 84 seconds, and in the final response at the 
very close of argument he addresses one of Justice Kennedy’s questions for over a 
minute.300  The other justices provide Justice Kennedy with the opportunity to have his 
questions resolved by respondent’s counsel without interruption, but Justice Scalia does 
not offer the same respect in petitioner’s argument. 
Qualitative Summary 
In summary of qualitative analysis, the justices treated petitioner and 
respondent’s counsel in a separate and disproportionate fashion.  Justice Scalia played 
the most significant role in the treatment of counsels as he dismissed and denigrated 
petitioner’s counsel while supporting and rescuing respondent’s counsel.  While Justice 
Scalia’s interaction largely reflects the actions of only one justice, his interruptions of 
Mr. Fisher’s response to Justice Kennedy were a significant and unfair tactic.  In oral 
argument it is common for a line of questioning to get derailed, but in three specific 
instances Justice Scalia interrupted Mr. Fisher, likely as a means of hampering his 
argument and diluting its effect on Justice Kennedy.  His treatment of counsels 
substantially differed, providing Mr. Cruz with an opportunity to address Justice 
Kennedy at length and allowing Mr. Cruz to speak uninterrupted.  Rhetorically, Justice 
Scalia actions could have vast consequences, potentially turning the course of a case, due 
to the manner in which he berated and hindered Mr. Fisher’s argument.  While Chief 
                                                 
300 See 07-343 Kennedy v. Louisiana pg.50-1, and pg 55-6. 
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Justice Roberts maintained a level of decorum and respect for both parties, his absence 
in respondent’s argument was noticeable and a likely advantage to respondent’s counsels 
because they did not have to struggle with his questions.  Where he advanced the 
philosophical questions about the nature of devolving trends, or shifting societal values 
during petitioner’s argument, Chief Justice Roberts failed to ask any similar exploratory 
questions to respondent.  It seems asking similar questions would be a helpful tactic to 
gauge a balanced understanding of both sides.  Furthermore, his minimized interaction in 
respondent’s argument, enables a potentially easier argument.  While Justice Breyer, 
Stevens, and Souter were more engaged in respondent’s argument, their behavior did not 
reflect a lack of respect for counsel’s position, nor did they press either counselor as 
aggressively as Justice Scalia or Chief Justice Roberts. 
Qualitative analysis provides a perspective and degree of understanding that 
quantitative methods cannot capture.  Quantitative analysis may display vigorous 
interaction, but it cannot reveal a justice’s bullying behavior or their quick attempts to 
assist a counselor.  Qualitative analysis calls attention to the situational qualities of 
rhetorical discursive interactions, capturing communicative and argumentative 
characteristics not illustrated by numerical abstractions.  Conversely, qualitative data 
cannot reveal the frequency of utterances, or convey the length of time in which actions 
occurred.  The two methods inform each other and both display an overwhelming sense 
of evidence towards a bias in certain justices’ rhetorical discursive interaction and a 
preferential bias in the manner in which justices may treat counsels during oral 
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arguments.  Both qualitative and quantitative methods convey behavior which aligns 
some justices with sensemaking behavior.   
Conclusion 
 
I chose to include an analysis of Kennedy v. Louisiana because the case offered a 
number of contributions that varied from the prior analysis of Morse v. Frederick.  
Quantitative data did not offer the significant differences that occurred in Morse v. 
Frederick, but qualitative information provided insight into the complex differences 
between justices’ treatment of advocates.  This case highlights the importance of a 
mixed method approach that can capture the dynamics of communication from a variety 
of perspectives.  Qualitative approaches displayed Justice Scalia’s behavior in ways that 
quantitative methods did not.  So this case provided an excellent display of the 
importance of both quantitative data and qualitative data and the rich insight they offer 
in conjunction with one another. 
Kennedy v. Louisiana also captured the justices’ rhetorical discursive behavior in 
ways that prior researchers had not considered.  Analyzing the justices’ individual 
behavior within oral arguments revealed the significant manner in which a justice can 
hinder or assist an advocate and how that action can influence the justices’ decision 
making ability.  Justice Scalia’s disproportionate interaction very likely impacted how 
Justice Kennedy and the other justices evaluated the case.  Instead of considering the 
swing justice to be the most important justice in oral arguments, Justice Scalia’s 
behavior provides more credence for considering the most powerful or influential justice 
to be the most rhetorically active justice. 
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In regards to sensemaking behavior, Justice Scalia appeared the most blatantly 
biased in his interaction.  At one point he accidentally articulates a point that cuts against 
his position in petitioner’s argument, but it is clear this accidental articulation did not 
alter his opinion in the case; a perfect example of rejecting undesirable alternatives.  
Chief Jusice Roberts also acted as a biased sensemaker, but in a manner that avoided the 
damage committed by Justice Scalia.  His philosophical explorations exhausted a 
significant amount of time in petitioner’s argument, and his silence in respondent’s 
argument offered a distinct advantage to the advocates by preventing them from 
spending time on their own explanation of his philosophical questions.  One round of 
debate between Justice Scalia and Justice Souter prevented Justice Stevens from begin 
able to ask a question.  Justice Stevens attempted to lean forward and respond to the 
advocate’s comments, but a lengthy back and forth debate between the justices stifled 
his interaction.  Chief Justice Roberts’ behavior is much more subtle than Justice 
Scalia’s, but his rhetorical discursive behavior offers a real advantage to one party, and 
hinders another.  His behavior should not be overlooked.  His ability to conclude 
arguments also played a role in this case, because as he ended petitioner’s argument 
time, Justice Souter was leaning forward to ask a final question.  Ending argument while 
justices still have questions clearly has the potential for limiting a justice’s 
understanding of the case.  Justice Breyer also displayed a significant difference in his 
interaction with advocates, and his behavior also follows a pattern of sensemaking, 
although he appears to accept respondent’s arguments with minimal challenge.  After 
oral argument in Kennedy v. Louisiana, Justices Scalia and Breyer, and Chief Justice 
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Roberts most likely left the courtroom with a firm conviction for which side they would 
vote.  It is probable that they entered the courtroom with a view of how they would vote 
anyways, but their rhetorical discursive involvement further entrenched and most likely 
solidified the counsel for whom they would vote.  Their rhetorical discursive interaction 
exhausted a substantial amount of time, clearly preventing less active justices from 
asking questions which may have helped resolve questions or issues.  Regardless of the 
reason for their behavior, the active justices in this case clearly impacted how other 
justices were able to gather information.  The active justices reflected sensemaking 
through biased rhetorical discursive interactions, and other less active justices (Ginsburg, 
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Alito, and Thomas) offered more balanced approaches to 
considering the case.  
Ethnographic, Quantitative, and Qualitative approaches all revealed the process 
of sensemaking in some of the Court’s justices.  Ethnographic observation revealed the 
difficult situation created by a justice’s humorous critique, as well as how more active 
justices prevent less active justices from interacting in oral argument.  Quantitative 
findings offered clear evidence of lopsided communication, while qualitative 
information revealed the rhetorical discursive sensemaking bias justices enacted through 
the arguments they advanced.  Justices in Kennedy v. Louisiana both displayed 
sensemaking behavior as well as a more balanced approach to questioning, but would 
justices behave in a more just and measured fashion if the case were of significant 
historical value or held significant social repercussions for the country?  It seems 
reasonable that the justices would want to ensure a more careful consideration of 
 
229 
 
important nationally prominent cases.  The next chapter attempts to answer this question 
by examining the justices’ rhetorical discursive interaction in District of Columbia v. 
Heller.   
 
230 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
HISTORICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF JUDICIAL SENSEMAKING  
 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. DICK ANTHONY HELLER 
 
Second Amendment: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”301  
 
  Chief Justice Roberts: “What is reasonable about a total ban on possession [of guns]” 
   
Counsel: “What is reasonable . . . is that it’s a ban on the possession of one kind of 
weapon, of handguns, that’s been considered especially dangerous.” 
 
Chief Justice Roberts: “So if you have a law that prohibits the possession of books, it’s 
all right if you allow the possession of newspapers?”302 
 
 Prior chapters presented analysis of two oral arguments that displayed judicial 
sensemaking behavior in the majority of the justices but also revealed how each 
argument elicited varied reactions by the justices.  Justices’ communicative interactions 
should vary as each case relates to a separate set of personal commitments.  We should 
not expect to see identical behavior for every case.  Analysis of oral arguments cannot 
prove definitively whether or not arguments and information offered in oral argument 
altered a justice’s evaluation of a case.  But from the justices’ personal accounts, we 
know the importance the act of oral argument holds for them, and we also know that 
language may influence actors by ways in which they are unaware.  It would also be an 
impossible feat to identify with certainty what directly influenced a justice’s thinking, 
but we could probably agree that the treatment and consideration justices gave to the 
prior cases, was less than desirable.  We could also agree that it seems likely, if not 
                                                 
301 Second Amendment, U.S. Constitution. 
302 U.S. 07-290 District of Columbia v. Dick Anthony Heller, 18-19 (ln.20-04). 
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certain, that justices’ consideration of a case was influenced by communication within 
oral arguments.  A justice’s speech may stifle a counsel’s arguments, advance personally 
appealing arguments, and prevent less active justices from asking questions, which likely 
shapes the manner by which other justices as well as the active speaking justice to 
evaluate the case.  We should expect a more careful analysis and mode of inquiry from 
our nation’s highest court. 
 The previous two cases may be considered minor cases in the overall landscape 
of the Supreme Court.  Although they attracted national attention regarding the situations 
and problems addressed by the Court, none were rare historic cases in the theme or law 
addressed.  Morse v. Frederick proved an intriguing case regarding students’ freedom of 
speech.  Kennedy v. Louisiana was a unique test of the constitutional limits of the death 
penalty surrounding child rape.  Each of these cases resulted in significant legal 
developments, but influential historic cases respond to heavy cultural issues, forge new 
historic legal ground, and attract national attention from the legal community because of 
the social implications surrounding the Court’s decision.  If one had to create a list of the 
top five historic cases the Court has heard in the past fifty years, most people would 
probably agree that Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, and Bush v. Gore would 
top the list.  Other cases in contention might be Mirandav. Arizona, Tinker v. Des 
Moines, Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, and District of Columbia v. 
Heller, which may eventually join the historic ranks. 
 Since the previous three cases were interesting but generally minor cases, the 
question arises: would justices behave more carefully in major historic cases?  If justices 
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do not behave any differently, then how might our country’s legal landscape have been 
shaped by the justices’ rhetorical discursive interaction in oral arguments?  It seems 
reasonable to believe that because historic cases may result in significant social 
developments, the justices pay particularly close attention to discerning the best possible 
solution.  We would hope that they remain open and provide both counsels with an equal 
opportunity to present arguments and information.  On the other hand, it may also seem 
reasonable that the justices have already formed their perspective on weighty social 
issues and are unlikely to change their opinion of them.  Below the title of this chapter, 
the excerpted lines from oral argument suggest that Chief Justice Roberts may already 
have his mind made up as he advances an absurd comparison between guns and reading 
material.  The Chief Justice’s example clearly over simplifies the situation and the 
answer to his ridiculous question is obvious.  However, this example is only one instance 
out of the lengthy oral argument involved in this case, and further consideration should 
be given to the entire Court’s interactions. 
Background 
 In order to gauge the justices’ interaction and approach in historic cases, I 
examined the famous 2008 second amendment case, District of Columbia v. Dick 
Anthony Heller.  The case maintains the same justices that participated in the previously 
analyzed cases and fell at about the same time as the other cases, which ensured a 
consistency among actors in the cases.  As the first Second Amendment case in nearly 
seventy years, the case also provided a unique opportunity because the justices had not 
ruled on a prior gun rights case before and thus may not have developed entrenched 
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perspectives.  The case arose from wealthy libertarian, Robert A. Levy, a prominent 
fellow at the Cato Institute, who manufactured six lawsuits to force the Supreme Court 
to address the issue of gun laws.  Mr. Levy recruited and financed the lawsuits of six 
plaintiffs that wanted to keep handguns in their homes for self-defense purposes.  The 
cases were designed to challenge whether law abiding citizens had the right to protect 
themselves in their homes.  Out of the six cases, five were dismissed for lack of 
standing.  Anthony Heller’s case divided the lower courts and forced the Supreme Court 
to take up the issue.303   
 Security guard Anthony Heller applied for a gun permit in the District of 
Columbia for his handgun.  The District of Columbia denied Mr. Heller’s application 
citing a ban on handguns for all people outside of law enforcement.  Mr. Heller 
challenged the constitutionality of D.C.’s handgun ban dividing upper and lower courts 
in crossed decisions.  The Supreme Court heard the case, in part to resolve the 
disagreement between lower courts, but also to address the larger issue of growing 
restrictions on gun laws across the nation.  The case was the first second amendment 
case heard by the Court since 1939 in United States v. Miller where the Court rejected a 
sawed off shotgun as an “arm” protected by the second amendment.  Heller drew 
worldwide attention because at question was the primary interpretation of the second 
amendment, an issue the Court ignored in Miller.304   
                                                 
303 For more on the story see Linda Greenhouse, “Case Touches a 2nd Amendment Nerve,” New York 
Times. 11/13/2007. 
304 Lexis Nexus reports nearly 3,000 articles on the topic between March 1, 2008 and July 1, 2008.  For a 
variety of the coverage regarding the case see Edwin M. Yoder, “Bearing Arms and Verbal Harms,” The 
Washington Times. 3/5/08.,  Sean Hayes, “Guns in America,” Korea Times. 3/18/08., Linda Greenhouse, 
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 In Heller, the Court was poised to respond to whether individuals have a 
Constitutional right to “bear arms,” separate from their connection to a “well regulated 
Militia.”  Nearly every state filed an amicus curiae and Vice President Dick Cheney 
submitted his own amicus in an attempt to counter Solicitor General, Paul D. Clement’s 
support for the petitioner in oral argument.  Heller provides a nearly ideal example for 
the complexity and ambiguity justices must struggle with when trying to resolve major 
questions regarding the interpretation of the Constitution.  Justices explored historical 
case law connected to various colonial laws as well as historic British laws to determine 
the amendment’s interpretation.  The justices also grappled with determining a primacy 
among the clauses, giving weight to either the individual or the militia within the 
amendment’s ambiguous phrasing and historical situation.  To further complicate 
matters, grammar rules were not standardized at the time of the Constitution and it is 
unclear whether the Framers read the amendment in the same way that current readers’ 
understand it.  Discussion of the case was vigorous at oral argument with nearly every 
justice participating and the case provides a good example of how justices interact within 
historic cases.  Methodology follows a pattern similar to the previous case analyses, but I 
was not present to observe oral argument. 
 Oral arguments in D.C. v. Heller were vigorous, engaging every justice on the 
bench, but Justice Thomas.  The interaction followed a pattern similar to the other cases 
                                                                                                                                                
“Court weighs right to guns and its Limits,” New York Times 3/19/2008., “Ruling tests constitution on 
American’s sacred right to bear arms,” The Australian. 6/27/08.,  “The Supreme Court Opens Fire,” The 
Economist. 6/28/08., Adam Liptak, “Gun Laws and Crime: A Complex Relationship,” New York Times. 
6/29/08, and Christopher Kromphardt, “Handing down history,” University Wire. 7/1/2008.  All accessed 
on 11/1/09 
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considered in this study with justices spending the greatest amount of time arguing 
against the advocate whom they eventually voted against.  Oral argument lasted 23 
minutes longer than its scheduled time, a very unusual move by Chief Justice Roberts, 
but a positive sign that he wanted the justices to have an opportunity to ask any 
necessary questions they may have.  This is an encouraging instance that the Court does 
recognize, in some instances, the need for extra time for justices and advocates to be 
satisfied in their consideration or advancement of arguments.  The case was settled in a 
5-4 vote with Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Alito, Thomas, and Kennedy 
voting in favor of the respondent and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer 
voting for the petitioner.  Analysis in this case must be nuanced to account for the 
discrepancy in speaking times each counsel received.  Petitioner’s counsel argued for 
nearly 40 minutes joined by the Solicitor General’s presentation of more than 20 
minutes, and respondent’s counsel argued for over 37 minutes.  The Solicitor General’s 
presentation creates additional opportunities for interruptions and prevents direct 
comparisons between parties; however, the Court provides both petitioner’s advocate 
and respondent’s advocate with nearly equal time allotments, so I have tried to 
distinguish differences between the justices’ behavior in petitioner’s advocate’s 
argument and the Solicitor General’s presentation. 
District of Columbia v. Dick Anthony Heller  
 Table 6.1 lists the number of interruptions generated from both transcript and 
audio file. 
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Table 6.1  Interruptions 
 
                  Roberts  Scalia  Alito  Kennedy  Thomas   Breyer    Souter   Stevens   Ginsburg     Total 
 
  Petitioner 23 16          4       16       0          1       7  12            7 86                 
    Dellinger 20 11 3 12 1 2 3 3 55 
   Clement 3 5 1 4 0 5 9 4 31 
   
Respondent 7 7            0            0               0          4       5              14            7 44 
 
 
In considering the rate of interruptions, justices reflected biased sensemaking 
behavior by primarily interrupting the party whom they voted against.  Removing the 
justices’ interruptions during General Clement’s presentation allows for a closer 
comparison between advocates’ arguments, but including the justices’ interruptions 
assists in understanding how justices may have become entrenched by heavily 
interrupting both advocate and General.  Including General Clement in our 
understanding of justices’ interactions in petitioner’s argument, we can see a dramatic 
difference between those justices who voted against the petitioner and those who voted 
in favor.  Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia , Alito, and Kennedy comprise over 
67% of interruptions during petitioner’s argument time.  And when compared to the 
types of statements articulated by justices in the following table, the justices primarily 
interrupted to challenge Mr. Dellinger or General Clement.  Similarly, those justices who 
voted against Mr. Gura accounted for over 68% of interruptions, although Justice 
Stevens heavily contributed to this number by controlling nearly a third of the 
interruptions.  Again, when compared with the following table, the majority of justices’ 
interruptions challenged Mr. Gura’s argument.  When comparing the number of 
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interruptions faced by Mr. Dellinger and Mr. Gura, they both endure a relatively similar 
amounts of interruptions, but there are glaring discrepancies between the number of 
interruptions committed by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy in 
Mr. Dellinger’s argument and those interruptions made during Mr. Gura’s argument.  
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy comprise over 78% of 
interruptions during Mr. Dellinger’s argument time.  Those same justices comprise fewer 
than 32% of Mr. Gura’s interruptions, less than half the percentage of interruptions faced 
by Mr. Dellinger.  The number of interruptions faced by Mr. Dellinger suggests a more 
difficult argument due to a more hostile environment created by the justices’ 
interactions.  Mr. Gura appears to have encountered a challenging argument from Justice 
Stevens.  Although Justice Stevens’ arguments in general tend to be more inquisitive 
than hostile, in this case he takes on a particularly aggressive approach.     
 Table 6.2 lists the number of challenging (C/), assisting (A/), or neutral (N/) 
statements or questions posed to each counsel by the justices.  Numbers in parentheses 
represent the distribution of interruptions within Mr. Dellinger’s and General Clement’s 
argument time. (Mr. Dellinger/General Clement). 
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Table 6.2  Statements 
 
               Roberts  Scalia        Alito     Kennedy Thomas  Breyer     Souter      Stevens    Ginsburg 
 
C/pet. 22 19 3 16 0  1  4  5  2 
  (10/12)  (11/8)      (2/1)          (10/6)          (1/0)         (0/4)   (2/3)      (1/1) 
 
A/pet. 0 0  0 0  0  0  4  12 6 
                     (3/1)           (2/10)      (3/3)  
 
N/pet. 2  0 2 1  0  0 1 0 0 
  (0/2)       (1/1)          (1/0)              (0/1) 
 
Total 24 19 5 17 0  1 9 17 8 
 
 
C/resp. 7 2 0 7 0  9  8 17 8 
 
A/resp. 2 7 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 
 
N/resp. 0 0 0 0  0  0 0 0 0 
 
Total 9 9 0 7 0 9 8 17 8 
 
 
 
 The justices’ interactional discrepancies between parties suggest biased rhetorical 
discursive interactions.  In particular, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, Breyer, Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg have imbalanced interactions.  Justices 
Alito and Thomas appear to be the only justices who do not disproportionately interfere 
with the advocates’ arguments.  Although he tends to be an active participant, Chief 
Justice Roberts does not typically play a more dominant role than Justice Scalia.  
Qualitative data will also reveal that Chief Justice Roberts held a number of personal 
questions about the case and his high level of interaction may have resulted from his 
questions rather than a preferential treatment of advocates.  However, under 
sensemaking, it is important for readers to remember that Chief Justice Robert’s biased 
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rhetorical discursive interactions indicate the potential for skewed decision making.  
Why did he not pose similar inquisitive questions to the respondent? 
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia’s behavior reveals a clear preference for 
respondent’s counsel.  His assistance of respondent’s argument makes obvious his 
voting position within this case.  Justice Kennedy’s behavior also displays biased 
rhetorical discursive interaction as he challenges petitioner’s advocate and General 
Clement more stringently than respondent’s advocate.  Justice Breyer interacts very little 
in petitioner’s argument, but plays a much more pronounced role in respondent’s 
argument.  Justice Souter assists petitioner’s counsel without ever equally assisting 
respondent’s counsel.  Surprisingly, Justice Stevens, who typically is not the most active 
justice in oral arguments, takes the role as the most active justice in respondent’s 
argument.  Justice Stevens actively assists petitioner’s counsel while heavily challenging 
respondent’s counsel.  His behavior provides extensive aid to petitioner without 
similarly treating respondent’s counsel in the same manner.  Finally, Justice Ginsburg 
also lends a significant amount of assistance to petitioner with extending the same 
opportunity to respondent.  The assistance offered by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg are 
comments that bolster the petitioner’s argument, but they also advance arguments 
separate from those proposed by petitioner’s advocates, causing petitioner’s advocate to 
use valuable time explaining the benefits of his approach.   
 In assessing whether Mr. Dellinger and Mr. Gura, as advocates for their clients, 
endured similar levels of questioning, separating the justices’ interactions in petitioner’s 
argument enables a closer scrutiny of the rhetorical discursive pressure advocates faced.  
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Chief Justice Roberts offers a relatively balanced treatment of Mr. Dellinger and Mr. 
Gura, although he offers Mr. Gura assistance in two instances, while not providing Mr. 
Dellinger with a similar opportunity.  Justice Scalia’s level of interaction is somewhat 
equal, but the type of interaction demonstrates that he heavily assists respondent’s 
counsel.  Justice Kennedy’s behavior becomes more balanced as he relatively equally 
challenges Mr. Dellinger and Mr. Gura.  Justice Breyer’s imbalanced rhetorical 
discursive interaction does not change our understanding of his behavior.  Justice Souter 
lends three assisting statements to Mr. Dellinger without once challenging his position.  
Conversely, he heavily challenges Mr. Gura without offering similar support.  Justice 
Ginsburg’s balanced interaction in petitioner’s argument illuminates further the 
discrepancy between her treatment of Mr. Dellinger and Mr. Gura, forcing Mr. Gura to 
endure a more stringent inquiry than Mr. Dellinger. 
 In general, justices appeared to once again more heavily challenge the counsel 
whom they voted against.  It is unclear as to whether this could be the result of minds 
already made up, or oral arguments further shaping their cognitive positions, but 
regardless of the reason for their interaction, it is important to recognize that the 
rhetorical discursive process is lopsided and offers imbalanced consideration.  The 
justices’ heavy attention directed towards petitioner’s counsel and the General presents 
problems for the evaluation of the case, as those justices in opposition to petitioner’s 
position become more firmly cognitively entrenched because they are given an 
opportunity to more heavily challenge petitioner’s position.  Those justices supporting 
the petitioner’s position are also given a longer amount of time to continue their support 
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and further entrench their position.  Respondent’s argument does not offer a similar 
opportunity because of the shortened amount of argument time.  The difference in time 
did not result in a difference in questioning by the justices because Mr. Dellinger and 
Mr. Gura endured an equal amount of challenges and assistance from the justices.  An 
examination of speaking time will help further our understanding of the justices’ 
interactions and the ability of advocates to advance their arguments.   
 Table 6.3 displays petitioner’s oral argument including rebuttal time.  Total 
speaking time:  60 min 17 sec (Dellinger = 39 min 16 sec, Clement = 21min 1 sec).  
Table 6.3 also displays respondent’s oral argument.  Total speaking time: 37 minutes 5 
seconds. 
 
 
Table 6.3  Speaking Time 
 
Petitioner 
                  Dell   Clem. Roberts  Scalia  Alito Kennedy  Thomas Breyer  Souter   Stevens  Ginsburg 
 
Seconds 1499   745      281         274     101 274              0   46           141        106           116 
 
Total              Pet. = 2244 (37 min 24 sec) Justices = 1339 (22 min 19 sec) 
   Dellinger = 24min 59sec, Clement = 12min 25sec         Dellinger = 13min 48sec, Clement = 8min 31sec   
  
Respondent 
                    Gura   Roberts   Scalia   Alito   Kennedy   Thomas  Breyer   Souter   Stevens  Ginsburg    
 
Seconds       1115       99           78         0            87          0          435        124          145           117   
 
Total           Resp. = 1115 (18  min 35 sec)                           Justices = 1085 (18 min 5 sec) 
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Differences between speaking times for petitioner and respondent are dramatic, 
in part because of the Solicitor General presenting during petitioner’s argument.  
Petitioner is provided with over an hour of argument time, while the respondent’s 
counsel is given over 37 minutes to argue his case.  When separating respondent’s 
counsel’s speaking time from General Clement, a more equal picture develops with 2 
minutes separating the advocates, not an insignificant amount of time, but a reasonable 
difference given their extended argument time.  Although the time allotted to advocates 
is similar in length, the justices’ interaction within the advocates’ time is substantially 
different.  Mr. Dellinger speaks for nearly 25 minutes, or 64% of his argument time.  
The justices’ active involvement in his argument accounts for nearly 14 minutes.  
Conversely, Mr. Gura argues for less than 19 minutes with the justices speaking for over 
18 minutes allowing Mr. Gura to present for barely over 50% of his argument time.  Mr. 
Dellinger enjoys a delivery advantage of over 6 minutes, a substantial amount of time in 
oral arguments. 
The previous analysis of the justices’ statements suggests a pattern of biased 
sensemaking, but further examination of the time justices speak during a counsel’s 
argument also contributes to a further understanding of the justices’ influence in a 
party’s oral argument.  For example, Justice Breyer only made nine statements in 
challenging respondent’s argument, almost half the number of statements spoken by 
Justice Stevens in the same argument, giving the impression that Justice Stevens 
dominated the argument.  However, Justice Breyer spoke for two-thirds longer than 
Justice Stevens, using substantially more of respondent’s time.  Both Justice Breyer’s 
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and Justice Stevens’ rhetorical discursive interactions suggest biased sensemaking 
behavior.  Justices’ behavior in general reflects biased sensemaking behavior in their 
interactions.  Justices who voted against petitioner accounted for nearly 70% of the time 
that justices spoke in petitioner’s argument.  Similarly, justices who voted against the 
respondent accounted for over 75% of the justice’s spoken time in respondent’s 
argument.  Justice Breyer engaged nearly 40% of the justices’ time, a substantial amount 
of time largely due to his lengthy hypotheticals. 
Justices’ interactions exhausted a substantial amount of advocates’ argument 
time.  Because this case involved argument time that was extended by Chief Justice 
Roberts, it is difficult to estimate the impact of the justices’ interactions.  The extended 
issue of argument time will be dealt with more fully in the qualitative section that 
follows, but the extended time may result from the Chief Justice recognizing the need for 
justices to have their questions satisfied by advocates.  The justices’ interaction in Mr. 
Gura’s argument did limit his ability to advance his arguments in the same manner that 
Mr. Dellinger was able to advance his position, and Mr. Dellinger enjoys over 6 
additional minutes in his argument, giving him a significant rhetorical advantage over 
Mr. Gura.  To further understand the justices’ interactions and rhetorical advantages a 
consideration of speaking timeframes can assist us in considering how the justices’ 
interactions may have stifled or enabled advocates’ ability to present their arguments.   
 Table 6.4 displays the number of speaking instances in which lawyers were able 
to speak for a certain timeframe. 
 
 
 
244 
 
 
Table 6.4  Lawyer’s Speaking Timeframes 
 
Seconds  1-10     11-20        21-30        31-40        41-50        51-60        61+ 
 
Petitioner 33        24           14               14   5     3              4 
    Dellinger         22       16          9               5              4              1               4  
   Clement           11                  8              5                  9              1              2               0 
 
Respondent 33       14           4               7              2               1              2 
 
  
 
 When comparing speaking time frames between petitioner’s advocate and 
respondent’s, justices force respondent’s advocate to make the majority of his statements 
within one and ten seconds.  Mr. Dellinger exceeds Mr. Gura in nearly every other 
timeframe category, and not captured in this table are Mr. Dellinger’s 124min, 120min, 
and 94min responses.  Clearly the justices afford Mr. Dellinger more extensive 
opportunities to advance his arguments offering him a greater opportunity at persuading 
the justices and getting them to understand his position.  The justices force Mr. Gura to 
keep his responses short, potentially limiting the effectiveness of his argument.  In 
general, the justices present Mr. Dellinger with opportunities that Mr. Gura is not 
offered, largely due to some of the justices active and prolonged involvement.    
 In summary of the quantitative analysis, justices’ behavior within a historically 
significant case appears to reflect biased sensemaking characteristics.  Justices appear to 
more heavily challenge the party with whom they will eventually vote against and assist 
the party whose position they support.  Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia and 
Kennedy more heavily challenged petitioner’s counsel and the Soliticitor General than 
 
245 
 
they challenged respondent’s counsel.  Similarly Justices Breyer, Souter, Stevens, and 
Ginsburg heavily challenged respondent’s counsel while not holding petitioner’s counsel 
to the same stringent questioning.  Quantitative data suggests that the justices may not 
alter their behavior in historically significant cases, but qualitative analysis may provide 
a more comprehensive understanding of the case and the justices’ rhetorical discursive 
interactions. 
Qualitative Analysis 
 Justices engaged in vigorous interaction in oral arguments, and justices’ 
interactions prevented other justices from having their questions answered.  Remarkably 
though, Chief Justice Roberts extended argument time by 23 minutes.   
 Chief Justice Roberts: Why don’t you remain Mr. Dellinger.  We’ll make sure 
 you have rebuttal. 
 
 Justice Kennedy: Yes, because I did interrupt Justice Breyer.305 
 
Chief Justice Roberts’ willingness to extend advocates’ argument time suggests a couple 
of important discoveries.  First, his extension of time may indicate that he is aware when 
justices may not have their questions answered and in this case he feels it important for 
all the justices to have their questions answered.  I have not ever witnessed Chief Justice 
Roberts extend argument time, even in other active oral arguments where it appeared 
justices still had lingering questions.  His reason for extending argument time may also 
be due to the importance of the case, which points to the second important discovery, 
namely that Chief Justice Roberts recognizes, in historically significant cases, that the 
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justices should have their questions properly addressed without the burden of time limits.  
He wisely gives each advocate a relatively equal amount of time, even though the 
Solicitor General is afforded additional time in the petitioner’s argument.  Chief Justice 
Roberts’ extension of time suggests that oral argument can be flexible, and his primary 
concern may lie with the justices’ comprehensive understanding of a case, rather than 
efficiently reviewing cases.     
 Chief Justice Roberts’ time extension may also be due to his own desire to have 
questions answered about the case.  In particular, he spends a large amount of time 
questioning Mr. Dellinger about the trigger locks required by the District of Columbia.  
In his questioning, Chief Justice Roberts implies that he has no understanding of how 
trigger locks function. 
Chief Justice Roberts: Well, before you start with it, how many minutes does it 
take to remove a trigger lock and load a gun? Because both the gun has to be 
unloaded; it has to have a trigger lock under the District laws. 
 
Mr. Dellinger: Those are alternatives, Mr. Chief Justice. 
 
Chief Justice Roberts: No, disassembled-- 
 
Mr. Dellinger: Just a trigger lock. 
 
Chief Justice Roberts: --In either case it has to be unloaded, correct? 
 
Mr. Dellinger: There are some versions of the trigger lock that allow you to put 
the trigger lock on and then load the gun. But the piece that goes in the trigger 
mechanism, even someone as clumsy as I could remove it in a second-- 
 
Chief Justice Roberts: Well, the law, as I understand it, says that the gun has to 
be unloaded.  So under your hypothetical, I assume that would violate the 
District's law if the gun is still loaded. 
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Mr. Dellinger: --You know, it's a question of where you put the parenthesis. I 
read that as disassembled and unloaded or under a trigger lock, and that's the, 
that's the way the District-- 
 
Chief Justice Roberts: So how long does it take? If your interpretation is correct, 
how long does it take to remove the trigger lock and make the gun operable. 
 
Mr. Dellinger: --You... you place a trigger lock on and it has... the version I have, 
a few... you can buy them at 17th Street Hardware... has a code, like a three-digit 
code. You turn to the code and you pull it apart. That's all it takes. Even... it took 
me 3 seconds. 
 
Justice Scalia: You turn on, you turn on the lamp next to your bed so you can... 
you can turn the knob at 3-22-95, and so somebody-- 
 
Mr. Dellinger: Well-- 
 
Chief Justice Roberts: Is it like that? Is it a numerical code? 
 
Mr. Dellinger: --Yes, you can have one with a numerical code. 
 
Chief Justice Roberts: So then you turn on the lamp, you pick up your reading 
glasses...-- 
[Laughter] 
 
Mr. Dellinger: Let me tell you. That's right. Let me tell you why at the end of the 
day this doesn't... this doesn't matter, for two reasons. The lesson-- 
 
Chief Justice Roberts: It may not matter, but I'd like some idea about how long it 
takes. 
 
Mr. Dellinger: --It took me 3 seconds. I'm not kidding. It's... it's not that difficult 
to do it. 
That was in daylight.  The other version is just a loop that goes through the 
chamber with a simple key. You have the key and put it together. Now, of course 
if you're going... if you want to have your weapon loaded and assembled, that's a 
different matter. But here's where I want to address the trigger lock. Here's why it 
doesn't matter for the handgun law. The District believes that what is important 
here is the ban on handguns. And it also believes that you're entitled to have a 
functional, usable weapon for self-defense in the home, and that's why this is a 
very proportionate law.  
 
Chief Justice Roberts: Well, if proportionate, in other words you're saying your 
interest is allowing self-defense in the home-- 
 
248 
 
 
Mr. Dellinger: Yes.306 
 
The back and forth discussion between Chief Justice Roberts and Mr. Dellinger indicates 
that Chief Justice Roberts is trying to understand how trigger locks function.  It is 
somewhat disturbing that the Chief Justice did not attempt determining how they work 
before listening to oral arguments on the matter.  Instead, he turns to the advocate for an 
explanation, and Mr. Dellinger’s poor response enables Justice Scalia to reframe the 
hypothetical in a disadvantageous manner noting “You turn on, you turn on the lamp 
next to your bed so you can... you can turn the knob at 3-22-95, and so somebody— ,” 
prompting Chief Justice Roberts to humorously poke fun at Mr. Dellinger’s response, “Is 
it like that? Is it a numerical code? . . . So then you turn on the lamp, you pick up your 
reading glasses...-- [Laughter].”  Mr. Dellinger’s inability to advantageously respond to 
Chief Justice Roberts’ question enables Justice Scalia to provide a ridiculous example 
that will more likely influence Chief Justice Roberts’ consideration of the case than a 
further reasonable explanation by Mr. Dellinger.  The Chief Justice’s line of questioning 
displays his own need to have questions answered, and his willingness to extend 
argument time both for his own unanswered questions and those of his colleagues.  
These two examples point to a willingness by the Chief Justice to extend 
argument time for the sake of unanswered questions in an important case, suggesting 
that oral argument time is flexible and does not follow the dogmatic protocol of the 
Rehnquist court.  In other words, Chief Justice Roberts, at times, approaches oral 
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argument with a sensitivity to justices’ questions.  In other oral arguments I observed, 
such as Kennedy v. Louisiana, justices were unable to ask questions or have issues 
satisfied.  It may be helpful for Chief Justice Roberts to continue remaining flexible with 
oral argument time limits to ensure the justices have their questions properly addressed 
by advocates.   
Chief Justice Roberts is not the only justice holding questions about the case.  
Justice Breyer uses his hypothetical to explore various positions with respondent’s 
counsel.  Although for brevity purposes I will not include all of Justice Breyer’s lengthy 
hypothetical, his use of exploratory language foregrounds his desire to work through the 
issues at hand, and may display a less biased approach to sensemaking than his 
colleagues.  Justice Breyer lays out his main problem early in Mr. Gura’s argument.   
Justice Breyer:  You’re saying this is unreasonable and that really is my question 
because I’d like you to assume two things with me, which you probably don’t 
agree with, and I may not agree with them either.    Assume that there is an 
individual right, but the purpose of that right is to maintain a citizen army . . . so 
it informs what’s reasonable and what isn’t reasonable.  Assume this is favorable 
to you but not as favorable as you’d like. . . . Now focus on the handgun ban.  As 
I read these 80 briefs - - and they were very good, I mean really good and 
informative on both sides - - and I’m trying to boil down the statistics where 
there is disagreement. . . . I read the two military briefs as focusing on the nature 
of the right, which was quite a pretty good argument there that the nature of the 
right is to maintain a citizen army.  But how does that make it unreasonable for a 
city with a very high crime rate . . . to say no to handguns? . . . I want to hear 
what the reasoning is because there is a big crime problem.  I’m simply getting 
you to focus on that.307   
 
Justice Breyer’s hypothetical neatly frames his thinking about the case and suggests that 
he is fairly considering a multitude of variables in resolving the case.  He admits the 
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difficulty in resolving this case by referencing the numerous briefs and acknowledging 
that they were “really good and informative on both sides.”  His hypothetical serves as a 
test to evaluate a compromise between the issues as he asks Mr. Gura to “assume two 
things with me, which you probably don’t agree with, and I may not agree with them 
either.”  Justice Breyer’s invitation for Mr. Gura to enter into the hypothetical suggests 
that he is testing the issues without being fully committed, laying forth reasoning that is 
“favorable to” Mr. Gura, “but not as favorable as [he]’d like.”  Justice Breyer explains 
the competing nature of a citizen army and the need for a city to control crime, and asks 
Mr. Gura to respond to those issues in particular.  The significance of this exchange lies 
in the unique situation of a justice explaining the crucial issues that are controlling their 
perspective of the case.  Justice Breyer presents Mr. Gura with a view of his perspective 
of the case, and suggests that he is fairly open to considering the issues before him, if 
Mr. Gura can properly address the issues.  Justice Breyer’s hypothetical exhausts a 
substantial amount of argument time as he spends over three minutes explaining this 
single hypothetical.  Unfortunately after his extensive hypothetical that painstakingly 
presented a complex hypothetical, Justice Stevens disrupts Mr. Gura’s response after less 
than 30 seconds, most likely leaving Justice Breyer frustrated without an answer.     
 In another instance of Justice Breyer’s questioning he again demonstrates his 
thought process in openly considering the issues before him.  His discussion moves 
through the points mentioned by Mr. Gura and ties them to larger philosophical 
ponderings of hand gun regulation.   
Justice Breyer: Why... now, when say "keep" and "bear", I mean you are... I think 
you're on to something here. Because you say let's use our common sense and see 
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what would be the equivalent today. . . .Fine, just as you could keep pistols 
loaded but not... not loaded. You had to keep powder upstairs because of the risk 
of fire. So today, roughly, you can say no handguns in the city because of the risk 
of crime. Things change. But we give in both instances, then and now, leeway to 
the city and States to work out what's reasonable in light of their problems. 
Would that be a way of approaching it? 
 
Mr. Gura: [response excerpted] 
 
Justice Breyer: And I agree with you that this, the firearm analogy, floats up 
there, but it isn't going to decide this case . . . .What you've suddenly given me 
the idea of doing, which I'm testing, is to focus not just on what the kind of 
weapon is... don't just look to see whether it's a cannon or a machine gun, but 
look to see what the purpose of this regulation is, and does it make sense in terms 
of having the possibility of people trained in firearms? . . . We have regulation 
worried about crime, back to my first question.308 
 
Justice Breyer suggests that Mr. Gura’s prior argument is valid as he notes “I think 
you’re on to something.”  Justice Breyer’s statement conveys the helpful quality he finds 
in Mr. Gura’s comments, as he attempts to resolve the issues at hand.  Building upon the 
inspiration Mr. Gura generated, Justice Breyer proposes considering the purpose of prior 
gun regulation in Massachusetts in 1895, asking Mr. Gura “Would that be a way of 
approaching it?”  Justice Breyer’s question invites Mr. Gura to assist Justice Breyer in 
addressing the problem of gun regulation looking upon Mr. Gura as an equal and relying 
on him to propose a solution to the justice’s problem.  Justice Breyer continues the 
process of generating a solution as he mentions “you’ve suddenly given me the idea of 
doing, which I’m testing, is to focus not just on the kind of weapon . . . but look to see 
what the purpose of this regulation is . . . .”  Justice Breyer’s statement highlights his 
desire in “testing” the idea he advances to determine how Mr. Gura might respond to the 
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solution Justice Breyer has just uncovered.  He then connects his solution to the first 
question he originally asked Mr. Gura to address in the first hypothetical.   
Justice Breyer’s hypotheticals and open discussions with advocates often 
exhausts a substantial amount of argument time, and it may prove more difficult for 
Justice Breyer to be engaged in an advocate’s argument than to have Justice Scalia’s 
barbed questions, because advocates may skirt or easily bypass Justice Scalia’s questions 
but must patiently endure Justice Breyer’s hypotheticals as he weaves a complex 
scenario to which few advocate’s can succinctly and satisfactorily respond.  In this case, 
Justice Breyer’s statements eliminate over seven minutes of Mr. Gura’s argument time, 
and it is unclear whether Mr. Gura satisfied Justice Breyer with his responses.  While the 
quantitative data suggests that Justice Breyer may have been engaging in biased 
sensemaking behavior, a review of Justice Breyer’s rhetorical discursive interactions 
indicate that the justice may have been attempting to press respondent’s counsel to assist 
him in resolving a problem or difficulty he recognized in the case.  Each discussion 
displayed in the qualitative section displays a process of open consideration in which 
Justice Breyer appears willing to shift or alter his position if the advocate can resolve his 
issue with the case. 
 While Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Breyer look to the advocates for 
answers to their problems with the case, Justice Stevens behaves more aggressively in 
challenging respondent’s counsel.  Justice Stevens heavily challenges respondent’s 
counsel and it is difficult to discern whether his tone implies any disrespect to the 
advocate, but his rapid fire responses cause Justice Scalia to rescue the advocate. 
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Justice Stevens: How do you explain the fact that you include self-defense, but 
only two States, Pennsylvania and Vermont, did refer to self-defense as a 
permissible justification and all of the others referred to common defense or 
defense of the State, and in the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution 
itself there is no reference to self-defense? 
 
Mr. Gura: Your Honor, the State courts interpreting those provisions that you 
reference had a different interpretation. For example, in 1895 Massachusetts-- 
 
Justice Stevens: 1895. I'm talking about contemporaneous with the adoption of 
the Second Amendment. 
 
Mr. Gura: --Well, at the time we haven't seen State court decisions from exactly 
that era. 
 
Justice Stevens: Just the text of the State constitutional provisions, two of them 
refer to self-defense. The rest refer only to common defense; is that not correct? 
 
Mr. Gura: On their literal text, yes. But judges did not interpret them that way, 
for example in North Carolina-- 
 
Justice Stevens: I understand that judicial interpretation sometimes is controlling 
and sometimes is not. But the text itself does draw a distinction, just as the 
Second Amendment does. It doesn't mention self-defense. 
 
Mr. Gura: --While it might not mention self-defense, it was clear that the 
demands that the States made at the ratifying conventions were for an individual 
right, and Madison was interested in-- 
 
Justice Stevens: Well, if you look at the individual rights I suppose you start back 
in 1689, the Declaration of Rights in England. And the seventh provision that 
they talked about said that: "The subjects which are protestants may have arms 
for their defense suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law. " Now do you 
think the term "suitable to their conditions" limited the number of people who 
had access to arms for self-defense? 
 
Mr. Gura: --It was in England, but that was criticized by the framers. St. George 
Tucker's edition of Blackstone-- 
 
Justice Stevens: So you think that the Second Amendment is a departure from the 
provision in the Declaration of Rights in England? 
 
Mr. Gura: --It's quite clearly an expansion upon it. 
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Justice Stevens: So that's not really your... you would not confine the right the 
way the English did then. 
 
Mr. Gura: I think the common law of England is a guide, and it's always a useful 
guide because that's where the... where we... where we look to, to interpret-- 
 
Justice Scalia: It's useful for such purposes as what "keep and bear arms" means 
and things of that sort. 
 
Mr. Gura: --It certainly is, Your Honor. And it's also useful to see how-- 
 
Justice Scalia: They certainly didn't want to preserve the kind of militia that 
America had, which was a militia separate from the state, separate from the 
government, which enabled the revolt against the British. 
 
Mr. Gura: --That's correct, Your Honor.309  
 
Justice Stevens’ unusually intense inquiry questions Mr. Gura’s argument for individual 
gun rights.  This exchange is atypical for Justice Stevens and his vigorous counters 
appear to reflect biased sensemaking behavior.  Justice Stevens argues from a historical 
position entrenched in collective gun rights rather than individual, and he supports that 
position with state constitutional provisions that suggest a collective right to gun 
ownership.  The rapid fire nature of the justice’s questioning prevents Mr. Gura from 
fully answering the justice’s questions.  Justice Stevens’ argument prompts Justice 
Scalia to assist Mr. Gura in the articulation of a satisfactory response.  Justice Scalia 
provides Mr. Gura with an argument countering the collective rights perspective by 
noting that the English Declaration of Rights is “useful for such purposes as what ‘keep 
and bear arms’ means and things of that sort. . . . They certainly didn't want to preserve 
the kind of militia that America had, which was a militia separate from the state, separate 
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from the government, which enabled the revolt against the British.”  Justice Scalia’s 
assistance responds to Justice Stevens’ questioning with more directness and force than 
Mr. Gura could provide and plays a role in temporarily quelling Justice Stevens.   
However, towards the end of Mr. Gura’s argument time, Justice Stevens again 
presses him, but this time on the issue of Mr. Gura’s reading of the Second Amendment.  
Justice Stevens’ argument causes Mr. Gura to accept his position without considering the 
consequences and both Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts come to Mr. Gura’s 
rescue.   
Justice Stevens: May I ask this question?  Are you, in effect, reading the 
amendment to say that the right shall not be unreasonably infringed instead of 
shall not be infringed? 
 
Mr. Gura: --There is that inherent aspect to every right in the Constitution. 
 
Justice Stevens: So we can... consistent with your view, we can simply read this: 
‘It shall not be unreasonably infringed?’ 
 
Mr. Gura: Well, yes, Your Honor, to some extent, except the word 
"unreasonable" is the one that troubles us because we don't know what this 
unreasonable standard looks like. 
 
Justice Scalia: You wouldn't put it that way. You would just say it is not being 
infringed if reasonable limitations are placed upon it. 
 
Mr. Gura: That's another way to look at it, Your Honor. Certainly-- 
 
Chief Justice Roberts: --you would define "reasonable" in light of the restrictions 
that existed at the time the amendment was adopted. 
 
Mr. Gura: --Those restrictions-- 
 
Chief Justice Roberts: You know, you can't take it into the marketplace was one 
restriction. So that would be... we are talking about lineal descendents of the 
arms but presumably there are lineal descendents of the restrictions as well.310 
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Justice Stevens’ question is directed to exploring the reasonable restrictions that may be 
placed on the Second Amendment.  His interpretation of the amendment opens the door 
to potential restrictions unfavorable to the respondent and Justice Scalia and Chief 
Justice Roberts assist in narrowing the reasonable provisions that may be ascribed to the 
amendment.  Justice Scalia suggests that the reasonable limitations can be left out of the 
language because they are implicit in the reading of the amendment.  Chief Justice 
Roberts continues with Justice Scalia’s reasoning by noting that reasonable restrictions 
would relate to those restrictions in place at the time of the amendment’s creation.  Both 
justices’ provide a more succinct and historically contextualized response than what Mr. 
Gura could likely articulate and the two justices inform each other and support each 
other in confirming what limitations could be placed on individual rights, suggesting that 
they are likely committed to interpreting the amendment as support for individual rather 
than collective rights.     
As Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia assist respondent’s counsel, Justice 
Souter lends substantial assistance to petitioner’s counsel, and his assistance comes at 
strategic moments to assist Mr. Dellinger in responding to Justice Kennedy’s questions.  
It seems likely that Justice Souter recognizes that Justice Kennedy may be persuaded to 
vote with the petitioner if he articulates a persuasive response to Justice Kennedy’s 
questions. 
Justice Kennedy: But the Second... the Second Amendment doesn't repeal that. 
You don't take the position that Congress no longer has the power to organize, 
arm, and discipline the militia, do you? 
 
Mr. Dellinger: No. 
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Justice Kennedy: So it was supplementing it. And my question is, the question 
before us, is how and to what extent did it supplement it. And in my view it 
supplemented it by saying there's a general right to bear arms quite without 
reference to the militia either way. 
 
Mr. Dellinger: [response excerpted] 
 
Justice Souter: So what you are... what you are saying is that the individual has a 
right to challenge a Federal law which in effect would disarm the militia and 
make it impossible for the militia to perform those functions that militias 
function. 
Isn't that the nub of what you're saying? 
 
Mr. Dellinger: --Yes. That is correct. 
 
In this exchange, Mr. Dellinger provides Justice Kennedy with an unfocused rambling 
explanation (left out for brevity purposes), and Justice Souter has offered a concise and 
succinct explanation of the essence of Mr. Dellinger’s response.  The assistance comes at 
a significant point in the argument in which Mr. Dellinger’s response could satisfy 
Justice Kennedy’s interpretation in which the Second Amendment addresses “a general 
right to bear arms quite without reference to the militia either way.”  Justice Souter’s 
assistance implies a preference for petitioner’s argument, and his strategic suggestion 
appears designed to sway another justice’s vote, a vote that would likely give victory to 
Justice Souter’s preferred position. 
 In another example of strategic assistance, Justice Souter again coaches Mr. 
Dellinger in his response to one of Justice Kennedy’s questions. 
Justice Kennedy: Well, there's no question that the English struggled with how to 
work this. You couldn't conceal a gun and you also couldn't carry it, but yet you 
had a right to have it. Let me ask you this: Do you think the Second Amendment 
is more restrictive or more expansive of the right than the English Bill of Rights 
in 1689? 
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Mr. Dellinger: --I think it doesn't address the same subject matter as the English 
Bill of Rights. I think it's related to the use of weapons as part of the civic duty of 
participating in the common defense, and it's... and it's... it's-- 
 
Justice Kennedy: I think that would be more restrictive. 
 
Mr. Dellinger: --That... that could well... the answer then would be-- 
 
Justice Souter: Well isn't it... isn't it more restrictive in the sense that the English 
Bill of Rights was a guarantee against the crown, and it did not preclude 
Parliament from passing a statute that would regulate and perhaps limit-- 
 
Mr. Dellinger: --Well-- 
 
Justice Souter: --Here there is some guarantee against what Congress can do. 
 
Mr. Dellinger: --Parliament could regulate. And Blackstone appears to approve 
of precisely the kinds of regulations here. Now— 
 
In this example, Justice Souter actually uses Justice Kennedy’s verbiage to address the 
question Justice Kennedy asked to Mr. Dellinger, “do you think the second amendment 
is more restrictive or more expansive of the right than the English Bill of Rights in 
1689?”  Mr. Dellinger fails to articulate a coherent argument, even stammering “that 
could well . . . the answer then would be--."  His less than persuasive remarks are 
unlikely to satisfy Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter instead offers a more reasonable 
response echoing Justice Kennedy’s concern with the restrictive nature of the Second 
Amendment in relation to the English Bill of Rights, stating “isn't it more restrictive in 
the sense that the English Bill of Rights was a guarantee against the crown, and it did not 
preclude Parliament from passing a statute that would regulate and perhaps limit--."  
Justice Souter’s assistance attempts to balance Justice Kennedy’s concern with the 
regulation of individual rights by formulating for Mr. Dellinger a proper explanation.  
These are the only examples of Justice Souter’s assistance for Mr. Dellinger and it seems 
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very probable that his assistance came at a time when it could be most effective to 
altering the way another justice considers a case.  
 In summary of qualitative methods, Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Scalia, 
Breyer, Stevens, and Souter were all active participants who used oral argument as a 
time to assist, heavily challenge, and understand the intricacies of an advocate’s 
argument.  A view of Justice Breyer’s discussion with respondent’s counsel suggests that 
his imbalanced interaction was related to his desire to understand and form a 
compromise on the issue.  Justices Scalia and Souter both assisted their preferred 
advocate during difficult moments of questioning.  Two surprises occurred in qualitative 
analysis.  Justice Stevens exhibited unusual behavior by heavily questioning 
respondent’s counsel.  Chief Justice Roberts extended oral argument time in order to 
allow the justices to explore necessary questions they held.  His own questioning of the 
use and function of trigger locks emphasizes his own questions that may have gone 
unanswered had he not extended argument time.  Except for Justice Breyer, the justices 
identified for biased sensemaking behavior in the quantitative section continued to 
reflect biased sensemaking behavior in their assistance and challenging of counsels, 
although they generally treated both parties with respect in the manner in which they 
questioned and addressed them.  At no time did a justice question any advocate in a 
disrespectful or hostile tone. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter explored whether justices may behave differently in historically 
significant cases.  Sensemaking behavior was apparent in the justices’ rhetorical 
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discursive interactions, but the general interaction by the justices maintained a concern 
for ensuring their colleagues satisfy their questions.  Justice Kennedy even notes the 
importance of extending time, when after the Chief Justice announces an extension, 
Justice Kennedy responds “because I did interrupt Justice Breyer.”  Although I was not 
present for the case, an analysis of the oral arguments does seem to indicate the justices 
treated the case with greater care and attention than other cases, particularly because the 
Chief Justice extended oral argument time in the midst of the argument.  Of course we 
cannot be clear why he extended the case’s argument, but it does seem reasonable that 
he recognized a number of justices, including himself, still held questions that were not 
addressed in the scheduled time.  Even with the Chief Justice’s extension of oral 
argument, sensemaking may still have played a role in the justices’ consideration of the 
case.  Imbalanced questioning, stringent challenging of opposing arguments, and 
assisting preferred advocates still suggests a flawed approach to problem solving and a 
resulting poorly considered decision.  Oral arguments in D.C. v. Heller followed a more 
respectful pattern than arguments in Morse v. Frederick or Kennedy v. Louisiana.  In 
this historically significant case, the justices did show greater care in their rhetorical 
discursive interactions, but I would still hope to see a more open process that more fairly 
considers the issues, rather than observing justices assisting certain counsels while 
challenging others.  Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Scalia, Souter, Kennedy, Stevens, 
and Ginsburg all reflected preformed positions and did not appear open to changing their 
positions.  It is unfortunate in a significant case such as this one that the justices choose 
to simply reinforce their positions rather than openly listening to contrarian perspectives. 
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 Justices appeared to treat the advocates preferentially by those justices who 
supported their arguments and challenged equally by justices who disagreed with their 
position.  Although both advocates received a similar amount of time, Mr. Gura spoke 
significantly less, largely due to Justice Breyer’s heavy involvement.  Mr. Dellinger 
faced stringent questioning from the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, but 
these justices also enabled him to offer at length responses to their questions.  Given the 
amount of time Mr. Dellinger was able to present, he held a real rhetorical advantage in 
the argument, although his inarticulate responses may have negated any time advantage 
afforded to him.  Mr. Gura managed to offer succinct and concise responses to the 
justices which is always a strong technique within oral arguments.  Neither Mr. Gura nor 
Mr. Dellinger endured any heavy ridicule.  Chief Justice Roberts poked fun at Mr. 
Dellinger because of his explanation of the trigger lock, but it was good natured humor 
and posed no real threat to Mr. Dellinger.  In general the advocates were treated with 
equal amounts of respect by the justices.     
 The Chief Justice’s extension of time points to an underlying concern for the 
justices to reach a clear understanding of the case.  Given this concern, reducing or 
correcting sensemaking behavior could also be a priority for the Chief Justice and this 
suggestion is included in a larger collection of recommendations in the following 
chapter.  Thus far three cases have been analyzed and a reasonable case has been made 
for using the theory of sensemaking to evaluate and interpret Supreme Court oral 
arguments.  The following chapter provides recommendations for scholars to consider 
other areas or lingering questions surrounding sensemaking in oral argument.  The 
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chapter also provides lawyers and judges with practical suggestions for overcoming and 
addressing sensemaking behavior.  The final chapter addresses criticisms that have 
arisen over the course of this research.  Over the span of four years my findings have 
been presented at a variety of conferences and audiences have raised valid questions that 
I believe should be addressed.  Finally, the chapter will raise questions about the conduct 
of certain justices in the courtroom, and consider which justice may do the least amount 
of harm in oral arguments. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 “SCALIA’S BIASED, WHO KNEW?” 
 
“Their legitimacy is in the Constitution, but their power rests on public faith in their 
independence and impartiality.” 
This study has responded to a series of progressive questions to understand the 
role of oral arguments from a communication perspective.  Chapter II reviewed the 
perspectives of other fields and researchers in answering the question “Do oral 
arguments matter?”  Research from political science, psychology and the legal 
community was considered to understand how these fields viewed the importance of oral 
arguments.  Flaws were noted in how each of these fields approached their study of oral 
arguments, and communication was suggested as a field that could provide valuable 
insight into the study of oral arguments.  Because no substantive research has been 
conducted on oral arguments in the field of communication, a theoretical answer to this 
question was derived from a traditional understanding of humans’ use of 
communication.  From a communication vantage, oral arguments influence how justices 
consider and evaluate a case, simply put, because communication frames how humans 
understand and think about the world.  Chapter III expanded on the importance of oral 
arguments, by exploring “how,” or in what manner, do oral arguments “matter?”  
Among the more obvious reasons related to the importance of oral argument, 
Sensemaking, a prominent communication theory, was suggested as a model of further 
understanding the justices’ interactions.  Integrating Sensemaking as a model of decision 
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making suggests that communicative influence may arise from an actor’s 
communication within an environment, such as, when dealing with the Court, the 
advocates’ arguments, other justices’ arguments, or a justice’s own interaction in oral 
arguments.  From the theoretical articulation of Sensemaking, a characterization of 
judicial sensemaking behavior was articulated to determine whether justices may align 
with behavioral expectations.  Chapter IV proposed the method of examining cases and 
included an overview of the justices’ rhetorical discursive style, and then applied the 
specified methods and analysis to Morse v. Frederick to determine whether the justices 
aligned with the proposed pattern of judicial sensemaking.  Similar to chapters V, and 
VI, in which Kennedy v. Louisiana, and D.C. v. Heller were evaluated, various justices 
exhibited biased sensemaking behavior that may have compromised their own or their 
colleagues’ consideration of cases.  Some justices, such as Justices Scalia, Souter, 
Stevens, Kennedy, Breyer, and Chief Justice Roberts, often reflected rhetorical 
discursive interactions reflective of biased judicial sensemaking.  Chapter VI questioned 
whether justices may approach oral arguments with a more balanced and careful inquiry 
during historically significant cases.  In examining D.C. v. Heller, some justices 
continued to act as biased sensemakers through their rhetorical discursive interactions.  
However, there did seem to be a consideration among the justices, particularly by Chief 
Justice Roberts, that the justices should have their questioned answered by advocates, 
even if oral arguments exceeded the allotted time limit.  This final chapter presents an 
overview of the study’s findings to highlight the broad range of contributions, responds 
to potential criticism, provides recommendations to the Chief Justice, judges and 
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justices, lawyers, and scholars, and concludes by considering how the justices’ rhetorical 
discursive interaction impedes justice.   
Broad Ranging Contributions 
As chapter II noted, a dearth of research on Supreme Court oral arguments exists 
in the field of communication.  This research provides the first in depth analysis of oral 
arguments from a communication perspective.  Blending a unique collection of areas 
within the field of communication, (ethnography, rhetorical criticism, discourse analysis, 
and sensemaking) this study has offered a new form of analysis for understanding 
communicative interactions in oral arguments.  Although the study offers a more 
concentrated form of analysis, by focusing on single cases, than other research in 
political science, psychology or law, rhetoricians, discourse analysts, and other 
communication scholars will likely recognize areas where even more analysis could be 
applied to oral arguments.  My hope is that scholars will see the vast areas of 
improvement that can be applied to study of oral arguments.  The following section 
discusses the study’s contributions as well as potential areas for further research.  A 
section further into this chapter will offer more suggestions based upon fields.  
Beginning with chapter II’s driving research question “Do oral arguments 
matter?,” communication scholars would argue that all human communication “matters” 
because it shapes humans’ understanding and in turn their construction of the world.  
Thus oral arguments, as communication, do “matter.”  After establishing the theoretical 
importance of oral arguments, Karl Weick’s theory of Sensemaking was integrated to 
provide a model that emphasized the importance of communication within the decision 
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making process, and foregrounded the importance of oral argument as a part of the 
process in the justices’ decision making.   
Taking the stance that oral arguments do matter and offering a new model of 
decision making for considering oral arguments contributes uniquely to the traditional 
stance found within prior research on oral arguments.  In addition, the integration of 
Sensemaking as a model of decision making should help scholars uncover even more 
about Supreme Court oral arguments, because it is the first proposed model that 
considers the role of communication in the decision making process.  Ironically, past 
models largely viewed communication as reflective or indicative of an a priori mindset, 
rather than viewing language and communication as generative of humans’ cognitive 
positions.  The difference in these perspective results in viewing oral arguments as 
symptomatic of a cognitive adherence and viewing oral arguments as generating a 
cognitive adherence.  Even if a justice enters the courtroom with a perspective in mind, 
or a heavily committed position, communication still serves to confirm a hunch or 
further bolster an intractable position.  In addition, previous models did not provide any 
room for individualized behavior by the justices which caused scholars to group the 
justices as a whole based upon the resulting votes in a decision.  Sensemaking 
recognizes that communication occurs at both the individual and group level, and that 
group level communication can influence individuals and vice versa.  Sensemaking also 
makes room for individual decisions or behavior that departs from the group.  Thus, 
Sensemaking allows the justices’ rhetorical discursive interactions to be viewed in 
consequence to the individual as well as the group.       
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Scholars should consider other models of decision making to find other avenues 
of evaluating the Court’s oral arguments.  Communication scholars may find the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model a useful technique.  Psychologists should consider 
evaluating individual communication in oral arguments instead of testing group 
behavior.  A psychologist who has sat in the courtroom and viewed the various 
interactional behaviors of the justices could produce a valuable understanding of each 
justice’s approach to problem solving.  Political scientists could begin offering aggregate 
studies of individual justices, rather than attempting to define and generalize the Court’s 
behavior; there are always anomalies to any generalized position and learning about the 
justices who do not neatly fit the typical mold would be both interesting and helpful. 
Sensemaking is a potentially valuable model of decision making, but like other 
models and theories it represents a collection of behaviors and actions which are not 
consistent among theorists.  I chose to rely on Karl Weick’s understanding of 
sensemaking, but largely because using one theorist prevented a splintering of 
characteristics.  My attempt to articulate a judicial theory of sensemaking was both an 
attempt to apply Weick’s Sensemaking to the courtroom, as well as to limit the variety 
of behavior that could be considered in the study.  One problem in applying 
Sensemaking to the study of oral arguments lies in the inadequate snapshot of one 
moment in the decision making process.  Because Sensemaking views communication as 
an essential and formative component in the decision making process, scholars ought to 
follow and study, as closely as possible, a group’s communication.  However, because of 
the private closed door nature of the Supreme Court’s decisional process, it is 
 
268 
 
impossible, even for clerks, to view the complete communication process the justices use 
to reach a decision.  Justices make their final votes in a closed door conference that only 
the justices are allowed into, but even if an observer were allowed to study the justices’ 
interactions, one could not follow the discursive process connected to the writing and 
negotiating of written decisions as justices conferred with each other and with clerks.  
This is one reason why the findings in this study and the use of sensemaking can only be 
theoretical.  Another reason why findings regarding oral argument can only be 
theoretical is due to the impossibility of knowing a person’s internal thoughts and 
reasoning.  I do believe this study offers reasonable findings that may help further 
understand the justices’ communicative interactions in oral argument. 
Scholars may want to elaborate on other characteristics of sensemaking, such as 
the selection-enactment-retention model which describes the cyclical and self-
reinforcing process communication may take to reconfirm a person’s commitments.  
Linking a justice’s communication in oral argument to prior language in written 
decisions or even amicus curiae could point to the self-reinforcing nature that oral 
arguments can play.  Weick’s understanding of mindfulness and its benefits to problem 
solving can also be elaborated upon.  Finally, another characterization of sensemaking 
could offer new findings.  I hope that my description of judicial sensemaking provides 
scholars with a tightly focused description of judicial sensemaking that they can reliably 
integrate into future studies; however, I also realize that first generation behavioral 
models are often subject to multiple revisions as they are refined or improved.     
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As partially discussed, chapter III built upon the foundation of chapter II, by 
expounding judicial sensemaking behavior and offering characterizations of potentially 
discernable behavior.  Chapter III also articulated the use of communication theories 
(rhetoric and discourse studies) and communication methods (ethnography, rhetorical 
criticism, and discourse analysis) that could answer the study’s driving research 
questions.  In the way of contributions, scholars have never considered sensemaking 
from a judicial perspective and an articulation of judicial sensemaking extrapolated from 
Weick’s theory of Sensemaking, provides researchers with a new collection and model 
of behavior they can further consider.  Of course only scholars’ use of judicial 
sensemaking can determine whether it is capable of withstanding critical consideration.   
The triangulation of three methods is also a highly unusual move, but in this 
study I believe it yielded a comprehensive perspective that generated new insight into 
the study of oral arguments.  The complex and dynamic interplay of communication 
within oral arguments required evaluation across multiple levels of purposeful 
communication.  Oral arguments posses a quality where understanding and persuasion 
function simultaneously but can be interpreted differently for different actors, and an 
actor’s speech can serve not only to influence other persons’ minds, but can reinforce 
concepts for the speaker.  Thus a speaker can persuaded himself or herself through his or 
her own speech, but they are also capable of impacting other individuals in their 
interactions.  The term “rhetorical discursive interaction” derived from the persuasive 
and comprehending interaction found within oral argument interactions.  The term was 
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also designed to remind readers of the simultaneous action occurring within the Court’s 
communications.   
Chapter III concluded with a description of the analysis used in evaluating oral 
arguments.  Prior scholars have not discussed their first hand observations of the Court’s 
oral arguments, and their lack of experience calls into question their understanding.  
Each time I visited the Court I left with new insight that added further depth to my 
understanding.  Out of all of the methods employed for studying oral arguments, first 
hand observations were by far the most valuable.  Unfortunately, these vast observations 
do not fit neatly within a table or in the analysis of the justices’ arguments in oral 
arguments, but rather they inform nearly every piece of analysis in this study.   
I received a comment from a journal reviewer responding to my mention of the 
number of oral arguments I had observed.  The reviewer suggested that mentioning the 
number of oral arguments was “self-serving.”  At first I was taken aback by the 
comment, but it was a self-serving comment, because I am offering to readers proof of 
my credibility, so they will understand that my observations and analysis do not derive 
strictly from others’ observations found in texts.  Part of my credibility as a researcher 
resides both in the depth of my understanding and experience with oral arguments, and 
in the rigorous and comprehensive application of my methods.  Field study is still a 
respected form of information gathering, and Clifford Geertz wrote that the struggle in 
providing “thick description” lay in providing “thin analysis.”  Hopefully, my integration 
of ethnography with rhetoric and discourse analysis offered thick description coupled 
with equally thick analysis.  
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Derived from discourse studies’ intimate involvement in examining dialogues 
and conversations, listening to oral arguments is also a new technique brought to the 
study of oral arguments.  Because previous scholars have been focused upon 
longitudinal studies, they could not physically listen to every oral argument in a timely 
manner.  However, listening to oral arguments was crucial to understanding the justices’ 
rhetorical discursive interactions, because the meaning of an utterance changed with the 
tone of the justice, which could not be captured in the transcripts.  Anger, hostility, or 
good humored statements became apparent where, on transcripts, the statements lacked 
sufficient meaning.  Listening to oral arguments should be required for researchers to 
offer an accurate estimate of the justices’ interactions, because so much depends upon 
researchers grasping the justices’ or advocates’ meaning through intonations.   
Chapter’s III’s methods and theories represent a small spectrum of potentially 
useful methods within Communication.  Other methods could clearly yield different 
results and I would be interested in what other methods scholars could apply to oral 
arguments.  Oral arguments have never been more accessible to communication 
researchers.  Oyez.org offers both transcripts and audio files, and the Court supplies 
electronic transcripts of their arguments soon after the case has been submitted.  
Communication and scholars from other fields can make valuable use of these materials 
for their analysis.  
Chapter IV applied the theories and methods discussed in the prior chapters to 
oral arguments by laying forth a comprehensive list describing the purpose and 
importance of oral arguments to various sections of the country, including the Court 
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itself.  Oddly, no real descriptive list has been offered by other scholars, perhaps they 
considered the task obvious or mundane, but the more than twenty purposes attributed to 
oral argument describes the richly meaningful and complex nature of the Court’s 
interactions.  The numerous purposes of oral argument also conveys that it cannot be 
reduced to language designed solely to change votes, as some scholars have suggested.  
The positions and issues found within oral arguments revolve around philosophical, 
personal, legal, and mundane issues relating to human nature.  To suggest that they 
simply do not change voting patterns, is to claim knowing a justice’s voting position, but 
also to claim that communication is irrelevant and without purpose.  I would like 
scholars to consider other purposes of oral argument or further explore the frequency of 
occurrences of some of the purposeful behavior I described.  For example, what are the 
intricacies and characteristics of oral argument as a ritual and how does this contribute to 
the Court?   
Chapter IV also offered individual descriptions of the justices’ rhetorical 
discursive behavior within oral arguments.  This description, that may have been deemed 
superfluous to some, was also an attempt to provide scholars with a characterization of 
the justices’ communication and behavior, and may be another example of the thick 
description I wanted to provide to readers.  The chapter concluded in an analysis of 
Morse v. Frederick which compared the strategic actor model with the judicial 
sensemaking model to determine the prominence of sensemaking behavior in oral 
arguments.  In the case’s oral arguments, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, 
Breyer, Souter, Kennedy and Stevens behaved as biased sensemakers in their rhetorical 
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discursive interactions by demonstrating a significant preference for one counsel over 
another in their challenging of counsels, allowing counsels an equal opportunity to 
respond, frequency at which they interrupt counsels, assistance of counsel’s arguments, 
and general treatment of counsels.  Chapter IV’s analysis of Morse v. Frederick offered 
real validity to considering the valuable potential of using Sensemaking to interpret and 
understand the significance of the justices’ communicative interactions in oral argument.  
The chapter also revealed how justices may act differently from one another so that a 
single model of decision making fails to encapsulate every justice.  Justices Ginsburg, 
Alito, and Thomas engaged in more balanced behavior that may have been more 
indicative of the strategic actor model, or mindful sensemaking rather than the biased 
sensemaking of their colleagues.  Chapter IValso provided an extreme example of biased 
sensemaking behavior that was not found in the other cases.  It is unclear the frequency 
at which justices become so aggressive with advocates and so biased with their 
arguments, but additional research could focus on the prominence of biased sensemaking 
behavior in cases with similar levels of contentiousness as Morse v. Frederick.  The case 
was chosen to give readers a clear picture and understanding of the imbalanced behavior 
justices may employ.      
Chapter V extended the successful use of theory and methods in Chapter IV and 
applied them to Kennedy v. Louisiana, an oral argument witnessed firsthand, to 
potentially identify further sensemaking behavior in the justices’ rhetorical discursive 
interactions.  Justices Scalia and Breyer, and Chief Justice Roberts reflected behavior 
closely aligned with biased judicial sensemaking.  Witnessing this case’s oral arguments 
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augmented the chapter’s findings by capturing how active justices impede less active 
justices from engaging in oral arguments.  Justices Scalia and Souter prevented Justice 
Stevens from asking a question, and the Chief Justice ended oral argument time as 
Justice Souter leaned forward to ask a question.  The interesting and significant findings 
from this chapter emphasized how the justices’ unintentional behavior could influence 
other justices’ understanding of the case.  Chapter V also foregrounded the importance 
of qualitative methods in the study of oral arguments, because quantitative methods did 
not accurately capture the justices’ arguments.  Overall, Chapter V bolstered the findings 
of biased judicial sensemaking within the study, and added further validity to observing 
the oral arguments first hand.  Other communication scholars should consider attending 
oral argument to determine what other interactional elements they observe in the 
courtroom.  Group communication experts could offer fascinating insight from the 
interactions they observe between justices and advocates.   
Chapter VI questioned whether justices may approach historically significant 
cases with more careful and balanced consideration than minor cases.  Oral arguments 
from District of Columbia v. Heller were considered because of the similarity in the 
justices, and the case offered the first review of the Second Amendment by the Court in 
over seventy years.  In oral arguments for District of Columbia v. Heller, the majority of 
justices displayed vigorously biased rhetorical discursive interactions, and their 
behaviors suggest that justices may offer less consideration and diminished impartiality 
in their judgment of historically significant cases, a highly important finding.  On the 
other hand, the Chief Justice extended argument time because of the vigorous oral 
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arguments, and it may have been due to the large number of questions justices wanted 
answered by advocates.  The Chief Justice’s extension of time may indicate a concern 
for the justices’ to obtain comprehensive understanding in significant cases.  However, 
the majority of justices still behaved as biased sensemakers, disappointingly implying 
that the justices may not be open to fairly considering historically significant cases.  It 
would be interesting for scholars to extend their analysis to other major cases, such as 
Bush v. Gore, Roe v. Wade, or Brown v. Board to determine how the justices have acted 
in other major cases in the past and thus how their interactions may have dramatically 
shaped the landscape of the United States.   
The following chapters have presented a variety of smaller arguments connected 
to the larger argument that the justices’ rhetorical discursive interaction in oral 
arguments has the ability to influence a justice’s decision making ability.  Sensemaking 
was offered as a potential model of decision making that emphasizes the cognitive 
influence of communication in human decisions.  By integrating a new approach to 
evaluating oral arguments, a specific analysis of three cases attempted to foreground 
sensemaking behavior in the justices’ rhetorical discursive interactions.  The previous 
research should have revealed the importance of the justices’ interactions in oral 
argument.  Thus far, there have been a significant number of contributions to scholarship 
on the Court’s oral arguments, primarily because communication scholars have largely 
ignored the topic.  This study’s research has only scratched the surface of the 
significance of oral arguments.  I hope that other communication scholars will begin to 
recognize the vast possibilities for research and academic contributions that can be found 
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in oral arguments.  More will be said later about how various fields could further 
contribute to the study of Supreme Court oral argument.  Of course while this study’s 
contributions may be wide ranging, weaknesses exist, and it seems important to address 
criticisms that have been repeated from time to time during the course of this research.   
Responding to Criticism 
This section will address potential criticisms surrounding the research conducted 
in this study.  This study has been a work in process for nearly four years.  In those 
years, research, analysis, and findings have been presented in classrooms, at 
conferences, and in journals.  The fairly broad number of scholars who have read and 
reviewed my work will occasionally ask repeatedly similar questions.  Readers and 
critics ought to question and challenge an author’s message and well trained scholars 
have been ingrained with the requisite critical eye.  So I have not taken affront to various 
criticisms levied against my research, but I do believe clarifying some of these questions 
and issues may resolve similar questions that readers hold.   
“What if the justices’ behavior is not sensemaking, then is your work without 
value?” 
Some scholars have rightly challenged whether or not sensemaking behavior is 
occurring, or whether or not Sensemaking is a viable model for considering oral 
arguments.  Just as what I advance in this study is a theoretical argument, if one were to 
dismiss the theory as unproven, then does the argument or research offer any additional 
insight?  Sensemaking is not wholly necessary to offer scholarly contributions to the 
study of oral arguments.  At the very least, this study has offered thorough research and 
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examples that demonstrated how certain justices’ interactions within oral argument have 
hampered advocates’ ability to advance their argument, or how justices have challenged 
the counsel they vote against or assisted the counsel with whom they will vote.  The 
justices’ rhetorical discursive interactions in oral arguments reveal their lack of 
commitment to the judiciary’s impartial nature.   
Ironically, at the highest level of the judiciary the justices do not reflect a 
balanced or equal consideration of cases, and this finding becomes even more distressing 
when considering that in historically significant cases, the justices continue their biased 
rhetorical discursive interactions, suggesting their decisions result from a flawed or 
partial decision making process.  Although I did not include my analysis of Bush v. Gore 
because of differences in the sitting justices (the 2007 term contained two new justices), 
the justices’ rhetorical discursive interaction reflected a heavy interactional bias from a 
majority of the justices, thereby influencing their consideration of the case.  In one of the 
most significant cases in Supreme Court history, there ought to be, at the very least, a 
balanced consideration of the issues, rather than biased interaction.  D.C. v. Heller, while 
not as historically significant as Bush v. Gore, contained biased rhetorical discursive 
interaction that may have impacted justices’ evaluation of the case. Perhaps out of all the 
findings in this research, the most troubling may be that the justices do not act with 
anymore careful consideration in historically and socially significant cases, than in more 
minor cases.  An understanding of the justices’ behavior within oral arguments, does not 
fully rely on Sensemaking.  Certainly the consequences of the justices’ ability to 
cognitively evaluate the case in an impartial manner has greater significance when 
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viewed through the theoretical lens of Sensemaking, but without Sensemaking the 
justices’ rhetorical discursive interactions still remain troubling.   
“Scalia’s Biased, who knew?” 
In connection with the consideration of historically important cases, another 
problematic finding is the pervasive occurrence of biased rhetorical discursive 
interaction by the majority of justices.  As one reviewer noted, “Scalia’s biased, who 
knew?”  The sarcastic comment, while reflective of a common belief in legal studies, 
struck me as ironic on a few levels.  First, that we, as scholars, largely believe Justice 
Scalia acts in both a judicially and communicatively biased manner and yet we tolerate 
his biased behavior with little criticism.  Second, the reviewer missed the larger point 
that while it may not be surprising that Justice Scalia behaves in a biased manner, it is 
surprising to discover that Justices Souter, Breyer, Kennedy, Stevens and Chief Justice 
Roberts displayed biased communicative interaction in the majority of the cases in this 
study.  Scholars do not generally consider these justices to be biased in their judicial 
decisions or rhetorical discursive interactions.  The fact that other justices appeared 
nearly as biased as Justice Scalia should be somewhat surprising to Supreme Court 
scholars, and may raise larger questions about the Court’s decision making process.  
Individual determinations also contribute information that aggregate studies fail to 
provide, so where larger studies place the Court within the strategic actor model or 
attitudinal model, this study’s approach is able to look within cases to understand how 
justice’s behavior may change on a case by case basis. 
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“It’s just how the justices do things, it doesn’t mean there is a bias.” 
Some have argued that the justices cannot escape or choose not to change their 
biased communicative behavior, yet the justices are certainly capable of acting 
differently, and do in fact act differently in minor cases, or in cases where there tends to 
be a unanimous vote.  In my observation of oral arguments, cases drew various levels of 
interaction that ranged from high levels, similar to those in the cases considered in this 
study, to lower levels in which advocates ended argument early because of a satisfactory 
presentation of their arguments, and minimal questioning from the justices.  I chose to 
analyze divisive cases in this study, which tend to offer higher levels of interaction, 
because more is at stake in these cases.  In divisive cases the rhetorical discursive 
interaction of justices becomes even more important because the case’s resolution may 
depend upon the vote of a couple or even a single justice.  Thus justices’ decision 
making process is of great significance, and studying the communicative interaction of 
justices becomes all the more important to understand the quality of consideration they 
give to the issues.  Given the importance of consideration within divisive cases, 
advocates should have the opportunity to present their arguments fully, for justices to 
have their questions resolved, and for justices to individually consider the issues before 
them, rather than having more active justices control the arguments presented, or 
potentially have active justices’ understanding of the case cognitively compromised by 
their own biased interaction in a case.   
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“You are ignoring the nature of Argumentation.” 
Other critics have suggested I am not embracing the nature of “argumentation,” 
specifying that neither arguments nor speakers are equal in quality, ability or style, and 
this point is both valid and true to an extent.  Superior advocates often deliver concise 
and poignant arguments, while novices may fail to provide clear responses to the 
justices’ questions, which in turn may bring a greater number of questions.  But the 
cognitive effect of arguing must also be considered to understand how the justices’ 
rhetorical discursive interaction in oral arguments can influence their decision making 
process.  And the justices should be striving for a balanced process, instead of the 
imbalanced interactions taking place in these case studies.  The justices ought to offer 
advocates a relatively equal opportunity to address their case’s primary arguments, and 
respond to the justices’ questions.  Justices should also allow their colleagues to resolve 
particular questions and issues they find pertinent to the case at hand. 
Related to this issue, some have also noted that I tend to frame the Court through 
argument based upon competition rather understanding, or what is also known as 
dialectical argumentation.  Approaching oral argument from the dialectical, rather than 
rhetorical or competitive perspective could alter our understanding of justices’ 
interactions in this study, so that justices who heavily challenge one party are actually 
attempting to understand that party’s position, rather than dismiss or overturn the 
arguments.  Joining rhetoric, which emphasizes persuasion, and discourse, which 
emphasizes understanding, in a study that foregrounded the term rhetorical discursive 
interaction within oral argument, was an attempt to draw upon both the persuasive and 
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understanding nature that can be concomitantly involved in oral arguments.  However, 
the end result of cases reviewed by the Supreme Court is typically an identification of a 
victor or winner in the case.  How the Court chooses to resolve the case may limit a 
party’s win, but competition surrounds the nature of legal disputes.  Time limits are 
imposed to maintain a fair sense of competition between parties and an equal 
consideration by the justices.  It is true that the justices are individuals who may or may 
not approach cases through simply competitive or understanding approaches to oral 
argument, and the justices may even shift their approaches depending upon their grasp of 
the case.  Justice Breyer clearly approaches oral argument with a very different style and 
purpose than Justice Scalia, but the interaction of both justices still influences how the 
rest of the Court and how they themselves understand and evaluate a case.  Whether the 
Court as a whole, or an individual justice engages in biased rhetorical discursive 
interaction for purposes of competition or understanding, the communicative interaction 
influences understanding for both the individual and the Court.  So, the issue becomes 
less about the purpose of argumentation (persuasion vs understanding) and more about 
the quality of argument and consideration given to a case.  Care should be taken to 
ensure that an equal level of understanding and persuasion is given to advocates in order 
for justices to achieve a balanced consideration of the case.    
As with any study, criticism may attack a wide range of methods, analysis, and 
conclusions, but the larger issue this study has revealed, which I believe most critics 
would argue with, is that oral argument is not what it ought to be.  This study offers 
compelling evidence that oral arguments can be potentially harmful to a justice’s 
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decision making ability, and in turn the communicative interactions in oral arguments 
can be improved to enhance the justices’ decision making ability and the advocates’ 
opportunity to state their case.  The justices’ current behavior within oral argument does 
not offer an impartial consideration of issues, nor does it offer a fair, balanced, or equal 
evaluation of both parties in a case.  Scholars who question whether oral arguments 
matter to the justices are in some ways asking the wrong question.  The question we 
should be asking is “What should oral arguments be?”  Because, as the large majority of 
scholars have implicitly noted with this question, oral argument in its current form is a 
highly biased process where justices do not appear to be fairly considering the issues 
before them.  The following section provides recommendations for the improvement of 
oral arguments, suggestions for lawyers in addressing sensemaking justices, and 
recommendations for scholars in the study of oral arguments. 
Recommendations  
To the Chief Justice: 
Mr. Chief Justice, I began this study by noting the irony of a book length study 
largely dedicated to a single individual, yourself.  As you are well aware, oral arguments 
are a step in the problem solving process for the Court.  Generally, oral arguments do not 
determine the outcome of a case, but based upon the justices’ comments in early sections 
of the study, oral arguments do frame a justice’s consideration by either confirming or 
overturning a justice’s tentative voting position.  I realize that my integration of 
Sensemaking may not persuade you that your own and the other justices’ interactions 
may cognitively influence how you evaluate a case, because few people are willing to 
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admit flaws in their approach to problem solving or admit flaws in an institution for 
which they hold a significant amount of pride.  It is only human to reject criticism levied 
at you and at the Court. 
However, I do believe that you feel oral arguments are important for the country, the 
advocates, and the justices, and I also believe that you feel the Court should provide the 
highest level of decision making the justices have to offer.  Because of these reasons, I 
also believe that you have a vested interest in ensuring every step of the decision making 
process reflects careful consideration of a case’s issues.  You have made changes to the 
interactions involved in oral argument since taking over for Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
I believe these changes are due to your experience as an advocate as well as your 
understanding that the justices’ interactions were preventing the proper course of Justice.  
The findings in this study do not directly pose a threat to the Court, unless Congress 
were to adopt them, but they do suggest that improvements can still be made to the 
process of oral arguments, thereby ensuring that the most public process of the Court’s 
oral arguments reflects a measured and careful consideration of the issues.  My 
suggestions are minor and I believe you can integrate them with little difficulty if you so 
choose.  All the changes simply require an awareness to the overall interactions of the 
justices and a concern for advocates’ ability to clearly explain their arguments without 
the justices breaking their arguments into a fragmented collage.    
 Extend Argument Time-As previously shown, Justices Breyer and Kennedy have 
both called for an extension of oral argument time, and you extended argument 
time for advocates in D.C. v. Heller.  Your extension of time, and the justices’ 
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call for an extension, relates to the understanding justices are able to obtain in a 
case.  If you and your fellow justices are calling for an extension in time, then 
why not extend argument time during the argument?  I realize for logistical 
purposes extending oral argument disrupts the Court’s schedule, but during 
important cases it seems a minor change that could enable justices to have a 
better grasp of the issues and to have their questions resolved by advocates.  The 
time limit for oral arguments should not be enforced simply for the sake of a rule, 
or for the greater importance of procedural efficiency, but the rule should rather 
be used as a guideline where flexibility may be applied when necessary.  I also 
realize that advocates can tend toward rambling presentations and thirty minutes 
curtails disorganized arguments, and encourages concise succinct presentations, 
but the justices’ heavy rhetorical discursive interactions can fracture and splinter 
even the best advocate’s presentations.  Consider the Solicitor General’s 
argument in D.C. v. Heller in which he was unable to articulate the standard that 
should be applied to interpreting gun laws before his white light lit up.  Only 
through Justice Souter’s urging was he able to address the issue of the law’s 
standard.  Extending oral argument time in medias res would allow you to gauge 
the justices’ interactions and determine whether extending time would be 
necessary; this change would also force advocates to be prepared for a thirty 
minute argument, and enable you to enforce this limit if a comprehensive case 
was being presented. 
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 Be Wary of Interactional Imbalances-As this study has noted, rhetorical 
discursive imbalances are a problem for the Court because they interfere with the 
justices’ consideration of the case.  This issue will be a more private matter you 
may take up with the justices, but you ought to consider urging the justices to 
take a more balanced and less partial approach to oral arguments.  I understand in 
your early tenure that your suggestions will be unlikely to change the approach of 
more experienced justices, but as newer justices replace the retiring senior 
justices, your ability to shape their interactions will grow.  This will be a slow 
change and may not be possible with more recalcitrant justices, but I would urge 
you to consider addressing the justices on this issue.  
 Invitation to Listen-This may also be another private discussion, but can be 
reflected through your own level of interaction.  Your level of interaction in oral 
argument is quite high, challenging even Justice Scalia, but it may be wise to 
suggest behavior more in line with Justice Thomas.  For all the criticism directed 
towards him, Justice Thomas reflects active listening behavior and his behavior 
does not disrupt advocates’ arguments.  I am not suggesting that you or the other 
justices remain quiet, but rather that you consider the value of listening to the 
case instead of persistently arguing points with the advocate.  Scholars may have 
suggested that oral arguments do not “matter” because of the lack of listening 
behavior involved in oral arguments, certainly some lawyers believe that the 
justices are present only to argue against their opposition.   
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 Control Overactive Justices-This issue may also be one that changes as the senior 
justices step down, but I have observed you control the justices’ questioning in 
some instances and this control suggests that you have a concern for the quality 
of discussions taking place in oral arguments, as well as a need to allow 
advocates to address justices’ questions before other justices’ disrupt and 
fragment that advocate’s response.  Simply stepping in to allow advocates to 
respond or asking that justices wait until advocates have finished responding 
would enable a less fractured process and ensure a more comprehensive 
understanding of advocates’ positions by the justices. 
 Control the Vigorous Advancement of Positions-Coupled with the last 
suggestion, I do believe justices should be able to articulate and advance 
positions they find appealing, in order to inform their colleagues about what 
arguments are appealing to them, but a justice’s vigorous or unnecessarily 
frequent argument with an advocate regarding a position wastes the Court’s and 
the advocate’s time.  Advocates are charged with zealously defending their 
clients’ case and will not be persuaded to reject their position by a justice’s 
arguments.  If a justice is attempting to expose the weakness of an advocate’s 
argument, then let them address the point in conference.  In oral argument, 
weaknesses in an advocate’s argument will be side stepped and talked around, 
rather than directly admitted by the advocate.  I have witnessed justices pursue 
advocates from every angle of an argument, pinning them in a clearly 
unfavorable position and the advocate will continue to reject the justice’s 
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argument.  Conference presents a much better opportunity for justices to discuss 
the strength and weaknesses in a case and it is closer to the resolution of the case 
where discussions can have a potentially greater impact. 
 Revised Structure-The beauty of oral argument stands in its ability to adapt to 
each argument and to the justices’ attention.  Already Mr. Chief Justice you have 
offered a more welcoming environment in oral arguments by preventing the rapid 
fire interactions of the Rehnquist court.  It is true that bad habits are difficult to 
break, and many of the current sitting justices developed bad habits of 
argumentation while under Chief Justice Rehnquist.  However, you have an 
opportunity, as new justices replace the retiring senior justices, to change how 
justices and advocates approach oral argument.  Including the prior suggestions 
will help to change the culture of oral arguments, but more can be done to offer 
an improved process of consideration.  Allowing advocates the first five minutes 
to state their argument and more fully explain their position, presenting the 
justices with a more comprehensive understanding of the landscape from which 
the advocate is arguing.  Five minutes without interruption is an eternity before 
the Court, but it is also short enough to force advocates to make a concise 
argument that articulates the essential points of their argument.  These five 
minutes would allow advocates an opportunity to explain the necessary elements 
of their case without having the justices constantly pushing back and preventing 
a full articulation of their case.  Normally the advocates have about a minute to a 
minute and a half to state their case before the justices begin their interruptions.  
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A few moments longer should enable a fuller picture of the arguments, and may 
minimize questioning as the advocate may address potential concerns or 
questions the justices hold.  In addition to allowing an extended presentation 
period for advocates, you may consider your role to function more as a mediator 
or facilitator between advocates and justices, rather than only as a fellow 
participant.  By a facilitator I do not mean to suggest that you need to limit your 
participation, but rather that you should pay special attention to the flow of 
communication between justices and advocates and remain mindful of the state 
of the argument as justices attempt to have their questions resolved. 
Mr. Chief Justice these changes are fairly minor in relation to the significant benefits 
they could offer justices and advocates.  If the goal of oral argument is to provide parties 
with an opportunity to make their case and explain issues to the justices, and the justices 
seek clarification and explanation of issues in oral argument, then the following 
suggestions can only improve the environment of oral arguments.  Even if you disagree 
with my entire findings in this study, I hope you will recognize the benefits of some of 
these changes and consider working them into oral arguments. 
To Advocates: 
Although this study embraces a rhetorical and discursive perspective, I will not 
be offering rhetorical suggestions for advocates in this section.  Already a handful of 
books provide rhetorical suggestions for advocates, but none consider how to address a 
biased sensemaking justice.  In regards to the findings in this study, advocates should 
realize that the justices are flexible in their approach to oral arguments, offering biased 
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sensemaking behavior in one argument, and then behaving as measured inquisitors in the 
next.  So the advice offered here must be integrated as advocates begin recognizing in 
medias res how justices are approaching a case.  Returning to the metaphor of a family 
dinner, consider that you are visiting your partner’s family for the first time during a 
family dinner.  When first opening a discussion you may have some idea of what the 
various family members may say, but you may not be completely familiar with who is 
trying to support your position, who is trying to overturn it, and who is trying to 
understand what you are saying.  It is important that you do not judge a justice too 
quickly for fear of overlooking assistance or making an early enemy.   
Sensemaking can prove valuable to you in the quick recognition of a justice who 
is challenging you consistently but with whom you stand little chance in altering their 
position or convincing them of the validity of your argument.  Sensemaking informs 
advocates that those justices with whom they experience significant resistance are not 
likely to change their minds, and thus time spent attempting to persuade those justices is 
probably a futile effort.  Arguments from antagonistic justices should be bypassed by 
trying to curry favor with those justices who may support your position.  For example, it 
is not uncommon for a justice to continually try to engage an advocate if they are heavily 
opposed to the position, but advocates should look to relate that justice’s point back to 
an earlier friendly point made by another justice, and then physically turn towards the 
justice to whom you are referring.  Physically altering your body and linking your 
communication to a more favorable position transitions away from the biased 
sensemaking justice and indicates to the other justices that they may engage in further 
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questioning.  Connecting to a more favorable justice may also help you further entrench 
an already favorable position. 
One of the most difficult scenarios advocates face is an unfavorable or even ad 
absurdum hypothetical posited by a biased sensemaking justice.  Advocates may again 
try to bypass this situation by referencing a point made by a supporting justice, allowing 
the advocate to redirect focus away from the antagonizing justice, and gain standing with 
the supporting justice.  If the advocate can bypass the argument or hypothetical and 
speak on a separate point for about ten seconds, then it is likely that another justice will 
jump in and redirect the questioning before the address can even properly address a 
point.  If a justice insists on an advocate confronting an argument or hypothetical, then 
the advocate should do his or her best in addressing that issue.  However, stalling or 
drawing out a lengthy response may cause an impatient justice to ask a separate 
question, redirecting the advocate away from the challenging hypothetical or argument, 
proving a valuable tactic. 
In active oral arguments, managing justices and their questioning onslaught will 
prove more helpful than trying to persuade the justices of a particular position.  On the 
other hand, if a justice appears to require specific information it is important to frame 
that information in a persuasive manner, demonstrating how that information supports 
the advocate’s position.  If the advocate has been unable to articulate certain crucial 
arguments, then it is helpful to tie that argument within a specific justice’s response.  
Justices appear reticent to interrupt another justice’s line of questioning, and connecting 
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an argument to a particular justice may both curry favor with that justice and buy the 
advocate precious seconds to articulate a point.   
Justices’ frenetic questioning may also be kept at bay if an advocate uses a 
mapping statement to state the number of points they want to make.  Often justices will 
allow advocates to briefly state their points, and allow them to finish their progression as 
long as it is not too lengthy; in the Morse case, justices kept most responses by both 
counsels to within the ten second range.  Lengthy uninterrupted statements are rare 
within oral argument, but if allowed time to articulate lengthy positions, then it could be 
a favorable sign for a counsel’s position.  Conversely, given the unusual instance of 
lengthy responses, it is important for advocates to reduce their arguments to terse 
statements they can present when appropriate.  Justices often indulge an advocate who 
asks for a certain number of seconds to articulate their argument or response, and this 
too can be a valuable tactic to gain crucial time for a response.    
Advocates should also consider the difference between the justices’ and 
advocates’ use language.  When examining transcripts, justices often use language at the 
colloquial level, relying on legal language only when necessary.  Advocates, on the other 
hand, cannot seem to depart from legal technical language, and may often get frustrated 
with a justice for not understanding the technical terms they are using.  Confusion by 
both advocate and justice can result from technical language.  Advocates should look to 
reduce their use of “legalese” and use technical language only when necessary or when 
referenced by justices.  The manner in which justices understand and apply technical 
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terms is crucial for them to understand a case, and obfuscating language can force 
justices to rely on their sensemaking or prefigured understanding of a case.     
Importantly, advocates traditionally have considered the most important justice 
to be the “swing” justice, that justice whose ideology falls within a moderate position in 
the case and is not decidedly against, or in support of a position.  Theoretically, an 
advocate’s argument could then swing or influence a swing justice to vote in his or her 
favor.  However, given the findings in this study, the justice controlling the rhetorical 
discursive interaction could be the most powerful and influential justice in the case, 
because he or she controls how information and arguments develop.  In these cases, 
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Scalia consistently were the most active justices in the 
oral arguments considered; managing these justices’ interactions may be more important 
than persuading the swing justice, because these justices controlled the arguments that 
were presented and articulated for the swing justice.  Redirecting an active justice’s 
comments may be the only technique to handle this difficult situation so that the 
advocate is able to bypass active justices and redirect their questions to influence the 
swing justice.     
Finally, advocates need to be bold but respectful.  The justices are often relying 
on advocates to help them resolve the issue at hand, and advocates should be prepared to 
explore and assist the Court.  Advocates should not hide behind “that is not this case,” 
but look to address the hypothetical or argument the justice is exploring.  Experienced 
advocates have developed a variety of personal techniques ranging from using one’s 
hands to negotiate the discussion and prevent other justices from interrupting them 
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during a line of questioning, to refusing to make eye contact with an antagonistic justice.  
Bold and forceful statements should not be avoided as long as advocates are maintaining 
a respectful tone; too often I have observed advocates turn justices into enemies by 
rudely addressing their questions.    
Judges and Justices: 
Although making suggestions for judges may be both fruitless and dangerously 
presumptuous, it can be no more presumptuous than addressing the Chief Justice, and it 
seems necessary that judges recognize that their own preconceptions and rhetorical 
discursive interactions can color their understanding of a case.  This study’s analysis 
makes apparent language’s constitutive nature, and correspondingly, it benefits everyone 
to be aware of its far-reaching consequences in all social spheres, particularly those that 
have a direct impact on peoples’ most basic right, the right to personal freedom and a 
fair trial.  Language’s constitutive nature has long been recognized by philosophers and 
scholars as a means of constructing the social world around us and how we understand 
the world.311  Karl Weick notes that the importance of sensemaking lies in its 
constitutive nature which “address[es] how the text is constructed as well as how it is 
read.”312  In oral argument, justices create the text through their rhetorical discourse and 
                                                 
311 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books 1971); William Labov, Language in the 
Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular (U of Pennsylvania Press 1972); Dell Hymes, “In vain 
I tried to tell you”: Essays in Native American Ethnopoetics (U of Pennsylvania P. 1981); Cathy Kohler 
Riessman, Narrative Analysis (Sage 1993); Dennis Mumby, Modernism, Postmodernism, and 
Communication studies: A rereading of an ongoing debate 7.1 Communication Theory 1, 28 (1997); 
Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy, Discourse analysis: Investigating processes of social construction 
(Sage 2002); Daniele M. Klapproth, Narrative as social practice: Anglo-Western and Australian 
Aboriginal oral traditions (Mouton de Gruyter 2004). 
312 Karl Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), 7. 
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their statements in turn influence how other justices experience and understanding the 
arguments.   The more justices or judges challenge a counselor, particularly in a lopsided 
oral argument, such as Morse v. Frederick, the more they are reaffirming their own 
position, and the more they are impacting the opinions of other justices.   
Language “produce[s] a social reality that we experience as . . . real.”313  If 
certain justices or judges control the path of language through dominant questioning and 
aggressive interruptions, then those justices have played a significant role in limiting and 
framing how other justices understand a case.  In these cases, Chief Justice Roberts, and 
Justices Scalia, Stevens, Souter, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Breyer controlled the majority 
of interactions in oral argument.   These justices played a profound role in how each 
other and how the other justices understood the cases.  By limiting advocates’ responses, 
challenging certain portions of a case, and providing assistance these justices 
dramatically shaped not only how the other justices understood the case, but also how 
the American people understand the case.  Thus it is crucial for justices and judges to 
consider how their engagement in oral argument may shape the case at hand, and if a 
single justice cannot control their dominance then the Chief justice should step in to 
limit that justice’s presence in the case.   
Scholars: 
This study has attempted to call attention to the importance of oral arguments by 
noting that the justices’ rhetorical discursive interactions in oral arguments have the 
                                                 
313 Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy, Discourse analysis: Investigating processes of social construction 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002), 1, 2. 
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ability to influence a justice’s, and the Court’s decision making ability.  Integrating 
Sensemaking as a potential model of decision making emphasized the role of 
communication in human decisions and identified biased sensemaking justices through 
their rhetorical discursive interaction.  This study has offered a significant number of 
contributions to prior scholarship on the Court’s oral arguments, primarily because 
communication scholars have largely ignored the topic, and previous scholars have 
ignored communication within oral arguments.  However, scholars can expand 
significantly upon the findings within this study, and should consider other areas of 
study regarding the Court’s oral arguments.  At the beginning of this chapter, cursory 
recommendations were made to scholars as contributions were identified, but this 
section offers a broader range of suggestions that scholars should pursue.   
Where other scholars have approached the study of oral arguments from an 
analysis of final voting positions to explain how justices came to reach that decision, in 
the end reflecting the scholar’s adopted decision making model, this study has reverse 
engineered the traditional approach.  I have been more interested in learning and 
analyzing the process justices take to solve a case’s problems, and pay little attention to 
the voting position or the eventual written opinion in a case.  I decided upon this 
approach because it foregrounds the public process of oral arguments that serves as the 
only available publicly observed step in the decision making process.  The procedural 
nature of oral arguments is one reason why Sensemaking proved a helpful decision 
making model because Sensemaking emphasizes the process of decision making that can 
influence the quality of the solution rather than the final decision.  Sensemaking’s 
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concern for the communication process also enables it to serve as an ideal model to 
evaluate the justices’ oral arguments.  So where other scholars emphasize final 
decisions/voting positions to theorize a justice’s process of reaching a decision, I 
emphasize analyzing the process to understand the quality of consideration justices gave 
to their final decisions.  The unique approach taken in this study, like most forms of 
research, makes contributions to the area of Supreme Court oral arguments, but various 
fields can offer further valuable insight.   
For communication scholars, this study took a broad range approach to 
considering various forms of communication in oral arguments.  Argumentation is a 
significant area that was not considered to its fullest, but explaining a justice’s individual 
style of argumentation would be a valuable contribution to our understanding of the 
Supreme Court.  An argumentation study related to the different character of the various 
Court’s across history would also contribute to an underdeveloped area.  Ethnographers 
could study the performance of oral argument and the role playing that occurs in the 
Courtroom.  Rhetorical studies should look at the role of persuasion and advocate’s 
skillful or failing approaches to oral arguments.  Oddly, style is a topic largely ignored 
before the Court, and moot courts often do not attempt to teach advocates stylistics 
techniques to assist them in maneuvering the justices’ arguments and questions.  
Rhetoricians may also be valuable in analyzing the hypotheticals justices advance and 
could offer suggestions for how advocates ought to respond to them.  I have long 
thought that a justice’s hypothetical is often not well thought out or pertinent to the 
argument at hand, and rhetorical scholars could easily identify the useless or useful 
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nature of hypotheticals in oral arguments.  Rhetoricians’ concern for symbols also makes 
them a prime resource for considering the symbolic interaction within the Court’s 
architecture and artwork.  As a building the Court is richly symbolic and contains 
numerous layers of meaning.  For example, at first glance the building appears as a 
replica of a Greek temple, but with a bit of research scholars will uncover that it is 
modeled after the La Madeline in Paris, a favorite building of architect Cass Gilbert, and 
the La Madeline was modeled after the Pantheon.  Even the Court’s veranda tiles match 
La Madeleine’s tiles.  For rhetoricians, a state building that is to be separate from 
church/religion but is modeled after a Catholic Church that is modeled after the Greek 
Pantheon (in Greek Pantheon means “Every god”), makes a densely complex symbolic 
object that invites analysis.   
While rhetoricians may emphasize the symbolic nature of the Court, discourse 
analysts can better emphasize the interactional nature of the justices’ arguments by 
studying the layers of meaning bound within advocates’ and justices’ iterations.  The 
Court’s interactions are richly complex and this study did not have the space to unpack 
the meaning surrounding actor’s statements.  Discourse analysts could also provide 
superior transcripts and a comparison with the Court’s transcripts may yield an 
interesting understanding of what the Court’s transcripts are failing to capture.  Only 
recently did the transcripts begin identifying justices and laughter tags in the transcripts, 
and discourse analysts could make suggestions for other discursive qualities that the 
Court could easily integrate into their transcripts.  A study of listening behavior and the 
importance of listening would also be a welcome contribution from discourse analysts, 
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particularly because oral arguments can be a difficult environment to listen and gather 
information. 
Finally, and most complicated of all the issues, is considering sensemaking’s role 
upon rhetorical and argumentation theory.  Rhetorical and argumentation theory suggest 
that, when in an argument or debate, a person advancing a position will be met by an 
opponent resisting that position and potentially advancing a separate position.  Under 
rhetoric and argumentation the goal is to persuade your opponent to take up your 
position by seeing the error of their own position; however, in debates or arguments, 
capitulation or admittance of an error rarely occurs.  Instead, arguers typically become 
more firmly entrenched in their positions.  In many ways, Sensemaking turns rhetorical 
theory and argumentation on its head, because it suggests that vigorous argument or 
persuasion may result in the speaker forming a cognitive bias to his or her own argument 
and position.  Systematic and logical consideration become emotional attachments, and 
rhetoric and argumentation become less about persuading or changing an opponent’s 
mind, and more about reinforcing ideas, either in yourself or your opponent.  This 
perspective of rhetoric and argumentation counters the bulk of traditional scholarship 
dating back to Aristotle.  Because this research is not designed to respond to this 
problem, it seems a pertinent and valuable area that rhetorical and argumentation 
scholars should address. 
For scholars in political science and psychology, my suggestions may be a bit 
more rudimentary because I am not as familiar with your fields as I am with 
communication.  However, I believe my findings may still offer questions that your 
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fields may address.  For political scientists and psychologists, a consideration and 
engagement of the communicative interactions in oral arguments may offer further 
evidence of the decision making theories that you propose to interpret the Court’s 
behavior.  An analysis of a single case could also serve as a means of overturning 
competitive theories that do not explain the Court’s behavior in that oral argument.  As 
you know, outliers always make for interesting case studies, and no single case offers 
identical levels or types of communicative interaction which could offer new findings in 
your fields.  Psychological explanation for the justices’ utterances would also be an 
entertaining and fascinating study.  Political scientists and psychologists have long 
offered decision making and personality determinations of presidents, but none have 
been offered on Supreme Court justices.  In many ways the justices’ perspectives are 
more public and accessible than presidents’ remarks, and should offer a bulk of 
examples that could lead researchers to an accurate assessment; discussions with former 
clerks may also add additional insight.  Finally, in regards to sensemaking behavior, 
longitudinal studies of the justices’ sensemaking behavior could be very helpful in 
understanding the frequency at which justices act as sensemakers and identifying the 
individual justices who commonly reflect sensemaking behavior. 
Conclusion: Pragmatic Idealism 
At midnight, standing in line for admittance to the Court’s oral arguments is an 
experience.  Depending upon the case, you may be one of the first in line, though some 
cases require observers to arrive days in advance.  The Court always reserves seats for 
the public and this open policy attracts a wide swath of America. Among those in line 
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are law students, tourists, special interest groups, lawyers, the homeless, housewives, 
and high school students.  As a group we stand waiting to be ushered through the bronze 
doors of the marble temple, and into the courtroom where images of angels and great 
lawgivers surround us.  We gaze at depictions of the innocent and wicked judged by 
ethereal figures.  The Court’s symbol, a turtle, reminds us of the slow and deliberate 
pace of Justice.  Within this sacred legal temple, it is difficult to imagine that this court 
receives petitions from prisoners scrawled on toilet paper, as well as amicus curiae from 
the President, or that the Court’s words may grant both freedom and death to America’s 
citizens.  The Supreme Court stands as a place where, emblazoned above the entry, 
“Equal Justice Under Law,” promises Justice to Americans , because “Justice,” as the 
Court’s West entrance declares, is the “Guardian of Liberty.”  And, while we should not 
forget, we often lose sight that it is for liberty that our judiciary exists.  The Court 
remains an ideal, reminding both our citizenry and our legal community that Justice 
should always be the primary purpose. 
The Court’s “legitimacy is in the Constitution, but their power rests on the public 
faith in their independence and impartiality.”314  The Court’s power results from the 
belief and faith of the American people and compliance to its orders relies on the Court’s 
rhetorical authority.  The Supreme Court occupies a strange place in American 
government because it lacks any self-executing power to enforce its orders.  Whereas 
Congress and the President may command troops or control the flow of money as a 
means of enforcing policies, the Supreme Court lacks any similar ability.  The Court’s 
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“rulings are not self executing.  The Court depends on other political institutions and on 
public opinion to carry out its decisions.”315  This dependence on other institutions relies 
on the belief and assent of Americans within those institutions.  If Americans lack faith 
in the Court’s decision, then the Court’s orders may be ignored, and because the Court 
interprets principles from the scared document of the Constitution, justices’ rulings may 
clash with popular culture.  Yet the Court’s rhetorical authority must be applied 
judiciously by understanding the American people as its audience and the republic as its 
social context.  The Court’s rhetorical authority can be ignored if its message lacks 
persuasiveness, as was the case in its prominent Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 
decision, which required a second Brown II, and a third case to bring schools in line with 
the Court’s orders.316 
The Court must carefully consider how to balance their rhetorical authority 
considering whether or not various political institutions will be persuaded by their 
rhetorical authority to support the Court’s orders because just as the Court relies on the 
people of the United States to carry out its rulings, “those [same] forces may also curb 
the Court.”317  The beauty in the Court’s rhetorical authority lies in its rhetorical ability 
to strategically understand the American context and rely on persuasion to gain 
compliance. 318   The Court must act rhetorically to persuade the American populace to 
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obey its orders.  The Court’s power, which flows from giving meaning to the 
Constitution, truly rests, in Chief Justice Edward White’s words, ‘solely upon the 
approval of a free people.’”319  The relationship between the American people and the 
Supreme Court relies on the Court’s ability to persuade the American people, and the 
freedom of the American people to obey or disregard the Court.  It is the American 
people, as believers, who give the Court its power; their faith and assent in the Court 
validates its existence as an institution. 
However, if the American people begin to question the Court’s decisions or even 
the Court’s process in making decisions, then the Court’s credibility starts to slowly 
erode.  Without credibility the Court cannot persuade or function effectively.  The 
findings in this study suggest that the justices may not be approaching oral argument as 
effectively as possible and thus their decisions may be flawed as a result of their 
interactions in oral argument, impeding justice.  If you believe, as this study has shown, 
that the justices’ interaction can impact advocates’ arguments, and in turn the justices’ 
decision making ability, then we can agree that oral arguments are important to the 
decision making process, and should thus be conducted in a manner that enables 
balanced consideration of both parties.  Moreover the justices’ current behavior in oral 
arguments may call some to question the Court’s credibility.   
The justices on the bench right now have all been lawyers and spent a significant 
portion of their life arguing cases, but argument is a task separate from judgment.  
Argument entails attempting to persuade a person of a position, often times by refuting 
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certain areas of their argument.  Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Souter, 
Stevens, Kennedy and Breyer all spent a significant amount of time challenging and 
assisting advocates’ arguments in this study.  Their behavior was less in accordance with 
that of a judge, and more in accordance with that of an advocate or lawyer.  But it 
appears entirely unfair and unjust for a judge to be an advocate, rather than an unbiased 
participant who weighs and considers arguments from both parties before making a 
decision.  Their preferential treatment stands in opposition to the oath taken when 
entering office:  
“I, XXX XXX, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice 
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that 
I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent 
upon me as XXX under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help 
me God.320  
 
To prevent biased rhetorical discourse, justices should be mindful of where they stand 
when entering cases, and, while participating in oral argument, justices should consider 
how their views may be influencing colleagues.  Most importantly, the justices’ biased 
rhetorical discursive behavior obstructs and impedes justice.  The impediment to justice 
results from failing to understand the role of argumentation.  As an art form and 
pragmatic approach to problem solving, argumentation requires participants to be 
listeners and respect one another, yet the justices do not typically behave as listeners or 
hold much respect for the advocates’ or fellow justices’ arguments. 
Argumentation is an art form dedicated to resolving issues and achieving 
solutions to problems, but in order to reach a just solution, the process of argumentation 
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requires a level of respect and consideration for participants that the justices do not 
always embrace.  “Argumentation is an instrument of communication to the extent that it 
functions as a social dialogue in which people articulate their differences, open 
themselves up to the ideas of others, critically investigate each argument offered, and 
work cooperatively to find answers or solutions.”321  In oral arguments, the justices do 
not appear to “open themselves up to the ideas of others,” and rather appear as if they are 
more willing to dismantle others’ ideas.  Oral argument serves more as a strategic battle 
or struggle than a careful examination, which in turn compromises the Court’s decisions.   
Effective argumentation requires “that by listening to someone we display a 
willingness to eventually accept his point of view,” and “participants must not try to 
silence each other to prevent the exchange of arguments and criticism.”322  Instead of 
viewing oral arguments as a verbal contest, justices should recognize that it can become 
“a collaboration or constructive working out of disagreements by verbal interactions in 
order resolve a conflict of opinions,” may ensure a deeper consideration of a case’s 
issues.323    The goal or purpose of oral argument should not be that “one person’s views 
should dominate, but that all members of the community should be allowed to contribute 
and reason together collaboratively” towards a just resolution.324  The justices’ current 
mode of rhetorical discursive interaction prevents a wholeness in understanding, and 
where “the great value of argumentation” lies in providing “a reliable means of arriving 
                                                 
321 Ridyacki and Ridyacki, Argumentation, 14. 
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at the probable truth,” or solution to the problem, the justices’ interactions reflect a 
larger struggle for control of the issues that should be considered, impeding and 
obstructing the course of justice.325 
If one doubts the obstructionist nature of the justices’ interactions, then consider 
the comments described earlier by some of the justices who have stated that the justices’ 
back and forth questioning in oral argument impacts an advocate’s presentation of their 
case.  Justices Stevens and Alito have lamented that some of their colleagues’ active 
involvement obstructs them from asking questions in a case and prevents lawyers from 
advancing arguments.  “‘I really would like to hear what those reasons are without 
interruption from all of my colleagues,’ Justice John Paul Stevens said at an argument in 
the fall. One of the newest justices, Samuel Alito, has said he initially found it hard to 
get a question in sometimes amid all the former law professors on the court.”326  Of all 
the justices, the justice who disrupts advocates and justices the least is Justice Thomas.  
The only justice not critiqued in this study has been Justice Thomas because his behavior 
never attempted to shape advocates’ arguments or his colleagues’ consideration of the 
cases; more than any of his colleagues, his behavior more closely reflected a just and 
balanced consideration of the issues.  
In the three cases examined in this study, Justice Thomas did not utter a word.  In 
fact over four years have passed and more than 300 cases have been argued before the 
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Supreme Court since Justice Clarence Thomas last uttered a word in oral arguments.  
According to Thomas, he last spoke on February 22, 2006 during oral arguments for 
Bowles v. South Carolina.327  Critics have harped that Thomas’ silence suggests a lack 
of involvement in cases, but Thomas attributes his silence to the belief “that if someone 
is talking, somebody should be listening.”328  His approach clearly offers a different 
perspective from Justice Scalia.  Since Justice Thomas’ book release, he has been more 
critical about the other justices’ frequent questioning in oral argument, proffering that his 
“colleagues should shut up.”329  At the very least, this research has offered findings that 
displayed the active presence of Justices, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, Kennedy, Breyer, 
Ginsburg, and Chief Justice Roberts in oral arguments.  Justice Scalia has developed a 
notorious reputation for his sometimes bombastic and overly pugnacious presence in oral 
arguments.  His behavior captured in this study reflects his biased aggressive approach 
that he brings to oral arguments.  Clearly justices approach oral argument with different 
purposes in mind; whether that may be listening to a lawyer’s arguments, asking a 
lawyer to clarify a question, or challenging a lawyer’s argument, a justice’s involvement 
may vary case by case.  But a justice’s behavior should reflect a measured consideration 
of the issues; their title reflects their responsibility.   
Does Justice Thomas’ silence in oral argument lend itself to a more informed 
perspective?  Is his silence ideal for considering and reflecting on issues?  If a justice 
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focuses on listening and reflecting upon arguments rather than attempting to refute a 
lawyer’s argument, then it seems the quiet justice could have a real advantage in 
grasping the complexities of a case.  The silent justice also allows colleagues to speak 
without interrupting and ask questions without diverting inquiry.  To an advocate, the 
silent justice is neither necessarily beneficial, but nor does he serve as a detriment to 
arguments either.  Justice Scalia suggests that “a good counsel welcomes questions,” but 
undoubtedly many advocates would prefer if Justice Scalia kept his interaction to a 
minimum.330   
However, regardless of their silent or active involvement, judicial behavior plays 
an important role in oral argument.  The information and arguments that lawyers present 
to justices depend on the former’s ability to answer a question or follow a line of 
reasoning without interruption.  Similarly, justices’ ability to ask a question relies on an 
environment in which they are permitted the opportunity to inquire about a topic.  More 
active justices control the flow of information through the direction of questioning, while 
less active justices must either patiently wait for an opportunity to engage a lawyer, 
aggressively interrupt a previous line of questioning, or lose the opportunity to have their 
question answered.  Although Justice Thomas did not participate in this study’s oral 
arguments, his behavior was less biased and detrimental than that of his fellow justices.  
In all three cases, he provided lawyers with the opportunity to advance their arguments, 
and he provided his fellow justices with the opportunity to resolve potential questions.  
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His approach to oral arguments appears more reflective of judicial principles than 
Justices Scalia’s, Breyer’s, Souter’s, Stevens’, Ginsburg’s, and Chief Justice Roberts’ 
biased rhetorical discursive behavior.   
Critics of Justice Thomas complain that his silence in oral arguments is 
indicative of his lack of attention or indifference to the case.  As an observer at oral 
argument, I can understand why critics jump to this conclusion.  He regularly leans back 
in his chair, covering his eyes for a few minutes, or he leans forward with his hand on 
his forehead shielding his eyes.  He also frequently turns to Justice Breyer on his left or 
Justice Scalia to his right and speaks without directly listening to the arguments.  But I 
also have observed him intensely rifling through counsels’ briefs, pointing out sections 
to Justices Breyer and Scalia, and quietly arguing legal points.331  What critics have 
perceived as indifference, are more likely moments of intense reflection and careful 
listening.  In these moments of intense listening, Thomas assumes an indifferent posture, 
typically followed by a frenetic reaction to a lawyer’s argument, causing Thomas to 
request materials, thumb through briefs, or argue quietly with Justices Breyer or Scalia.  
During my weeks of observation, Justice Thomas’ behavior appeared more indicative of 
careful reflection than bored indifference.   
In comparison to the rhetorical discursive interactions of his colleagues, Justice 
Thomas’ behavior more closely reflects how justices should act.  Justice Thomas has 
pointed out that he thinks his colleagues should “‘ask questions.  But I don’t think that 
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for judging, and for what we are doing, all those questions are necessary.’”332  His 
comment suggests that justices should limit their questions to those essential to the case, 
because “once the cases get to the Supreme Court, there are no surprises left” no new 
discoveries for the Court to make; as Justice Thomas puts it “‘this is not Perry 
Mason.’”333  Justice Thomas recognizes that each justice has his or her own particular 
approach to oral argument, some justices “like to talk about it” other justices “enjoy the 
questioning and the back and forth,” and other justices “think that if they listen deeply 
and hear the people who are presenting their arguments, they might hear something 
that’s not already in several hundred pages of record.”334 
Justice Thomas’ approach to oral arguments may not be ideal for all the justices, 
and it seems reasonable that each justice has their own particular approach to oral 
arguments.  Even top advocates have mentioned their appreciation for questions by the 
justices, and while Justice Thomas may not represent the ideal audience for these 
advocates, his silence suggests a form of respect for the advocates, and their arguments, 
a respect that the other justices do not always provide to advocates.  In noting Justice 
Thomas’ silence, I am not suggesting his lack of questioning is the preferred method of 
oral arguments, but rather that his interaction in oral argument does not hinder an 
advocate’s ability to advance an argument, or negatively influence how his colleagues 
understand a case.  When comparing Justice Thomas’ silence to the aggressive 
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pugnacious style of Justice Scalia’s biased questioning or softball arguments, it is easy to 
see which justice has the greater potential for committing injustice. For all of Justice 
Thomas’ silence, he does not stand in the way, nor force upon others his view of justice. 
“When the Supreme Court speaks, by and large people obey.  And that unspoken 
contract is one of the hidden keys to our freedom.  If the Court ever stopped defending 
the Constitution or the people ever stopped listening, then one of the treasures that keeps 
this nation the freest nation in the world, would cease to exist.”335  The justices owe the 
Court as an institution, and the American people an improved approach to a currently 
misguided process of oral arguments.  The American people trust that the Court presents 
“a willingness to protect the unpopular to stand against the temporary political tide, a 
concern for principles beyond today’s politics.  People want to know that there is some 
institution that’s taking a long view.”336  The Court cannot be caught in the biased 
partisanship that dominates politics, because that partisan mentality and behavior may 
destroy the Court’s legitimacy.  The Court’s most public act and ritual, oral argument, 
should reflect the measured and balanced principles of justice.  “Most people are willing 
to accept the fact that the Court tries to play it straight.  That acceptance has been built 
up by the proceeding hundred justices of this Court going back to the beginning. We are 
in fact trading on the good faith and the conscientiousness of the justices who went 
before us.  The power of the Court is the power of trust earned, the trust of the American 
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people,” and the Supreme Court must remain ever vigilant in its pursuit of Justice to 
maintain our trust.337     
                                                 
337 Justice Souter in the Supreme Court Video. 
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